Summary
Holding that eighteen-day delay in providing religous meals, caused by administrative delay, was not a substantial burden
Summary of this case from TAPP v. STANLEYOpinion
Civil No. 03-01385-AS.
August 10, 2004
MARVIN HOLIDAY, TROY RAMSEY, Portland, OR, for Plaintiffs Pro Se.
AGNES SOWLE, County Attorney, SUSAN M. DUNAWAY, Assistant County Attorney, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs, inmates at the Multnomah County Detention Center ("MCDC"), brought this pro se religious discrimination action against Multnomah County Sheriff Bernard Guisto and MCDC Chaplain Thomas Duncan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (#29). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, both Muslim inmates at MCDC, allege that Defendants violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.,: (1) by failing to hire a full-time, paid Muslim chaplain, and in particular the volunteer Muslim chaplain, Derek Rasheed; (2) by failing to obtain certification as a Halal meal provider or, in the alternative, failing to provide packaged Halal meals or packaged Kosher meals, or a combination of the two; (3) by failing to provide religious Halal diets and materials in a timely manner; and (4) interfering with Plaintiffs' prayer activities. By way of remedy, Plaintiffs seek money damages in the amount of five million dollars and injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring Defendants to provide packaged, certified Halal meals, official certification of Halal meal preparation, or packaged Kosher meals, and to hire a full-time, paid Muslim chaplain.
Defendants move for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' first and second claims should be dismissed pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. With respect to Plaintiffs' third and fourth claims, Defendants contend that no reasonable fact finder could find that they rise to a free exercise or equal protection violation, or that they violate the RLUIPA. Plaintiffs filed their response to Defendants' motion on May 26, 2004 (#43, 47). Defendants have waived the opportunity to file a reply brief.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who have violated rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal statutes. Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995). In civil rights cases involving a plaintiff proceeding pro se, this court construes the pleadings liberally and affords the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). The wide latitude given to pro se litigants ensures that they do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits when civil rights are at issue. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither weigh evidence nor make credibility determinations, but must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255. While the court must disregard all evidence in favor of the moving party that a jury would not be required to believe, it should give credence to evidence supporting the moving party if it is uncontradicted and unimpeached. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 22 (1997). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not respond simply with general attacks upon the [movant's] credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the [opposing party] has carried his or her burden of proving" the elements of his or her claim. Id. The opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations or mere assertions, Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), but must present significant probative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Such evidence must be sufficient, taking the record as a whole, to allow a rational jury to find for the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Where "the factual context renders [the non-moving party's] claim implausible . . ., [that party] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support [its] claim than would otherwise be necessary" to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
DISCUSSION
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement has been construed broadly to "afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2002). Section 1997e(a) encompasses inmate suits about both general circumstances and particular episodes of prison life. Id. at 532. It applies even when an inmate seeks relief not available through grievance proceedings, such as money damages. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
An inmate's failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement with respect to any claim mandates dismissal of that claim without prejudice. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). "The district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits . . ." Id. at 1200 (quoting Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36, n1 (1st Cir. 2002)) (citation omitted). To satisfy § 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a complaint. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200. It is not enough to file a grievance during the course of litigation. Id.
Defendants raise as an affirmative defense the claim that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the following two claims: (1) that there is no paid Muslim chaplain; and (2) that Defendants refuse to provide Plaintiffs with prepackaged Halal or Kosher meals, despite the fact that the Halal diet served at MCDC is not certified. Defendants have presented undisputed evidence that: (1) MCDC has in place a grievance procedure which was distributed to Plaintiffs in the form of an Inmate Manual; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to utilize these procedures with respect to the claims in question prior to bringing this lawsuit.
In their Concise Statement of Facts, Defendants incorporate a section of the 2002 Inmate Manual, which instructs inmates how to address any grievance concerning "a rule, complaint of oppression, or misconduct by an employee in administering rules" (Ex. 2 at 2). The manual requires prisoners to fill out a Grievance Form and submit it to a staff member within five days of the incident or situation upon which the grievance is based. A staff member must provide a written response within five days. That response may be appealed by submitting a new Grievance Form to the next supervisory level within five days of receiving the response.
