Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-1696
06-04-2021
Robert HOLLAND, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., Appellee-Defendant.
Appellant Pro Se: Robert Mik-El El Farooq III, f/k/a Robert Holland III, Gary, Indiana Attorney for Appellee: David J. Beach, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, Indiana
Appellant Pro Se: Robert Mik-El El Farooq III, f/k/a Robert Holland III, Gary, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: David J. Beach, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, Indiana
Weissmann, Judge.
[1] For five years, Robert McLee Holland has attempted to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered in falls at the entrance to the Indiana University Northwest Library. Despite his training as a lawyer, Holland's path has been littered with nonsensical pleadings and refusals to comply with procedural requirements and court orders. Showing admirable patience, the trial court first struck his pleadings, then imposed sanctions, and ultimately, dismissed his claims. Holland's previous appeals in this matter also ended with dismissal.
Holland was suspended from the practice of law in Indiana in 2013 and has never been reinstated.
[2] Undeterred, Holland continued his quest for relief on the same claims both in the trial court and now in this appeal. We conclude that Holland's latest appellate escapade is frivolous and in violation of this Court's earlier order dismissing part of his claims and limiting the scope of the surviving issues. We dismiss this appeal as to all but one issue and conclude res judicata bars that claim. Finally, given Holland's continuing obdurate conduct, repetitive and frivolous filings, and flagrant disregard of court orders, we grant Indiana University's request for sanctions in part.
Facts
[3] The tortuous history of this case began in 2016 when Holland filed a complaint against Indiana University (IU) for injuries he received in falls outside the IU Northwest Library. In late 2018, Holland filed an "Affidavit of the Defendants (sic) Lack of Sovereignty and Immunity and Request for Declaratory Judgment." Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 10-14. In that motion, Holland alleged that because IU operates retail establishments on its campus, IU is a corporation under federal law and can never claim sovereign immunity under state law. Id. at 12. His only support for that proposition was Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States , 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), which decided a dispute over a check issued by the United States and later fraudulently cashed. The Court ruled that "the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than state law." Id. at 366, 63 S.Ct. 573.
[4] The trial court struck the affidavit as frivolous and sanctioned Holland, ordering him to pay $1,500 in attorney fees within 60 days. Id. at 36. The trial court warned Holland that if he continued to file such frivolous motions, as had been his pattern, the next sanction would be dismissal of his lawsuit. Appellee's App. Vol. III, p. 30.
[5] Undaunted, Holland requested the trial court certify twenty-four of its orders for interlocutory appeal. Appellee's App Vol. II, pp. 38-61. The trial court declined to do so. Although certification is a mandatory prerequisite to such a discretionary interlocutory appeal under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B), Holland obdurately proceeded with the appeal. Holland thereafter failed to arrange for a transcript, prompting this Court to order him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. When he failed to do that, the Court dismissed the appeal. Holland persisted, filing a petition to transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court denied in July 2019.
[6] By that time, the judge presiding over Holland's case had retired, and the Indiana Supreme Court had appointed a senior judge to serve as a temporary replacement. In August 2019, IU filed a rule to show cause, dismiss, and impose additional sanctions based on Holland's failure to pay the original $1,500 in sanctions and his continued frivolous filings (specifically, the dismissed interlocutory appeal which he lacked necessary permission to file). Finding that Holland had continued filing "frivolous, repetitive, and disjointed motions," the trial court dismissed Holland's lawsuit the next day. Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 74-76.
[7] Holland filed a motion to correct error alleging he had not paid the $1,500 due to his indigency and, in any case, that he, as an "indigenous aboriginal autochthonous Moorish American National," was not subject to Indiana law. Id. at 141-142. The trial court denied Holland's motion to correct errors, and Holland again appealed. [8] Holland sought transfer of the appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court under Indiana Appellate Rule 56 because the trial court had refused to acknowledge the special rights he claimed as a "Moorish American." The Indiana Supreme Court denied his petition in March 2020. This Court dismissed Holland's appeal a month later after Holland filed an untimely brief.
Although the branches of the Moorish movement are diverse, its members, like those in the "sovereign citizen" movement, generally are described as believing they are not bound by federal or state law. See , e.g. , Moorish Sovereign Citizens, Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/moorish-sovereign-citizens (last visited May 21, 2021).
[9] In response, Holland filed an untimely, amended notice of appeal seeking to appeal the same orders he challenged in that just dismissed appellate proceeding. Appellee's App. Vol. IV, pp. 126-129. Holland then filed a "Verified Request for Court of Appeal Review, Declaratory Judgment, and/or Transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court Pursuant to IAR 1 and 57" in May 2020. Appellee's App. Vol. IV, pp. 130-137. In that request, Holland claimed the trial court's orders violated a 1787 Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and were void and unconstitutional. Both the Indiana Supreme Court and this Court issued orders denying him relief in June 2020, effectively ending his appeal.
