Opinion
3:15-CV-00154-KRG
04-03-2017
GEORGE HOLLAND, Plaintiff, v. JAMIE LUTHER, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI LAUREL HIGHLANDS; ANNETTE KOWALEWSKI, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR, SCI LAUREL HIGHLANDS; DR. SHERIA, OPTOMETRIST, SCI LAUREL HIGHLANDS; MS. MILLER, NURSE, SCI LAUREL HIGHLANDS; AND VARIOUS OTHER NURSES, SCI LAUREL HIGHLANDS; Defendants
cc: GEORGE HOLLAND CQ-9878 SCI Laurel Highlands 5706 Glades Pike P.O. Box 631 Somerset, PA 15501-0631 All counsel of record via CM/ECF electronic filing
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 58]. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted and Plaintiff's constitutional claims be dismissed with prejudice and the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's purported state law claims.
II. REPORT
a. Background
Plaintiff George Holland ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner currently confined at State Correctional Institute ("SCI") at Laurel Highlands and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action on June 1, 2015 alleging that a number of medical staff members and prison officials at SCI Laurel Highlands violated his constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Thereafter, Plaintiff petitioned the court to appoint counsel, as he is blind and would be unable to adequately represent himself in this action. The court granted Plaintiff's request, but has been unable to locate pro bono counsel prior to making this Report and Recommendation. Because Plaintiff's complaint did not contain enough factual background to determine Plaintiff's claims, the court held a hearing in which Plaintiff participated by video to allow Plaintiff to explain the gravamen of his complaint. During the hearing, and because of his disability, Plaintiff agreed that his oral statements made during the hearing regarding the facts underlying his complaint would be considered his amended complaint, and the court would not require him to file a written amended complaint. See Tr. [ECF No. 56] at 9-10. Plaintiff later supplemented the statements made at the hearing in an untitled document sent to the court. See 11/28/16 Supplement [ECF No. 63]. The background recounted here is taken from Plaintiff's oral representations made during the April 29, 2016 hearing and the post-hearing supplement sent to the court.
Plaintiff alleges that in 1994 or 1995, while incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") system, he was diagnosed with glaucoma and was provided medication for his medical condition in the form of multiple eye drop prescriptions by Defendant Dr. Sheria. Tr. at 5; Supplement [ECF No. 63] at 1. He was then transferred to SCI Laurel Highlands in 2005 and his prescriptions were changed. Tr. at 6. Specifically, he claims that prior to being transferred to SCI Laurel Highlands, he was permitted to administer the eye drops himself and that Dr. Sheria originally directed him to wait one minute between administering the separate eye drop medications. Tr. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that once he was transferred to SCI Laurel Highlands, he was no longer permitted to administer the drops himself and alleges that Defendant Ms. Miller, ("Nurse Miller") a nurse at the facility, did not wait one minute between administering separate eye drop medications and administered the drops close in succession. Id. Plaintiff claims that after being transferred to SCI Laurel Highlands and after Nurse Miller allegedly inappropriately administered the eye drops, his eyes became "bleary" and he began seeing a blinding white light. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he was sent to an eye clinic, but the doctors at the clinic could not explain the bright white light he was seeing. Tr. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that he complained to Dr. Sheria about seeing the bright white light, but Dr. Sheria "just shrugged his shoulders." Supplement [ECF No. 63] at 1. Additionally, during the course of his incarceration, Plaintiff suffered three strokes and is wheelchair bound. Tr. at 24. Plaintiff alleges that he is blind, or sees the blinding white light because Nurse Miller did not wait enough time between administering the eye drops. Id. at 19.
Plaintiff originally filed the instant action against multiple prison and medical officials seeking monetary damages and to be seen at an eye clinic of his choice. However, because it became clear at the hearing on this matter and after the submission of the Supplement that Plaintiff seeks to bring his complaint against Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria for alleged improper medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and a state law claim of negligence, only those claims against Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria will be addressed in making this recommendation.
