Opinion
No. 1880 C.D. 2014
03-25-2015
Hollidaysburg Area School District, Appellant v. AFSCME Council 83
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Hollidaysburg Area School District (District) appeals the September 19, 2014 order of the Blair County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court) denying the District's petition to vacate a May 28, 2014 arbitration award because the Trial Court concluded that the Arbitrator's award was rationally derived from the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the District and AFSCME Council 83 (Union). We affirm.
On January 22, 2014, the District terminated Kim Wilt's (Grievant) employment as a special education paraprofessional. (Arbitrator Opinion & Award (Arbitrator O&A) at 2-3, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 81a-82a.) Grievant began working for the District as a special education paraprofessional in 2002. (Arbitrator's O&A at 7, R.R. at 86a.) In 2007, Grievant received her real estate license and, with permission from her principal and assistant principal, Grievant placed her business cards in the staff members' mailboxes and a poster in the staff break-room advertising her realtor services. (Id.) In the 2010-2011 school year, Grievant sustained a work-related ankle injury. (Id.) Grievant returned to work in the 2011-2012 school year with restrictions. (Id.)
In the 2013-2014 school year, Grievant was reassigned from her position in the high school, which did fit her work restrictions, to two positions that did not, and in October 2013 Grievant was placed on medical leave of absence and began pursuing a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. (Id.) While on medical leave, Grievant continued to work and receive income from her real estate business. (Id.) Subsequently, although still on medical leave, Grievant was asked to attend a meeting with the District to discuss her real estate work. (Id.)
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
Following her meeting with the District, Grievant was terminated for violating Article 10.C(6) of the CBA for receiving income from her real estate work while on medical leave from her position with the District. (Arbitrator's O&A at 7, R.R. at 86a) Article 10 of the CBA addresses issues of Probation and Seniority. (CBA, Article 10, R.R. at 39a.) Section C of Article 10 lists a series of actions that will cause an employee to lose seniority. (Id., Article 10.C(1)-(8), R.R. at 40a-41a.) Section C and Subsection 6 of Article 10 of the CBA state:
C: An employee's continuous service shall be broken so that no prior period or periods of employment shall be counted and his/her rights to seniority shall cease upon the following:(Id., Article 10.C(6), R.R. at 40a (emphasis added).)
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6. Working elsewhere for monetary gain while on approved leave of absence.
On February 3, 2014, the Union filed a grievance on Grievant's behalf. (Arbitrator O&A at 3, R.R. at 82a.) On April 21, 2014, a hearing was held before Arbitrator Marc A. Winters. (Hearing Transcript, R.R. at 14a-24a.) On May 28, 2014, the Arbitrator issued an opinion and award reinstating Grievant "to her former position with all rights and privileges, including no break in seniority," and ordering that Grievant was "to be made whole for all loss of earnings dating back to January 23, 2014." (Arbitrator O&A at 9, R.R. at 88a.)
In arriving at the award, the Arbitrator determined that the language in Article 10.C(6) of the CBA was a term and condition of employment negotiated by the parties and that the District was within its rights to terminate the employment of an employee who violated this provision. (Arbitrator A&O at 7, R.R. at 86a.) The Arbitrator examined the language and concluded that an ambiguity existed as to whether the language prohibited all outside work while on leave or whether it was directed at outside work begun after an employee was placed on leave. (Id. at 8, R.R. at 87a.) Applying this question to the facts at hand, the Arbitrator determined that the issue was whether the Grievant was able to continue her real estate work without violating the CBA because it was begun prior to her approved medical leave. (Id.) The Arbitrator examined the parties' actions and determined that the District had knowledge of Grievant's real estate work and failed to advise Grievant that she must cease these activities while on leave under its interpretation of the CBA and that Grievant was open about her continued real estate work while on leave. (Id.) These facts led the Arbitrator to conclude that the language in the CBA referred to work obtained for monetary gain after being placed on an approved leave rather than to work for monetary gain that was done concurrently with District employment and continued while on approved leave from the District. (Id. at 9, R.R. at 88a.)
