Opinion
No. 2-058 / 00-2113.
Filed July 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, JOHN BAUERCAMPER, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order annulling the writ of certiorari and affirming the city council's issuance of a landfill permit to Wal-Mart. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Karl G. Knudson, Decorah, for appellants.
Richard D. Zahasky, Decorah, for appellee City Council of Decorah.
Charles F. Becker and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Wal-Mart.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and HECHT, JJ.
We are asked to decide, in this appeal from a district court decision annulling a writ of certiorari, whether the city council of defendant-appellee Decorah, Iowa, acted illegally when it authorized by resolution defendant-appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) to fill land Wal-Mart owned. The land, a floodplain of the Upper Iowa River, was zoned by the city as "F-1." Plaintiffs-appellants Frank Holland, Loyal Rue and Marilyn Rue, who are citizens of Decorah, Iowa, and who reside on or own land on the Upper Iowa River, contend the city acted illegally in passing the resolution. We agree. We reverse the district court, sustain the writ, and remand to the district court to determine an appropriate remedy.
There is little dispute as to the facts. Wal-Mart owns real estate in Section 23 of Decorah Township in the City of Decorah. Part of this land was zoned "C-4 Commercial," and part was zoned "F-1 Floodplain." Planning to build a new store in Decorah, Wal-Mart sought to fill the land it owned in the "F-1" district. Wal-Mart sought approval from the Iowa Department of Natural Resources to fill the land. In July of 1999, before the DNR had approved Wal-Mart's request, there was correspondence between the Decorah City Administrator and the DNR indicating Wal-Mart was making application to the Board of Adjustment for a "special exception." There is no evidence this application was ever made, or that any hearing regarding a special exception was held. Wal-Mart received the approval of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources to fill the land on July 25, 2000. Wal-Mart then sought approval by the Decorah City Council. On August 15, 2000, the Decorah City Council passed a resolution by a vote of four to three, allowing defendant-appellee Wal-Mart to fill its land in the floodplain zoned "F-1."
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the approval of the Department of Natural Resources did not cover all the land the city authorized Wal-Mart to fill.
In May and June of 2000, at the very same time Wal-Mart was seeking and receiving permission to fill the floodplain for purposes of further development, Upper Iowa Marine, another business similarly seeking to fill the F-1 Floodplain in order to develop it, applied to the Board of Adjustment for a special exception. Instead of seeking "permission to fill" from the city council, Upper Iowa Marine had applied directly to the Board of Adjustment for a "special exception." Like Wal-Mart, Upper Iowa Marine had already received permission from the DNR to fill the land. The Board of Adjustment rejected Upper Iowa Marine's application, concluding development of the floodplain was contrary to the purpose and intent of the Decorah Zoning Ordinance and its Comprehensive Plan to protect and preserve floodplains as natural resources.
Plaintiffs argue Wal-Mart should have been required to seek (and receive) approval from the Board of Adjustment rather than the Decorah City Council to proceed with its plan to fill the land. Unhappy with the council action allowing Wal-Mart to fill the land, plaintiffs filed a petition with the district court for a writ of certiorari, requesting the council's resolution be vacated. Wal-Mart was joined as an indispensable party. The district court annulled the writ, affirming the council's resolution.
Plaintiffs on appeal contend (1) the city council lacked jurisdiction to grant the request to fill, (2) the city council's action violated the city's own comprehensive plan, (3) the council's action was de facto rezoning, and (4) the plan approved by the council did not have final approval of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources.
Plaintiffs filed a motion after transfer to this court, contending that following the district court's decision, Wal-Mart sought to have the land it filled rezoned. Wal-Mart supported this zoning proposal with, according to plaintiffs, the logic that because the land previously zoned "F-1" now was filled, it no longer met the definition of an "F-1" zone and must therefore be rezoned. Plaintiffs' motion further contended that additional information should be gathered by the district court on the issue before we decide this appeal. Defendants resisted the motion, contending the only question before our court in this appeal is whether the council was correct in permitting the land to be filled. Defendants argue the rezoning issue is before the district court in another proceeding. We agree with the defendants that the only issues before us are related to Wal-Mart's filling the land, and consequently we overrule plaintiffs' motion. We therefore proceed to address issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal.
In an appeal of a certiorari proceeding we review the district court's judgment for correction of errors at law. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Sch. Dist. v. City Council, 605 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 2000). The district court's findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Our standard of review is the same as from judgment founded on a special verdict by a jury. Lauridsen v. City of Okoboji Bd. of Adjustment, 554 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Iowa 1996). Our review is therefore on assigned errors only. Id.; Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Iowa 1976). A writ of certiorari is granted when a court determines a governmental board, such as the city council here, has exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. Plaintiffs challenge the legality of the council's action and consequently bear the burden of proving their case. See State Public Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 620 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Iowa 2000).
Plaintiffs first contend that the city council did not have jurisdiction to grant Wal-Mart permission to fill land in the "F-1" zone. Plaintiffs contend that function belonged exclusively to the board of adjustment. To address the issue we look first to Iowa Code chapter 414 (1999) which authorizes a city council to adopt comprehensive zoning plans and regulations, and provides for notice and public hearing before the comprehensive laws are adopted and amended. See Depue v. City of Clinton, 160 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Iowa 1968). Sections 414.2 through 414.5 provide procedures and requirements for the local legislative body, here the city council, to zone the city. Sections 414.6 and 414.7 mandate the appointment of two official bodies: (1) a zoning commission, the function of which is to make recommendations to the council on adoption of the city plan and to make like recommendations in connection with amendments thereto, and (2) a board of adjustment. See Depue, 160 N.W.2d at 861.
Creation of a board of adjustment is mandatory. Id. at 863. The board having been created, the jurisdiction of the board is fixed by statute, not by city ordinance. Id.; Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment, 254 Iowa 380, 118 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1962). The board may not legislate as does the city council. Id. It exercises only administrative and quasi judicial power strictly within the limitations of the statutes. Depue, 160 N.W.2d at 863. Significantly, the power conferred on the board by state statute may not be limited by city ordinance. Depue, 160 N.W.2d at 863.
Section 414.7. Board of adjustment — review by council provides:
The council shall provide for the appointment of a board of adjustment and in the regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to the authority of this chapter shall provide that the said board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinances in harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained and provide that any property owner aggrieved by the action of the council in the adoption of such regulations and restrictions may petition the said board of adjustment direct to modify regulations and restrictions as applied to such property owners.
The council may provide for its review of variances granted by the board of adjustment before their effective date. The council may remand a decision to grant a variance to the board of adjustment for further study. The effective date of the variance is delayed for thirty days from the date of the remand.
Section 414.12. provides:
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
1. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this chapter or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto.
2. To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance.
3. To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.
The city council contends its authority for the resolution comes from Decorah ordinance 17.120.020, captioned "Principal Permitted Uses," which applies to an "F-1" Floodplain District. That ordinance provides as follows:
Only the uses of structures or land listed in this section shall be permitted in the F-1 floodplain district:
A. Agriculture, truck gardening and nurseries, and the usual accessory buildings, but not including livestock feedlots or poultry farms or similar uses; provided, that no permanent dwelling units shall be erected thereon:
B. Forests and forestry preserves, wildlife areas;
C. Publicly owned parks, nature areas, playgrounds, golf courses and similar noncommercial recreational uses;
D. Any use erected or maintained by a public agency, public and private parking lots;
E. Public utility structures, subject to approval of the board of adjustment, except those utilities and structures constructed by the city;
F. Dumping of approved material for landfill purposes, subject to prior approval of the city council and appropriate state agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiffs argue that the dumping of landfill (subsection F of ordinance section 17.120.020) is a special exception. They further argue that the power to grant special exceptions lies exclusively with the board of adjustment and that ordinance 17.120.020(F) invalidly bypasses the board of adjustment by requiring approval only by "the city council and appropriate state agencies." The defendants counter, and the district court found, that the dumping of landfill as provided for in subsection F does not in fact amount to a "special exception" or "special use" under the zoning ordinance. The district court reasoned that the city council, in proceeding under the authority of subsection F, did not approve a "special exception" because it did not authorize any subsequent site improvement, nor did it make an inevitable future zoning change.
The question we must address is whether ordinance 17.120.020(F), in delegating approval power to the city council, is actually unduly limiting the approval power Iowa Code section 414.12 grants exclusively to the board of adjustment.