Jacqueline Stoutt, the Liaison for MCDC who reviewed Plaintiffs' grievance files, attests that: "Neither of [Plaintiffs'] Sheriff's Office files include grievances concerning the fact that there presently is no paid Muslim chaplain or concerning our certification of Halal meals" (Stoutt Aff. at 2). Plaintiffs do not deny these particular assertions, but instead point to grievances they filed regarding other claims. Plaintiffs' only direct response to the assertions in question is that "Plaintiff Holiday did file a service request form asking for a Kosher diet . . . stating the want of Kosher because Halal is not certified within [MCDC]" (Pls.' Br. Opp'n at 4). However, Plaintiffs do not address Defendants' assertion, supported by a printout of Plaintiffs' grievance records, that they "never followed up with a grievance regarding lack of certification or denial of the Kosher diet" (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 11). A service request form, without followup, does not satisfy the PLRA's requirement that inmates exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.
Because Defendants' exhaustion evidence is neither contradicted nor impeached, Reeves requires this court to give credence to it. Defendants have shown that Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies with respect to: (1) MCDC's failure to hire a full-time, paid Muslim chaplain; and (2) MCDC's alleged failure to obtain certification as a Halal provider or, in the alternative, to provide Plaintiffs with packaged Halal or Kosher diets. These claims should therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
2. Delays in Providing Religious Diet and Materials
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their rights by failing to process their requests for religious meals and religious materials in a timely manner. The prison records submitted by Defendants, which Plaintiffs do not contest, show that the delays in processing religious meal requests amount to approximately four days for Plaintiff Ramsey and, at most, eighteen days for Plaintiff Holiday. With respect to the eighteen-day delay, records indicate that Defendant Duncan requested verification of Plaintiff Holiday's Muslim status eleven days after Plaintiff Holiday filed his first service request. Defendant Duncan attests in his affidavit that he waited a full week for the volunteer Muslim Chaplain, Derek Rasheed, to respond to his memorandum, then called Rasheed to verify by telephone. Duncan processed Holiday's request on the day of that telephone call, although he did not receive written verification until nearly a week later.
Plaintiffs concede prison policies require Rasheed to confirm a Muslim inmate's religious status before the inmate's Halal diet request can be granted. However, they contend that Defendant Duncan deliberately failed to verify Plaintiff Holiday's Muslim status sooner, despite having the opportunity to do so. In support of this position, Plaintiffs point to Defendant Duncan's alleged remark that he did not understand why Plaintiffs were in such a hurry to receive their meals, since the only difference would be the meat served. Plaintiffs also place great emphasis on the fact that Defendant Duncan saw Rasheed between the times he requested verification, and when Rasheed finally responded.
Defendants respond that the eighteen-day delay was not intentional, but was the result of Rasheed's slow response and backlogged paperwork. Ed Stelle, Chaplain Supervisor for MCDC, attests that in one month alone, the Chaplain's Office ("CO") may receive as many as 700 requests for various services. Defendants suggest that the huge amount of service requests handled by the CO explains both the occasional delay in processing, and Duncan's failure to ask Rasheed about Plaintiff Holiday's religious status when he saw him.
Plaintiffs also contend that their constitutional and statutory rights were violated when their requests for religious materials were not answered in a timely manner. Plaintiff Holiday asserts that it has taken up to a month for Defendant Duncan to distribute requested religious materials and supplies. Several Christian inmates have submitted affidavits attesting that Defendant Duncan has always answered their requests for religious materials with no delay.