The District filed a petition to vacate the Arbitrator's award in the Trial Court, which the Trial Court denied and dismissed in a September 19, 2014 order and opinion. (Trial Court Opinion, R.R. at 123a-133a.) The Trial Court held that "the Arbitrator's decision as a whole is based on the Arbitrator's interpretation of the pertinent collective bargaining agreement language," and that although the Trial Court believed the Arbitrator made factual findings that "are irrelevant to the interpretation of the contract," the Arbitrator's interpretation was rationally derived from the CBA. (Trial Court Opinion at 8, 9, R.R. at 144a, 145a.) The District appealed the Trial Court's order to this Court.
The proper standard for judicial review of a grievance arbitration award is circumscribed, deferential, and known as the "essence test." The essence test provides a two-pronged approach where the reviewing court shall: (1) determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the CBA; and (2) determine if the arbitrator's award can be rationally derived from the CBA. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association (PSEA-NEA), 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2007). If both prongs of the essence test are satisfied, the arbitrator's award must be affirmed, which is to say that "a court will only vacate an arbitrator's award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from the [CBA]." State System of Higher Education (Cheney University) v. State College and University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999) (Cheney).
Neither party disputes that the first prong of the essence test has been satisfied. However, the District argues that the Arbitrator's award fails the second prong of the essence test. The District contends that the Arbitrator created an ambiguity where none existed and that the language of Article 10.C(6) prohibiting "[w]orking elsewhere for monetary gain while on approved leave of absence," clearly bans all employment during an approved leave of absence. The District argues that because the language is not ambiguous, the Arbitrator erred by going outside the bounds of the CBA to examine the conduct of the parties. The Union argues that the Arbitrator's award is rationally derived from the CBA. The Union contends that the Arbitrator did not err by interpreting the language of the CBA in the context of the factual situation presented.
The Union also argues that the parties stipulated that the ultimate issue was whether Grievant's alleged violation of Article 10.C(6) constituted "just cause" to terminate Grievant's employment. Because of our resolution of this matter, we find it unnecessary to address this argument. --------
Under the second prong of the essence test, this Court may not inquire into whether the arbitrator's award was reasonable, but only whether the award was rationally derived from the CBA when "viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention." Cheney, 743 A.2d at 411. When discerning the intent of the parties, an arbitrator is not confined to the express terms of the CBA and may consider, among other factors, the actions of the parties as evidence of their interpretation of the terms of the CBA. Danville Area School District v. Danville Area Education Association, PSEA/NEA, 754 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. 2000) (holding that an arbitrator's use of past practice to determine the intent of the parties and fashioning an award in accordance with that intent satisfied the essence test). The arbitrator is not a trial judge, bound by the common law and blind "to all save the express terms of the contract." Penns Manor Area School District v. Penns Manor Area Educational Support Personnel Association, 953 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). An arbitrator "has great latitude to decide what the language of a CBA means and may use extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties' intended it to mean, [but] that does not imply that an arbitrator has the unfettered discretion to make an interpretation based on some notion, unsupported by evidence or the language of the contract, as to what the parties meant." Allegheny Valley School District v Allegheny County Education Association, 943 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). If an arbitrator ignores the plain language of the CBA, the arbitrator's award cannot be said to rationally flow from the CBA, and it will be vacated under the essence test. Greater Nanticoke Area School District v. Greater Nanticoke Area Education Association, 760 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
In the instant matter, the Arbitrator did not ignore the express terms of the CBA. Instead, the Arbitrator determined that the express terms of the CBA failed to resolve the issue of whether an employee on an approved leave of absence was prohibited from continuing to work elsewhere for monetary gain. As a result, the Arbitrator looked at the language of the CBA, the interpretations of this language advanced by the parties, and the factual background presented. The Arbitrator concluded that the actions of the parties must be viewed as an indication of their intention in bargaining for Section 10.C(6) of the CBA and that Grievant's actions conformed to her stated interpretation of the CBA while the District's actions did not conform to its stated interpretation of the CBA. Based on both the language of the CBA and extrinsic evidence, the Arbitrator determined that the language of Article 10.C(6) of the CBA must be interpreted as intending "to mean work obtained for monetary gain after being placed on an approved leave," and fashioned an award accordingly. (Arbitrator O&A at 9, R.R. at 88a.) The Arbitrator's award is rationally derived from the CBA and cannot be said to violate the second prong of the essence test.
Accordingly, the order of the Trial Court is affirmed.
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2015, the order of the Blair County Court of Common Pleas in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge