While similar comments could in some instances be improper, such as where those comments attempt to seek favor for a party by injecting the issue of national origin into the case, we cannot say that it is improper for counsel to seek an unbiased trier of fact and equal justice for his client regardless of his country of national origin. On point is Holeman v. Smallwood (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 796, 412 N.E.2d 41. There, plaintiff claimed that defense counsel improperly injected a racial reference in his closing argument when he stated: "Black and white, young and old, they are all the same. They are all equal when they walk into this courtroom.
Nor did Alas otherwise act unreasonably in stopping at the stop line, looking both ways, and only then inching into the crosswalk to make his right turnβall before Miedema arrived at the intersection. See Cusick v. Clark, 360 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. App. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the defendant was negligent where the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude "that the plaintiff entered the crosswalk after the defendant's car had entered the crosswalk"); see also Holeman v. Smallwood, 412 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (Ill. App. 1980) (same, even though the plaintiff was crossing with a "walk" signal and thus had the right-of-way). At worst, after Alas saw that traffic on Harlem was clear to the left, he took his foot off the brake to begin his turn before he again looked right, saw Miedema in front of him, and stopped before hitting her or her bicycle. Doc. 46, Alas Testimony (Alas testifying that he inched forward by easing off the brake, saw Miedema, and then hit the brake again); ibid. (Alas testifying that he saw Miedema "right before [he] took ... [his] foot off the brake," at which point he "reapplied the brake").
A great assemblage of case law holds a driver entering an intersection on a favorable signal may not rely entirely thereon, but must anticipate and allow pedestrians time to clear the intersection. See Holeman v. Smallwood, 89 Ill. App.3d 796, 45 Ill.Dec. 5, 412 N.E.2d 41 (1980); Huston v. Chicago Transit Authority, 35 Ill. App.3d 428, 342 N.E.2d 190 (1976); Fox v. Calhoun, 34 Ill. App.3d 336, 340 N.E.2d 125 (1975); Duke v. Meisky, 12 N.C. App. 329, 183 S.E.2d 292 (1971); Schmitt v. Henderson, 1 Cal.3d 460, 82 Cal.Rptr. 502, 462 P.2d 30 (1969); Hall v. Marshall, 394 F.2d 790 (C.A. 6 Tenn. 1968); Applebaum v. Hersh, 26 A.D.2d 58, 270 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1966); Vinet v. Checker Cab Co., 140 So.2d 252 (La.App. 1962); Gray v. Felts, 241 Miss. 599, 131 So.2d 454 (1961); Arney v. Bogstad, 199 Va. 460, 100 S.E.2d 749 (1957); Overy v. St. Louis PublicService Co., 295 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1956); Engel v. Davis, 256 Ala. 661, 57 So.2d 76 (1952); Knuth v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 225, 54 N.W.2d 771 (1952); Fielding v. Dickinson, 204 Okla. 372, 230 P.2d 466 (1951); Petersen v. General Rug Carpet Cleaners, 333 Ill. App.? 47, 77 N.E.2d 58 (1947); Ward v. Bowles, 228 N.C. 273, 45 S.E.2d 354 (1947); Werker v. McGrain, 315 Mich. 287, 24 N.W.2d 111 (1946); Kerr v. Floyd, 25 Wn.2d 135, 169 P.2d
Where there is a conflict in evidence, a directed verdict is not appropriate because the trier of fact is to resolve conflicting evidence. Holeman v. Smallwood, 89 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799 (1980).ΒΆ 47 Here, there was conflicting evidence regarding who started the physical altercation between plaintiff and Hoopingarner. There was also conflicting evidence regarding which establishment or establishments caused Hoopingarner's intoxication. Because there were contested factual issues, the trial court did not err by failing to enter a directed verdict in plaintiff's favor.
As the appropriate inquiry in this matter is whether, considering all of the evidence in an aspect most favorable to the defendant, it so overwhelmingly favors plaintiff, that no contrary verdict could ever stand. ( Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504; Holeman v. Smallwood (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 796, 412 N.E.2d 41.) We carefully considered the record and cannot conclude that an opposite conclusion is clearly evident.