Defendants counter that any disparity in responding to requests for religious materials has been due to a shortage of donated Muslim materials that does not exist for Christian religious materials. Stelle and Defendant Duncan attest, and Plaintiffs do not deny, that Multnomah County itself does not purchase any reading materials, but rather the chaplains hand out materials that have been donated by churches, temples, or synagogues. Defendant Duncan admits in his affidavit that he cannot recall the dates when Plaintiff Holiday submitted requests for Muslim religious materials, nor does he remember when those requests were answered. However, Defendant Duncan asserts that his practice is to deliver donated materials to inmates as soon as he receives them.
a. Personal Capacity Claim Against Defendant Guisto
Official-capacity suits filed against state officials are merely an alternative way of pleading an action against the entity of which the defendant is an officer. Haler v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). In an official capacity suit, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that a policy or custom of the governmental entity of which the official is an agent was the moving force behind the violation. Id. Where the plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, there is a strong presumption that the official is being sued in their personal capacity, since an official-capacity suit for damages would be barred. See Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish liability in a personal-capacity suit, the plaintiff must show that the official caused the alleged constitutional injury. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
It is undisputed that Defendant Guisto played no direct role in the delays in processing Plaintiffs' religious requests. Indeed, Plaintiffs concede in their Response to Defendants' CSF that their claims against Defendant Guisto rest solely on the fact that he is Sheriff of MCDC — e.g., on his official capacity. However, Plaintiffs are barred from seeking damages in an official capacity suit, and Plaintiffs have not asked for injunctive relief in connection with this claim. The injunctive relief sought in their complaint pertained only to the Halal certification and Muslim chaplain claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs state repeatedly in their complaint that they intend to sue both Defendants in their individual, or personal, capacities. For these reasons, this court must conclude that Plaintiffs have sued Defendant Guisto in his personal capacity.
However, Plaintiffs do not point to any wrongdoing on the part of Defendant Guisto personally, much less present evidence that he caused the delays that form the basis of this claim. Since Plaintiffs have presented no probative evidence that Defendant Guisto caused them a constitutional injury, all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Guisto arising from the delayed processing should be dismissed.
b. Personal Capacity Claims Against Defendant Duncan
For the same reasons given above, this court must conclude that Plaintiffs have sued Defendant Duncan in his personal capacity. The threshold question, then, is whether Plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights have been violated. They assert that the processing delays violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause, the RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause.
I. Free Exercise Claim
"The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security." McCauley v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) ( per curiam) (citations omitted). To establish a free exercise violation, an inmate must show that defendants burdened the practice of his or her religion by preventing the inmate from engaging in conduct mandated by his or her religious faith. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). The burden imposed must be substantial, and not merely an inconvenience. Id. at 737. "Inmates . . . have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion." Id. at 198. This rule does not apply if dietary requirements do not stem from religious sentiments. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) ( per curiam). Prison officials have no affirmative obligation to provide appropriate attire or clergy for inmates. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993).
Viewing the record as a whole, the relatively minor delays in processing Plaintiffs' religious diet requests do not rise to the level of a free exercise violation. Prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in ascertaining whether an inmate requesting a religious diet is truly of the religion he professes to be before granting his religious diet request. See Resnick v. Adams, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding requirement that inmates submit applications before prison officials provide kosher diet). An eighteen-day delay in processing Plaintiff Holiday's religious dietary request simply is not a substantial burden, but rather an inconvenience. Moreover, the undisputed evidence suggests that the delay was caused by a verification process which the Ninth Circuit has recognized as a legitimate penological interest.
It is well-established that Plaintiffs do not have a free exercise right to be provided with religious materials. See Ward, 1 F.3d at 876. Therefore, any burden created by delays in providing such materials is de minimis. In sum, the delays in processing Plaintiffs' religious requests do not rise to the level of a free exercise violation, since they were not a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' religious practice and were the result of verification procedures which MCDC had a legitimate interest in performing. For this reason, Plaintiffs' free exercise claim arising from processing delays should be dismissed.
c. RLUIPA Claim
Under the RLUIPA, "no government shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person . . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000. To trigger the RLUIPA's strict scrutiny test, an inmate must show that the policy or event at issue was not merely an inconvenience, but a significant interference with the inmate's religious practice.Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. As discussed above, the minor delays in processing Plaintiffs' requests simply do not rise to the level of a substantial burden on their religious practice. For this reason, Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claim based on processing delays should also be dismissed.
d. Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause protects prisoners from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. To succeed on an equal protection claim, an inmate must show that prison officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Prison officials must give inmates who adhere to a minority religion a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to the conventional religious precepts." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) ( per curiam). Prison facilities need not provide identical facilities or accommodations to persons of different faiths, see id. at 322, n. 2, but must make "good faith accommodation of the [inmates'] rights in light of practical considerations." Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Duncan deliberately delayed in processing their requests for religious meals and materials, while processing similar requests from Christian inmates immediately. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of quicker processing of dietary requests made by Christian inmates. The affidavits submitted speak only to requests for religious materials. The undisputed evidence shows that the process for providing religious diets, which turns on verification of a requesting inmate's religious belief, differs significantly from the process for distributing religious materials, which depends on receipt of donations. Plaintiffs' disparity evidence for religious materials is therefore irrelevant to whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs in processing their dietary requests. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence of a disparity with respect to dietary requests, much less a discriminatory practice.
Moreover, no rational fact finder could conclude that the delays in processing either type of request was intentionally discriminatory. In support of their discriminatory intent argument, Plaintiffs point to only two events: (1) Defendant Duncan allegedly remarked that he could not understand why Plaintiff Holiday was in such a hurry to receive his Halal meals when only the meat would change; and (2) Defendant Duncan did not expedite the verification process by asking the Muslim volunteer chaplain, Rasheed, about Plaintiff Holiday's Muslim status when they saw each other in person.
However, it is undisputed that: (1) it took Rasheed over a week to submit the necessary paperwork to verify that Plaintiff Holiday is in fact a Muslim; (2) the Chaplain's Office receives up to 700 religious requests each month, which undoubtedly makes it difficult for chaplains to remember which inmates have outstanding verification requests; (3) Defendant Duncan did expedite the verification process by processing Plaintiff Holiday's Halal diet request several days before he actually received the necessary paperwork from Rasheed; and (4) Plaintiff Ramsey, a similarly situated Muslim inmate, received his religious diet within four days of filing the proper request. These undisputed facts strongly suggest that Defendant Duncan's failure to ask Rasheed about Plaintiff Holiday's Muslim status when he saw him was an oversight resulting from the enormous number of religious requests received by his office. Given Defendant Duncan's subsequent efforts to expedite the verification process, and the timely processing of Plaintiff Ramsey's request, no rational fact finder could find that Defendant Duncan has a practice of intentionally delaying in processing Muslim inmates' requests.
Duncan's alleged remark about the Halal diet does not change this conclusion. "Although not itself rising to the level of a constitutional violation, prison officials' use of abusive language directed at an inmate's religion may be evidence that prison officials acted in an intentionally discriminatory manner." Freeman, 125 F.3d at 738, n. 6. However, Defendant Duncan's remark, as described by Plaintiff Holiday, was not abusive. He employed no vulgarity, but made a true statement about the Halal diet served at MCDC. This relatively innocuous remark is therefore not enough to rebut the overwhelming evidence that the delays in processing Plaintiffs' requests were procedural, not intentional, in nature. Because Plaintiffs have failed to present significant probative evidence either of any disparity with respect to the processing of dietary requests, or of Defendant Duncan's discriminatory intent in processing either type of request, their equal protection claim based on processing delays should be dismissed.
2. Interference With Prayer
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants violated their rights when correctional officers interfered with their prayer activities. On September 22, 2003, Deputy Hon allegedly interrupted Plaintiff Ramsey's morning Fajr prayer by kicking and shaking his cell door and demanding that he remove the towel he had hung from his bunk. Plaintiff promptly filed a grievance with Defendant Guisto, describing the incident in some detail. In response, Plaintiff received an apologetic memorandum from Chief Deputy T. Moore, who stated, "I can assure you that this has not fallen on deaf ears and is being addressed by Captain Turney who is the Commander of MCDC."
On September 16, 2003, Deputy Harrison allegedly told Plaintiff Ramsey that, per instructions from Sergeant Lindstrom, he and his fellow Muslims in housing unit 8 Alpha were prohibited from praying together. In responding to Plaintiff Ramsey's grievance, M. Lindstrand, presumably the sergeant who gave the order, maintains that she never stated that Muslims are not allowed to meet, but only that inmates are not allowed to lead prayer groups. Similarly, MCDC Chaplain Stelle maintains that Multnomah County jails have a uniform policy prohibiting inmates from leading other inmates in prayer services, regardless of their religion.
