Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Greyhound Corporation v. Dewey

    240 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1957)   Cited 19 times

    See also Rottman v. Beverlee, 1935, 183 La.947, 165 So. 153. And see also Cooper v. Kennard, La. App. 1939, 192 So. 534; Dyck v. Maddry, La.App. 1955, 81 So.2d 165; Hollins v. Crawford, La.App. 1942, 11 So.2d 641; Baquie v. Meraux, 1929, 11 La.App. 368, 123 So. 338; Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., La.App. 1949, 38 So.2d 235; Hanson v. Great American Indemnity Co., La.App. 1947, 33 So.2d 549; and Culpepper v. Leonard Truck Lines, 1945, 208 La. 1084, 24 So.2d 148. Under these decisions, issues of fact were clearly developed and the findings of the jury thereon have the support of the trial judge who observed the witnesses as they testified and refused to set the verdict aside or to enter judgment contrary to it.

  2. Evans v. Atlantic Refining Company

    150 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. La. 1957)   Cited 1 times

    His violation of the statute was negligence per se, and it was the proximate cause of the accident. Holliday v. Hartford Acc. Indemnity Co., La.App., 38 So.2d 235; Hanson v. Great Am. Indemnity Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 549. On the question of quantum, it appears that the plaintiff, Lucille Lewis, suffered the following injuries: concussion of the brain; severe shock; extensive lacerations and deep cuts across both eyelids, over right side of upper lip and left side of chin, center of the forehead and completely across the right knee cap; comminuted fracture of the distal end of the right radius with the fracture lines extending into the articular surface of the radius with slight displacement of the fragments together with slight impaction; extensive comminuted fracture of the lower third of the femur, both supra-condylar and inter-condylar with anterior angulation at the fracture site and some impaction.

  3. Small v. Lyons

    198 So. 2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 6 times

    The provision of the statute to which we have referred governs the situation. Frey v. Central Mutual Insurance Company (La.App.) 150 So.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1963 — cert. refused); Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. (La.App.) 38 So.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1949). Remaining for consideration is the matter of the awards to which plaintiff is entitled.

  4. Landrum v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co.

    151 So. 2d 701 (La. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 11 times

    The court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur reasoning that a prima facie case of negligence was established where defendant did not testify that the emergency brake was still set or the transmission lever still in high gear after the accident. In the case of Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, 38 So.2d 235 (La.App. 2 Cir., 1949) the court found defendant guilty of negligence per se in violating the statutory rule of the road against leaving an unattended vehicle on any grade without setting the brakes and turning the front wheels to the curb (Act 286 of 1938, Sec. 3, Rule 15(e)) and noted that it was dangerous to park a vehicle on an incline and leave it unattended without setting the brake. Many similar cases from the appellate courts of our sister states are found cited in the annotation in 16 A.L.R.2d 979-1014.

  5. Crawley v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.

    107 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 1 times

    It is also clear that Mrs. Crawley was attempting a passing movement at a street intersection in violation of the provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:233, subd. E, which prohibit the driver of a vehicle from overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of a highway. In Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., La. App., 38 So.2d 235, 238, the provisions of the Highway Regulatory Act were held applicable to city streets. Moreover, plaintiff's act, in attempting a passing movement, was also in violation of the provisions of a city ordinance providing that such movement shall not be attempted or made within 75 feet of a street intersection.

  6. Thompson v. Ferrara

    96 So. 2d 113 (La. Ct. App. 1957)

    "'Highway' includes every way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel." Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., La.App. 1949, 38 So.2d 235; Parker v. Home Indemnity Co. of New York, La.App. 1949, 41 So.2d 783. We are fully cognizant of the fact that the violation of a traffic regulation will not be regarded as actionable negligence if it is without causal connection to the accident but, here, we entertain no doubt that the overtaking and attempted passing of the defendant's vehicle in the intersection by the plaintiff was at least, a factor which contributed to the accident.

  7. Fernandez v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.

    76 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 1955)   Cited 3 times

    We agree this is a correct postulation provided the negligence of defendant was a proximate cause of the accident, but in view of our finding herein which wholly absolves McKinley from any act of negligence the contention must be rejected. Counsel has cited for our attention for the purpose for disclosing actionable negligence against the driver of the truck, the following cases which we have carefully reviewed but do not find controlling under the facts and circumstances presented herein: Rea v. Dow Motor Co., La. App. 1948, 36 So.2d 750; Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, La. App. 1949, 38 So.2d 235; Dodge v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 1949, 214 La. 1031, 39 So.2d 720; Lynch v. Fisher, La. App. 1949, 41 So.2d 692; Capitol Transport Co., Inc., v. A. R. Blossman, Inc., 1951, 218 La. 1086, 51 So.2d 795; Lovelace v. Gowan, La. App. 1951, 52 So.2d 97; Simms v. Lawrence Bros., La. App. 1954, 72 So.2d 538. The above cases are distinguishable on various grounds, such as: atmospheric conditions, the fact the accident occurred in a place not so illuminated as to excuse the use of lights and flares, or because the vehicle was of such a construction or so parked as not to be visible under ordinary conditions.

  8. Parker v. Home Indemnity Co. of New York

    41 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 18 times
    In Parker v. Home Indemnity Company of New York, supra [41 So.2d 788], plaintiff, who was riding a motorcycle attempted to pass defendant's automobile as it attempted a lefthand turn in order to enter the intersecting street.

    With reference to the provisions of Rule 7(e) of Section 3 of Act No. 286 of 1938, prohibiting passing at highway intersections, counsel for plaintiff contends that the same is not applicable to the streets of a city, being intended only as a safeguard for traffic at highway intersections. This point has been recently considered by this Court in Holliday v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., La. App., 38 So.2d 235, 238, and the opinion of Judge Taliaferro disposed of the issue in these words: "Defendant argues that the street on which the accident happened has not been shown to be a highway or part of a highway within the purview of the quoted rule.