Decided October 30, 1997 Reported below, 237 A.D.2d 400. On the Court's own motion, appeal, insofar as taken from that portion of the Appellate Division order which dismissed the appeal from Supreme Court's order denying reargument or renewal, dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that that portion of the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution; appeal otherwise dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.
With respect to the third cause of action, which alleges that the 2007 Law takes plaintiffs' property without just compensation, we conclude that plaintiffs “did not meet their heavy burden of showing that the [2007 Law] resulted in a regulatory taking” (Matter of VTR FV, LLC v. Town of Guilderland, 101 A.D.3d 1532, 1535, 957 N.Y.S.2d 454 ; see Clearwater Holding v. Town of Hempstead, 237 A.D.2d 400, 401, 655 N.Y.S.2d 768, appeal dismissed and lv. dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 1005, 665 N.Y.S.2d 955, 688 N.E.2d 1038 ; see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 ). In any event, even if the 2007 Law effected a regulatory taking, the appropriate relief would be a hearing to determine “just compensation,” not a declaration that the law is invalid (see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 ).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that Local Laws, 1994, No. 6 of the Town of Mamaroneck is constitutional as applied to the plaintiff's property. To establish a successful claim that a land regulation has effected a taking of his or her property, a property owner must show by "dollars and cents" evidence that under no use permitted by the challenged regulation would his property be capable of producing a reasonable return ( de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66, 77). "[T]he economic value, or all but a bare residue of the economic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed by the regulations at issue" ( de St. Aubin v. Flacke, supra, at 77; see also, Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 263; Matter of Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 431, 432; Clearwater Holding v. Town of Hempstead, 237 A.D.2d 400; Matter of Licari v. Scheyer, 193 A.D.2d 604; Matter of W.W.W. Assocs. v. Rettaliata, 175 A.D.2d 133; Matter of Kransteuber v. Scheyer, 176 A.D.2d 724, affd 80 N.Y.2d 783). Here, the valuation report proffered by the plaintiff demonstrated that notwithstanding the enactment of the challenged ordinance, the subject property was capable of earning a reasonable return and was not deprived of "all but a bare residue" of value.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs. Zoning enactments have a strong presumption of constitutionality, and while such presumption may be rebutted, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt ( see, Clearwater Holding v. Town of Hempstead, 237 A.D.2d 400; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Town of E. Hampton, 82 A.D.2d 551). The plaintiff failed to meet that burden. In 1994 the Town of Mamaroneck adopted Local Laws, 1994, No. 6, which rezoned an area of the Town as a Recreational District. The plaintiff, whose property falls within the rezoned area, contends that the law is unconstitutional.
"The mere fact that [he] might be able to obtain a higher return on [his] propert[y] if [it] w[as] zoned [differently] is insufficient". (Clearwater Holding v Town of Hempstead, 237 A.D.2d 400, 401 [2d Dept 1997].) Petitioner offers no proof regarding the value of his residential property before and after the adoption of Local Law No. 2.