However, Plaintiff Holiday also filed a grievance on September 18 complaining that an officer "denied [Muslim inmates] the ability to gather for religious services" (Defs' Ex. 4 at 2). S. Gray responded to that grievance, stating: "Group worshipping is against SO policy. You may worship alone" (Defs' Ex. 4 at 2). Yet Plaintiff Ramsey attests that, on September 18, he observed Christian inmates praying together without a volunteer or staff chaplain. Plaintiff Ramsey also states that he saw Christian inmates praying together again in February 2004, and that Defendant Duncan was aware of this gathering, since he came into the same housing unit to give Plaintiff Ramsey a prayer schedule at that time.
a. Personal Capacity Claim Against Defendant Duncan
There is no suggestion that Defendant Duncan was involved in the towel incident, or in ordering Plaintiffs not to engage in group prayer. Rather, Defendant Duncan's only point of involvement was that he allegedly witnessed Christian inmates praying together shortly after prison officials told Plaintiffs they could not do the same. Because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Defendant Duncan, no rational fact finder could find him liable for the alleged interferences with Plaintiffs' praying activities.
b. Defendant Guisto
I. Personal Capacity
With respect to the towel incident, Defendant Guisto played a minor role in the alleged interference with Plaintiffs' prayers insofar as Plaintiff Ramsey addressed his grievance to him. Moreover, Plaintiffs state in their complaint their intent to sue both Defendants in their individual capacities. However, Plaintiffs have no provided no evidence that Defendant Guisto caused Hon's conduct, either by encouraging it beforehand or by condoning it thereafter. The only evidence provided suggests that T. Moore, acting for Defendant Guisto, handled the matter appropriately by referring it to a subordinate for further investigation. Without some evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Defendant Guisto, Plaintiffs' personal-capacity suit against him should be dismissed.
ii. Official Capacity
Having moved for summary judgment, Defendants must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact before the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to present probative evidence in support of their claim. Defendants have not met their burden with respect to Plaintiffs' prayer interference claim. The prison records submitted by Defendants themselves show that MCDC's group prayer policy is ambiguous at best, with some prison officials invoking a policy against inmates leading other inmates only, and other officials asserting a sweeping prohibition against all group prayer. Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim based on their failure to include as named defendants the correctional officers who allegedly stopped them from praying. However, Defendants have failed to address Plaintiff Ramsey's allegations that Christian inmates pray together regularly, and in plain sight of Defendant Duncan on at least one occasion, while Muslim prisoners indisputably are forbidden to do the same.
If Plaintiff Ramsey's allegations regarding prayer interference are true, which this court assumes for purposes of deciding a summary judgment motion, then Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie official capacity claim against Defendant Guisto. A reasonable jury could find that: (1) the ambiguous group prayer policy was a motivating force behind disparate treatment of Muslim and Christian inmates; and (2) the disparate treatment deprived Plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity to practice their religion, comparable to the Christian inmates. For these reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied in part with respect to Plaintiffs' official capacity claim against Defendant Guisto regarding MCDC's group prayer policy.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that Plaintiff's claims that: (1) MCDC has not hired a full-time, paid Muslim chaplain, and (2) MCDC has not obtained certification as a Halal meal provider or, alternatively, provided Plaintiffs with packaged Halal or Kosher meals, should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 29) should be GRANTED IN PART with respect to: (1) all of Plaintiffs' claims arising from the delays in processing their religious diet and materials requests; and (2) Plaintiffs' personal capacity claims against both Defendants based on alleged interference with their prayer activities. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (#29)should be DENIED IN PART with respect to Plaintiffs' official capacity claim against Defendant Guisto based on the MCDC's ambiguous group prayer policy.SCHEDULING ORDER
Objections to these Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due August 25, 2004. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district court judge and go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, a response is due no later than fourteen days after the objections are filed. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district court judge and go under advisement.