Opinion
3:01-CV-00775-D
November 14, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
II. PARTIES
Petitioner is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"). Respondent Janie Cockrell is Director of the TDCJ-ID.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 11, 1999, Petitioner pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the Fourth District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Petitioner also pled true to two enhancement paragraphs relating to two prior felony convictions. On February 5, 1999, the court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years imprisonment.
On December 30, 1999, the Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. See Holland v. State, No. 05-99-00340-CR (Tex.App.-Dallas, December 30, 1999). On March 29, 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for discretionary review.
Petitioner filed three state applications for writ of habeas corpus. On June 28, 1999, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus. On November 3, 1999, the petition was dismissed because Petitioner's appeal was still pending. Ex parte Holland, Application No. 24,466-02. On May 9, 2000, Petitioner filed his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. On August 16, 2000, the petition was dismissed because Petitioner's appeal was still pending. Ex parte Holland, Application No. 24,466-03. On June 6, 2000, Petitioner filed his third state petition for habeas relief. Ex parte Holland, Application No. 24, 466-04. Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. On September 27, 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further evidence. On January 5, 2001, the trial court again denied Petitioner's claims. On February 14, 2001, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner's application without written order on the findings of the trial court. Ex parte Holland, Application No. 24,466-04, After Remand, at 2.
On April 18, 2001, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Petitioner also attaches a memorandum to his petition that appears to argue his counsel was also ineffective for failing to object to the arrest affidavit and indictment. After consideration of the petition, the Court finds it should be DENTED.
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review
The pertinent terms of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provide:
(d) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in a State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ of habeas corpus if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently from the United States Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380-84 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the United states Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id.
This amendment applies to all federal habeas corpus petitions which are adjudicated on the merits in state court after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2049 (1997). The petition in this case is subject to review under the AEDPA.
Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a presumption of correctness must be accorded findings of fact made by a state habeas court if supported by the record. Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
2. Voluntariness of plea
Petitioner claims his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Petitioner states his counsel told him he would receive probation and rehabilitation if he entered a guilty plea. As a general rule, a defendant may not collaterally attack a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 327 (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). Before the trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must ensure that the defendant "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences." Taylor, 3933 F.2d at 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)). A plea is involuntary, and therefore insufficient to support a conviction, if the defendant "has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Taylor, 933 F.2d at 330 (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976)).
In this case, Petitioner has not shown that his plea was involuntary. The states record shows that the trial judge repeatedly and throughly questioned Petitioner regarding his knowledge and understanding of the charges against him and the effects of a quilty plea. The plea transcripts state:
Court: Mr. Holland, you understatnd, sir you have charged with two criminal cases, one of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and that's been enhanced with one or two paragraphs.
Defense Counsel: Two paragraphs.
Court: Two paragraphs. Making the range of punishment available to the Court in that case of — if the Court finds the paragraphsto be true and finds you guilty of that offense, of not less than 25 years in the penitentiary nor more than 99 or life and it could include a fine of up to $10,000?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And you also have been charged with possession of cocaine and that's a first-degree felony with a paragraph I assume?
Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: If 1 find those to be true, the range of punishment in that offense would be not more than five — not less than five nor more than 99 years or life and a fine of up to $10,000?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
* * *
Court: Sir, it is my understanding that you have expressed an intention to enter a plea of guilty to these charges and a plea of true to the enhancement paragraphs to these charges and waive or give up certain legal rights that the law allows you, and you have filed documents to that effect with the Court; is that correct?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And did you sign these documents of your own free will?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And did you go over them with your attorney?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And did you understand what is contained in them?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: You wish to give up these rights?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
* * *
Court: And sir, it is also my understanding that according to these documents that you have filed with the Court, that you have no type of plea agreement with the State in these matters in exchange for your pleas of guilty to these offenses; is that correct?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: Now, do you understand if you do have any agreements with the State in these matters or you feel like you have any agreement with them, then I am not aware of those agreements — or the Court is not aware of those agreements. And the Court would not be bound by your agreements?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And with that in mind, you are telling me again there is absolutely no agreement?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
* * *
Court: All right. Sir, to the charge that you committed the offense of possession of cocain in the amounts alleged in the indictments in the possession case, how do you wish to plead?
Petitioner: Guilty.
Court: And to the charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, cocaine, in the possession with intent to case, how do you wish to plead?
Petitioner: Guilty.
Court: And to the enhancement paragraphs set out in each of those cases that prior to the commission of this offense you have legally been convicted of other offenses, enhances the punishment range in these cases, how do you wish to plead, are those allegations true or untrue —
Petitioner: True.
Court: — that are set out in the second and third paragraphs? They are true?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: Are you entering all of these pleas freely and voluntarily?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: Nobody has promised you anything to get you to enter these pleas?
Petitioner: No, sir.
Court: Nobody has forced or threatened you in any manner?
Petitioner: No, sir.
Court: Are you pleading guilty simply because you are guilty of these offenses and for no other reasons?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Court: And the same question, are you pleading true because the allegations in the enhancement paragraphs are true and for no other reason?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Plea Trans. pp. 4-9.
The transcript of Petitioner's guilty plea clearly shows that Petitioner's plea was voluntarily and knowingly made.
Moreover, the state court found that Petitioner's counsel did not coerce Petitioner into pleading guilty. The state court found that all paperwork signed by Petitioner indicated there was no agreement as to punishment and that Petitioner was subject to the full range of punishment. The court found Petitioner's claims that his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty were without merit and unsupported by the record.
Further, Petitioner's attorney submitted an affidavit to the state court in which he stated: (1) Petitioner stated he wanted to make an open plea before the court where Petitioner would request deferred adjudication from the judge and would also request to be sent to a rehabilitation center; (2) counsel explained the implications of a guilty plea; (4) counsel explained that under an "open plea" everything is left to the judge's discretion; (5) counsel read and explained the plea papers to Petitioner and Petitioner read the plea papers before Petitioner signed them; (6) counsel made no promises to Petitioner regarding the outcome of his guilty pleas; and (7) counsel did not promise Petitioner that he would receive probation in exchange for his guilty pleas and counsel did not make any assurances to Petitioner. See Ex parte Holland, Supplemental pp. 4-5.
In light of the state record in this case, the Court finds that the state court's denial of habeas relief did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established precedent of the United States Supreme Court. The denial, furthermore, does not appear to be based upon any unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner's claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty should therefore be denied.
3. Arrest affidavit and indictment
Petitioner also appears to argue that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the arrest affidavit and indictment. Petitioner's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Once a guilty plea has been entered, all nonjurisdictional defects are waived. See Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Barrientos v. United States, 668 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1982)). This waiver includes all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those claims that relate to the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Smith, 711 F.2d at 682 (citations omitted). Petitioner's claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the arrest affidavit and indictment do not relate to the voluntariness of the plea. Petitioner's claims are therefore waived.
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Petitioner's habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied with prejudice for failure to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right.