Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners

12 Citing cases

  1. VanKirk v. Cent. Cmty. Coll.

    285 Neb. 231 (Neb. 2013)   Cited 7 times

    ” Hollandsworth did not hold or suggest that a waiting-time penalty is required for delinquent payments of medical expenses. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000).Id. at 760, 619 N.W.2d at 582.

  2. Russell v. Stricker

    635 N.W.2d 734 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    Plain error exists where there is an error, plainly evident from the record but not complained of at trial, which prejudicially affects a substantial right of a litigant and is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). We addressed the issue of plain error in the context of § 25-21,185.

  3. Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich

    622 N.W.2d 663 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 19 times

    SCOPE OF REVIEW Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Cum. Supp. 2000), an appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). Upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the trial judge of the compensation court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

  4. Dragon v. Cheesecake Factory

    300 Neb. 548 (Neb. 2018)   Cited 7 times

    We have said that to avoid waiting-time penalties under 48-125, an employer must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation.Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003), disapproved on other grounds,Kimminau v. Uribe Refuse Ser. , 270 Neb. 682, 707 N.W.2d 229 (2005) ; Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). See Armstrong, supra note 4; Dawes, supra note 34.

  5. Holdsworth v. Cooperative

    286 Neb. 49 (Neb. 2013)   Cited 40 times
    Holding parties could not "by private agreement" deprive workers’ compensation court of jurisdiction

    Thus, it is important to discourage unnecessary delay in the payment of a court-approved settlement agreement.Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). Id.

  6. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting Painting

    266 Neb. 526 (Neb. 2003)   Cited 67 times
    In Dawes, one of the issues presented to this court was whether the Workers' Compensation Court had erred in directing the claimant's employer to directly reimburse the claimant's health insurance carrier for medical and hospital expenses paid by the insurer on the claimant's behalf.

    The penalty statute is to encourage prompt payment of benefits. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). In summary, the mandate for prompt payment of benefits requires that employees and insurers promptly handle and decide claims.

  7. Chadd v. Lower Platte South Natural Resources District

    621 N.W.2d 299 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 6 times
    Concerning landowner's objection to withdrawal and transfer of ground water from his property, where ground water was being transferred away from overlying land to neighbor's property, and landowner argued there was significant adverse effect upon him

    In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000); Vopalka v. Abraham, 260 Neb. 737, 619 N.W.2d 594 (2000). At the outset, we find it helpful to engage in a brief discussion of Nebraska's common law regarding the transfer of water off overlying land as such discussion will give some background relative to the Legislature's intent when it enacted § 46-691 in 1995.

  8. Tilt-Up Concrete, Inc. v. Star City/Federal, Inc.

    261 Neb. 64 (Neb. 2001)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that because contractor received "all of the benefits to which this court determined it was entitled" under Act, contractor could not state claim for damages under § 52-157

    Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Neb., 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000); Armour v. L.H., 259 Neb. 138, 608 N.W.2d 599 (2000). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000); Gage Cty. Bd. v. Nebraska Tax Equal. Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 750, 619 N.W.2d 451 (2000).

  9. Rice v. Sykes Enters., Inc.

    No. A-17-496 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018)

    (b) Fifty percent shall be added for waiting time for all delinquent payments after thirty days' notice has been given of disability or after thirty days from the entry of a final order, award, or judgment of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court . . . . In Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that § 48-125 is applicable to orders approving lump-sum settlements. In this case, the order approving the parties' settlement agreement was entered on January 26, 2016.

  10. Harris v. Iowa Tanklines, Inc.

    825 N.W.2d 457 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    (Emphasis supplied.) In Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that § 48–125 is applicable to orders approving lump-sum settlements. In the present case, Commerce & Industry issued the settlement check on the 30th day after the compensation court's approval of the settlement and directed UPS to deliver the check to Iowa Tanklines' counsel, who then effectuated delivery to Harris'counsel on the 31st day. Iowa Tanklines and Commerce & Industry argue that delivery of the check started within the 30–day period when the check was given to UPS for eventual delivery by Iowa Tanklines' counsel to Harris' counsel. They argue that Iowa Tanklines' counsel, as an agent of Iowa Tanklines, was a “link in the chain of delivery sent into motion” on the 30th day. Iowa Tanklines and Commerce & Industry also point out that no delay in delivery occurred, because Harris received his settlement check on the same day he would have had it been sent by Commerce & Industry directly to him.