Opinion
Record No. 0555-92-4
August 17, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY JAMES H. CHAMBLIN, JUDGE.
Paul A. Maslakowski for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
John B. Holland (appellant) appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Loudoun County (trial court) that approved a jury verdict convicting him for maliciously wounding Gabriel Fuentes (victim). The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment. We find that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
The record discloses that on July 18, 1991, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., the victim and Huber Fuentes were engaged in conversation while seated on a bench outside their apartment. Three men, one taller than the other two, walked past the victim and Huber and returned shortly thereafter. Without warning or words spoken, two of the men suddenly attacked the victim, striking him in the eye and throwing him to the ground and kicking him, causing his face and throat to bleed. At least one was wearing tennis-type shoes. When one of these men grabbed the victim by the throat, he lost consciousness. When the victim regained consciousness, he found that his money was gone.
As Huber ran from the scene, the third man, identified as Joe Folkes, chased and caught him. A struggle ensued, during which Folkes demanded, "give it up." Huber broke free and ran back to the scene where the assault had first occurred. At the scene, the victim was heard "moaning and groaning."
Earlier that night, appellant had been seen with two other men at a nearby open air party. Of the three, one man was taller than the other two.
When the police arrived at the scene, appellant and another man were observed leaving the area. At 3:00 a.m. on July 19, 1991, appellant and the other men were arrested. Human blood stains, matching the victim's blood type and contrary to appellant's blood type, were found on their clothing. Of particular significance was blood found on tennis shoes and shorts. A forensic scientist analyzed the blood found on the clothing, compared it with blood samples taken from the victim and the other men and testified as follows:
[O]n the human blood stains that I detected on the boxer shorts, the Item three socks from Wiley, the right sneaker from Folkes, the shirt, the cut-off sweat shirt and the T-shirt, all whose [sic] stains could have come from Mr. Fuentes.
However, each one of the three other individuals; Jerome Wiley, Joseph Folkes and [appellant] are eliminated. They could not have left those blood stains.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence is wholly circumstantial and fails to prove that he was one of the assailants. We disagree. At trial, the victim pointed to appellant and identified appellant as the person who attacked him. On cross-examination, the victim stated that because of the sudden unprovoked attack, he could not describe the specific blows struck by either assailant, but knew that appellant was one of the persons who inflicted the injuries he sustained. When asked further on cross-examination how he knew appellant was one of the assailants, pointing a finger at appellant, he responded: "I really can't say or know except I know that that's the man." He repeated several times that he knew that appellant was the man.
In summary, the record discloses that appellant was in the area of the crime scene at the time the assault took place; that he was identified as a criminal agent who participated in the assault; that the injury inflicted supports the charge of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51; and that the jury could reasonably have inferred that the blood stains found on appellant's clothing came from the bleeding that resulted from the victim's injuries.
Viewing the totality of the evidence, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict that appellant was a criminal agent who maliciously wounded the victim.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.