[10] With his appellate claims extinguished, Holland renewed his attempt to overcome the trial court's ruling by filing three motions to set aside the judgment in August 2020. He purportedly filed those motions pursuant to provisions of Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) authorizing relief where the judgment was obtained by fraud (subsection 3) or is void (subsection 6) or where a default judgment is obtained against a party who was served solely by publication and had no notice of the proceeding (subsection 4). He also cited Trial Rule 60(B)(2), which allows a judgment to be set aside on "any ground for a motion to correct error, including without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to correct errors" under Indiana Trial Rule 59.
[11] Holland alleged in those motions that the trial court was obligated to acknowledge his status as a Moorish American National with special birthrights, privileges, and protections under the 1787 Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. He further claimed that allowing IU to assert defenses under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) would violate that treaty. That motion contained the same rambling allegations about the Treaty, the inapplicability of the ITCA, the impropriety of sanctions, Holland's perceived entitlement to summary judgment, and the trial court's lack of jurisdiction found in Holland's prior filings in the trial court and on appeal.
[12] In two separate orders entered in August 2020, the trial court rejected those Trial Rule 60(B) filings. The trial court ruled that Holland's lawsuit had been dismissed with prejudice, Holland had "exhausted all appeals," and nothing remained pending before the trial court. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 36-37.
[13] For the same reasons, the trial court later rejected Holland's motion to waive the costs of appeal. Id. at 37. Holland thereafter initiated this appeal. He indicated in his notice of appeal that he was challenging not only those orders rejecting his purported Trial Rule 60(B) motions but also a number of the orders and judgments entered by the trial court during the last three years. This Court dismissed all portions of Holland's appeal except his challenge to the trial court's orders dated August 5 and 31, 2020.
Discussion and Decision
I. Trial Rule 60(B) Motions Barred by Res Judicata
[14] Holland purports to raise four issues on appeal. This Court dismissed all but one of the issues in our order dated October 21, 2020. Accordingly, we address only the single issue that survives that order. We restate that issue as whether the trial court abused its discretion and violated Holland's constitutional rights by rejecting his Trial Rule 60(B) filings without a hearing.
[15] We initially observe that Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions are file marked. Therefore, the trial court's orders rejecting those pleadings appear to be orders summarily denying relief, not refusals to accept those pleadings for filing. Ordinarily, we review under an abuse of discretion standard a trial court's denial of a motion for relief from judgment filed under Trial Rule 60(B). Baird v. Lake Santee Regional Waste and Water District , 945 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh. denied. However, where, as here, the trial court rules on the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, we review the decision de novo. Id.
[16] Holland's arguments on appeal are confusing, rambling, and often nonsensical. However, the gist of his arguments appears to be that the trial court was obligated to accept his Trial Rule 60(B) motions, conduct a hearing on them, and grant the requested relief. Holland argues the earlier dismissal of his lawsuit is not a sufficient reason to reject his Trial Rule 60(B) motions, inasmuch as judgments may be set aside under that rule.
To the extent Holland intended to raise other issues, he has waived them by failing to provide cogent argument supported by appropriate authority and citations to the record. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[17] Hearings are required under Indiana Trial Rule 60(D), except where the motion lacks "pertinent" evidence to support it. Integrated Home Technologies, Inc. v. Draper , 724 N.E.2d 641, 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ; see Darling v. Martin , 827 N.E.2d 1199, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh. denied (ruling that court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing on Trial Rule 60(B) motion where no "pertinent" evidence existed). No hearing on Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions was required because no pertinent evidence supported them.
[18] In his three Trial Rule 60(B) motions, Holland argued the trial court's orders requiring him to pay $1,500 in sanctions within 60 days and its later dismissal of his action are void and/or procured by fraud. He alleged the following:
1. The trial court judges presiding over his case never acknowledged Holland's "stated status as a Moorish American National, his birthrights, privileges and protections and the 1787 Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Amity and Commerce)." They also failed to recognize that Indiana University is not a governmental entity to which immunity may attach;
2. The trial court's dismissal of Holland's lawsuit violates the 1787 Moroccan Treaty of Amity and Commerce;
3. The Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Holland's claims because the trial court declared the Indiana Tort Claims Act unconstitutional and in violation of the 1787 Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship;
4. The dismissal of Holland's lawsuit deprived him of due process of law by denying him a hearing on his negligence claim;
5. The trial court's order of sanctions against Holland in 2019 and the resulting dismissal for non-payment of those sanctions were clear error, in
part because the trial court lacked jurisdiction;
6. Two judges may not serve in one case. Therefore, the appointment of the judge pro tempore by the Indiana Supreme Court to serve temporarily in place of the retiring regular judge was irregular and resulted in a lack of jurisdiction to hear Holland's claims;
7. Holland was entitled to summary judgment on his negligence claim; and
8. IU was obdurate and deceptive during discovery and in various motions it filed including its successful motion to dismiss.
Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 39-92.
[19] Holland raised all these claims in the dismissed trial court action, the dismissed appeals, or both. For instance, Holland has maintained since 2016 that he was entitled to summary judgment on his negligence claim. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 123-147. Holland raised claims of fraud as to IU's discovery practices at least as early as December 14, 2018, and, as is his custom, continued to barrage the trial court with those allegations even after its rejection of them. Appellee's App. Vol. II, pp. 2-7, 90; Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 238-243; Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 2-3. Holland's relentless insistence on raising his treaty claims even after the trial court found them to be frivolous is exactly what led to sanctions and, ultimately, dismissal of his negligence action. Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 36, 74-76. In his transfer motion denied by the Indiana Supreme Court in 2020, Holland claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the judgments were void and unconstitutional, and that the Indiana Supreme Court has jurisdiction over his claims. Appellee's App. Vol. IV, pp. 130-135. The Indiana Supreme Court denied that motion. Appellee's App. Vol. IV, p. 139.
[20] Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions and this appeal are merely attempts to relitigate issues that were conclusively litigated in the earlier proceedings. The doctrine of res judicata, which consists of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, bars his claims. Claim preclusion applies when a final judgment on the merits has been rendered in an action and bars a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties. Brimner v. Binz , 149 N.E.3d 1214, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit. Id. at 1219.
[21] Both doctrines apply here. All of the issues Holland raised in his Trial Rule 60(B) motions were previously litigated and resolved adversely to him by either the trial court or the appellate courts or both. Although Holland is correct that Trial Rule 60(B) allows a collateral attack on judgments that are void or procured by fraud, it does not authorize such an attack when final judgments adverse to the Trial Rule 60(B) movant already have been entered on the identical questions of voidness and fraud. Res judicata serves to prevent such repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same. Marion County Circuit Court v. King , 150 N.E.3d 666, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), reh. denied , trans. denied. As Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions simply regurgitate prior arguments already conclusively decided, we conclude no pertinent evidence supports the allegations in Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motion and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions without hearing. II. Sanctions Merited
[22] In its filings in this Court, IU seeks sanctions for Holland's pursuit of this frivolous appeal—specifically, restrictions on his future filings related to this case and an award of attorney fees and expenses. We agree that sanctions are appropriate. See Zavodnik v. Harper , 17 N.E.3d 259, 268-270 (Ind. 2014) (authorizing restrictions on abusive filers).
[23] Holland's Trial Rule 60(B) motions have placed unceasing burdens on the court system and the defendants in his lawsuits. His knowing refusal to abide by court standards, rules, and orders not only frustrates judicial efficiency and wastes judicial resources, but also exponentially increases the costs and breadth of litigation for those unlucky enough to be sued by him. With every frivolous filing, Holland emphatically reiterates his allegations that he is not bound by the law. Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 141-142.
The irony of Holland's position is not lost on us. While arguing he is not bound by state or federal law, Holland nonetheless has sought the protection of and relief under those laws through his serial litigation.
[24] The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit grew so weary of Holland's unceasing flow of frivolous filings that it designated him a "restricted filer" four years ago. Holland v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't , Case Number 64D05-1808-PL-7586, Order of August 17, 2018; Appellee's App. Vol. IV, p. 149. After the federal courts effectively closed its doors to him, Holland relentlessly launched frivolous litigation in Indiana's state courts. The Porter Superior Court ultimately barred Holland from further filings in a case in which he alleged a conspiracy among a myriad of Lake County officials. Id. ; Appellee's App. Vol. IV, pp. 156-157.
[25] We agree with the trial court and IU that enough is enough. Holland may no longer operate as a broken faucet from which the flow of frivolous filings never ebbs. We affirm the trial court's judgment and remand to the trial court to determine, after due consideration of Holland's history of abuse, which of the restrictions authorized by our Supreme Court in Zavodnik , 17 N.E.3d at 268-269, should be imposed against Holland. As we believe filing restrictions are an adequate sanction, we deny IU's request for monetary sanctions.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.