During the hearing, Plaintiff used the term "they" or "them" in making some of his allegations, but never directed any of the alleged wrongdoing against anyone but Nurse Miller or Dr. Sheria. See e.g., Tr. at 6 ("they changed the prescribed prescription . . . I tried to tell them, something is wrong"). It is clear that he seeks to hold only Nurse Miller responsible for her alleged wrongdoing in not following the physician's directions in waiting a period of time between administering the separate eye drop prescriptions, which he claims caused him to see blinding white light, and also clear that Plaintiff seeks to hold Dr. Sheria responsible for his alleged wrongdoing in failing to correct Nurse Miller's administration of the prescription eye drops. Plaintiff does not allege that he failed to receive medical treatment for his glaucoma or was delayed medical treatment or denied medical treatment from SCI Laurel Highlands prison officials or medical staff members. Further, he alleges no personal involvement of any of the originally named defendants besides Nurse Miller or Dr. Sheria. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in alleged constitutional deprivation). Plaintiff also seeks to hold the "DOC" responsible in his Supplement because Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria are "agents employed by the DOC and under contract of the DOC." Supplement [ECF No. 63] at 1. However, liability under Section 1983 cannot be based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that liability under Section 1983 may not be based solely on doctrine of respondeat superior), and the DOC cannot be sued under Section 1983 because it is not a "person" within the meaning of that section. Mendez v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 233 F. App'x 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the DOC, the court should dismiss any such claim with prejudice. Gleaning from the allegations presented to the court at the hearing and from Plaintiff's Supplement, the court will make the inference that Plaintiff seeks to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a negligence claim against Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria only.
b. Standard of Review
1. Pro Se Litigants
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As such, a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so "as to do substantial justice." Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In other words, if the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance"). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This "'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Nevertheless, the court need not accept as true "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Doug Grant, Inc. v. Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions," Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
c. Discussion
1. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
In the present case, Plaintiff maintains that Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical issue in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff asserts his Eighth Amendment violation claim against Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that an individual acting under color of state law violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights or statutory rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In accordance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the government is obliged "to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 104 (citation omitted). "[W]hether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed . . . deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983." Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
A medical need is "serious" if "it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). "The seriousness of an inmate's medical need may also be determined by reference to the effect of denying the particular treatment." Id.
The "deliberate indifference" a plaintiff must allege lies "somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other" and is frequently equated with recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994). This standard "affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients." Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Where a prisoner has received medical care and only the adequacy of the treatment is disputed, courts are often reluctant to second guess professional medical judgment. See id. However, deliberate indifference can be manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment, and the denial of prescribed medical treatment. See Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Deliberate indifference may be shown by intentionally denying or delaying medical care.").
An inmate's disagreement with the diagnosis or course of treatment does not establish "deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Likewise, "[m]ere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir.1990). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (reaffirming that mere negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference under Estelle).
Taking all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, Plaintiff cannot state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Miller or Dr. Sheria. He has not alleged that he was refused medical care, denied medical treatment or denied his prescribed treatment necessary to establish a deliberate indifference claim. In fact, he alleges that he has received medical care for his eye condition and was seen by an eye care specialist with regard to him seeing a blinding white light. The crux of Plaintiff's complaint against Nurse Miller is that she "did not follow the doctor's [directions]" by administering eye drops for his glaucoma in short succession instead of waiting a period of time between administering the eye drops. The crux of Plaintiff's complaint against Dr. Sheria is that he did not correct Nurse Miller when she allegedly improperly administered his prescription eye drops. As such, Plaintiff merely disagrees with his course of treatment which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and to the extent Plaintiff has a claim against Nurse Miller or Dr. Sheria for the allegedly improperly administered eye drops, it sounds in negligence. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional claim, the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law tort claims that may exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009); Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2012) (it was proper for the court to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where pro se plaintiff's constitutional claims were dismissed). Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Nurse Miller and Dr. Sheria should be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002).
d. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, Plaintiff's constitutional claims be dismissed with prejudice, and the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's purported state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (the statute of limitations is tolled for 30 days after the district court's dismissal of a state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Huertas v. City of Camden, 295 F. App'x 484, 486 (3d Cir. 2008).
If a civil rights complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 299, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A district court must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend. Id. For the reasons discussed supra, it is recommended that Plaintiff not be granted leave to amend his Amended Complaint, as it would be futile.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, may file objections to this Report and Recommendation by April 20, 2017 and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, may file objections by April 17, 2017. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: April 3, 2017 cc: GEORGE HOLLAND
CQ-9878
SCI Laurel Highlands
5706 Glades Pike
P.O. Box 631
Somerset, PA 15501-0631
All counsel of record via CM/ECF electronic filing