[Cit.]." Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844 (1) ( 375 S.E.2d 840) (1989). The first restriction clearly limits the use to which the property may be put to "residential purposes."

Overlook Gardens Properties, LLC v. Orix, USA, LP, 366 Ga. App. 820, 826 (1) (a) (i), 884 S.E.2d 433 (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord The Rainmaker Group Ventures v. Bellack, 354 Ga. App. 847, 851, 841 S.E.2d 738 (2020); see Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Anderson, 243 Ga. 867, 868, 257 S.E.2d 283 (1979) ("There can be no breach of an implied covenant of good faith where a party to a contract has done what the provisions of the contract expressly give him the right to do.")Davista Holdings, LLCv.Cap. Plaza, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 131, 133, 741 S.E.2d 266 (2013) (punctuation omitted); see Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844, 845 (1), 375 S.E.2d 840 (1989) ("The general rule is that the owner of land has the right to use it for any lawful purpose. Restrictions upon an owner’s use of land must be clearly established and must be strictly construed.

Westpark, 288 Ga.App. at 636(2), 655 S.E.2d 254. But if the intent of the parties cannot be discerned from the document as a whole, any ambiguity must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, Douglas v. Wages, 271 Ga. 616, 617(1), 523 S.E.2d 330 (1999), inasmuch as “restrictions on private property are generally not favored in Georgia,” Canterbury Forest Assn. v. Collins, 243 Ga.App. 425, 427(1), 532 S.E.2d 736 (2000), and generally speaking, an owner of land has the right to use it for “any lawful purpose.” Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844, 845(1), 375 S.E.2d 840 (1989). Thus, “[r]estrictions upon an owner's use of land must be clearly established,” id., and covenants restricting the use of real property may not be enlarged or extended by judicial construction.

(Punctuation omitted.) Douglas v. Wages, 271 Ga. 616, 617(1), 523 S.E.2d 330 (1999), citing Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844, 845(1), 375 S.E.2d 840 (1989). See also Westpark Walk Owners v. Stewart Holdings, LLC, 288 Ga.App. 633, 636(2), 655 S.E.2d 254 (2007).

It is true that the declaration is silent as to any restrictions upon use; if a restriction exists, it would have to be found by implication, which is not favored. Sissel v. Smith, 242 Ga. 595, 596(2) ( 250 S.E.2d 463) (1978). Accord Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844, 845(1) ( 375 S.E.2d 840) (1989). But if the intent of the parties "is clear and it contravenes no rule of law and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction."

When the covenants at issue are considered as a whole, it is clear that the intention was to limit use of the property to permanent single-family residences (paragraphs 1, 2) of at least 1,400 square feet on the main floor (paragraph 3) on a lot meeting the minimum size requirements of paragraph 6. Given the rule that any use not expressly prohibited is permitted, Statham, supra, since there is no express restriction against lot subdivision but there is a provision specifying minimum lot sizes, we must conclude that subdivision is permitted provided these minimum lot restrictions are honored. See generally Holbrook v. Davison, 258 Ga. 844, 846 (1) ( 375 S.E.2d 840) (1989). Contrary to appellants' assertions, we find no ambiguity in the differing terms used in paragraphs 1 and 6. Although the use of a "lot" is restricted in paragraph 1 to construction of a single-family residence, paragraph 6 defines the minimum size for a "lot or parcel," (emphasis supplied), thus authorizing the subdivision of platted lots into parcels meeting the size requirements.

Under Georgia law, "the general rule is that the owner of land has the right to use it for any lawful purpose." Douglas v. Wages, 523 S.E.2d 330, 331 (Ga. 1999) (quoting Holbrook v. Davison, 375 S.E.2d 840, 841 (Ga. 1989)). Accordingly, purported land use limitations require clear evidence that is "beyond reasonable doubt of the existence, application, and intent of express restrictive covenants."