Although we give deference to the council's interpretation of its city's zoning ordinances, final construction and interpretation of zoning ordinances is a question of law for the court to decide. See Lauridsen, 554 N.W.2d at 543; Ernst v. Johnson County, 522 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Iowa 1994); Obrecht v. Cerro Gordo County, 494 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Iowa 1993). In interpreting ordinances it is appropriate to apply the general rules of construction for statutes. Lauridsen, 554 N.W.2d at 543 (citation omitted).
Under section 414.2 of the Iowa code, a municipality may divide the city into districts, but all regulations and restrictions issued by the municipality must be uniform throughout each district. In short, regulations issued by a legislative body must be uniform. In contrast, a judicial body may make case-specific determinations for individual land-use proposals. In that the board of adjustment's role is to make case-specific land use determinations, its function is quasi judicial. See Depue, 160 N.W.2d at 863. In the case at hand, to follow the terms of the ordinance, the city council had to approve Wal-Mart's bid to fill the floodplain area zoned "F-1." In approving the bid, under the ordinance the city council would have had to determine whether approval had been granted from "appropriate state agencies," which in this case included a rather extensive DNR permit. In examining this permit for the council, city engineer Lindsay Erdman examined what the DNR determined would be the effect of the proposed fill on the land and surrounding environs. As we conclude from his letter, this examination would have been fact-intensive and case-specific. Fact-intensive, case-specific evaluations are quasi judicial, and reserved for the board of adjustment, not a legislative body such as the city council. Id. at 863.
The case of City of Des Moines v. Lohner, 168 N.W.2d 779, 780-81 (Iowa 1969), supports our conclusion that when city ordinances require case-specific land-use proposals to have approval, that approval must come from the board of adjustment, not the city council. In Lohner the Iowa Supreme Court held that a list of specific uses in an "M-2" zoning district requiring approval must be given approval from the board of adjustment, not the city council, as the ordinance had provided. Id. at 783-84. The court was unpersuaded that the list of uses had not been designated "special uses," stating, "Although [the ordinance] employs the words `uses hereinafter listed,' it is quite clear those enumerated [in the list] must be classified as `special uses'. . . ." Id. at 781. We similarly conclude that although section F of ordinance 17.120.020 does not indicate it is addressing "special uses/exceptions," it nevertheless is. If the court in Lohner required approval by the board of adjustment when one of a list of already-contemplated uses was proposed for the least-restrictive zoning district, surely in this case the board of adjustment must also be required to approve Wal-Mart's proposal for an unprecedented fill transforming a zoned floodplain into, effectively, a different zone.
By definition, the floodplain district encompasses "those areas subject to inundation by floodwater and generally includes areas having elevations lower than the water level of the river when the river has a discharge capacity of twenty-nine thousand cubic feet per second." The use proposed by Wal-Mart removes the land at issue from its floodplain definition. Furthermore, special requirements for new or existing buildings or structures are specifically geared to the elevation of the land; filling the land alters these requirements. Additionally, dumping fill clearly affects land adjacent to the dump site, and consequently, adjoining property owners. The increase in elevation as a result of the fill will likely change the use of land in the district, regardless of whether it is officially rezoned. The use proposed by Wal-Mart not only removes the land at issue from its floodplain definition, it imposes many complications into the continuing use of the land, complications which can only be addressed specifically and adequately by a quasi judicial body, namely the board of adjustment.
In that ordinance 17.120.020(F) delegates approval power in fact-specific cases such as this one to the city council, we conclude it limits the power conferred by Iowa Code section 414.12 upon a board of adjustment. If an ordinance purports to limit the power conferred by state statute upon a board of adjustment, insofar as that ordinance conflicts with the statute delegating power to the board of adjustment, that ordinance is void. Brock v. Dickinson County Board of Adjustment, 287 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 1980); see, e.g., Depue, 160 N.W.2d at 863-64; Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment of Planning and Zoning Commission, 254 Iowa 380, 384, 118 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1962). We consequently conclude that section F of ordinance 17.120.020 is void, and that the city council's actions in the current case pursuant to that ordinance must be invalidated.
Having decided the case on this issue, we find it unnecessary to address plaintiff's other issues. We reverse the district court, sustain the writ, and remand to the district court to fashion a remedy.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.