Opinion
00 C 0191
June 25, 2003
OPINION
Plaintiff Holden Metal Aluminum Works, Ltd. ("Holden") has submitted a Motion for Reconsideration and Offer of Proof in connection with my April 3, 2003 order barring the testimony of Kenneth R. Brown, Ph.D. The law is well settled that motions to reconsider serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. First Health Group Corp. v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., No. 00 C 0524, 2000 WL 1010193 (N.D.Ill. Jul. 14, 2000) (citing Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987)). "Motions to reconsider are not at the disposal of parties who want to `rehash' old arguments," and such motions are not appropriate vehicles for tendering new legal theories for the first time. In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz," 794 F. Supp. 261, 267 (N.D.Ill. 1992), aff'd, 4 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 1993). A motion to reconsider serves the appropriate function only where "the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. . . . Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare." Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983).
As an initial matter, Holden nowhere claims in its motion that it is presenting newly discovered evidence as a basis for my reconsideration of the April 3, 2003 order. Accordingly, the question here is whether I made a manifest error of law or fact in barring the testimony of Dr. Brown. More specifically, the question here is whether I made a manifest error of law of fact based on the record as set forth on April 3, 2003 in barring the testimony of Dr. Brown. I emphasize this point regarding the status of the record on April 3, 2003 because it is important in this case. In its motion, Holden discusses in great detail Dr. Brown's qualifications, the basis for his opinions, and the process he went through in forming those opinions. In fact, Holden goes through these items in much greater detail than it did so in both its Response and its Sur-Reply (a rare brief in a motion in limine such as this). Holden's 14-page motion for reconsideration is longer than the combined 9 pages of its Response and Sur-Reply in opposition to Wismarq's original motion.
The fact of the matter is that Holden has already raised all of the issues which it raises in its motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately for Holden, its arguments were inadequate and unconvincing, and Wismarq's contrasting arguments were persuasive and supported by the record. Based on the record and the briefs submitted in support and in opposition to the original motion, I found that Holden had not sufficiently shown how Dr. Brown's qualifications, the basis for his opinions, and the process he went through in forming those opinions pass muster under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
As for the present motion, Holden has offered nothing demonstrating that I have overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied any fact or argument that it originally set forth in its briefing. Rather, Holden has made the case, largely through new arguments that are more detailed and more extensive than its prior arguments, that Dr. Brown's testimony should not be barred. However, that is not the question before me. The question is whether I made a manifest error of law of fact based on the record as set forth on April 3, 2003 in my ruling. Having found none, I deny Holden's motion for reconsideration.
Were Brown to be Holden's only proposed expert as to the cause of the paint failure in this matter, it might be said that a court should be more lenient in this matter. Here, however, Holden has proposed two experts as to the cause of the paint failure in this matter, Kenneth Brown and Ken Minor. Despite the striking of Brown's testimony, Minor is still free to testify at trial and thus plaintiff's entire case is not "doomed."
According to Holden, the "substance of [Minor's] opinion is that the intermittent failure of the coating . . . was due to an adhesion problem of the coating to the aluminum coating." Brown's opinion, as expressed in his report, is that the "adhesion failure at the primer-substrate interface was caused by a coating process which performed in a faulty manner as regards its intended purpose." Therefore, both Minor's and Brown's opinion, although not cumulative, address the cause of paint failure. Indeed to the extent the opinions differ significantly, it would ordinarily (though not invariably) be wise for a plaintiff to choose one or risk that the trier of fact would believe neither.
As for the offer of proof, "[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." Fed.R.Evid. 103. Accordingly, the offer of proof is unnecessary here. For the above reasons, Holden's Motion for Reconsideration and Offer of Proof Regarding Order Barring the Testimony of Kenneth R. Brown is DENIED.