Summary
reversing the ALJ for failing to adequately consider a Washington DSHS decision finding the claimant disabled
Summary of this case from Leilani B. v. O'MalleyOpinion
No. 15-35552
08-30-2017
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-03039-FVS MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
Fred L. Van Sickle, District Judge, Presiding Before: D.W. NELSON, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Amy Holbrook appeals the district court's decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010), and we reverse and remand.
The administrative law judge ("ALJ") failed adequately to consider a Washington State decision finding Holbrook disabled approximately four months prior to her alleged Social Security disability onset date. See Social Security Ruling 06-03p (stating that "evidence of a disability decision by another governmental or nongovernmental agency cannot be ignored and must be considered"). The ALJ failed to provide persuasive, specific, and valid reasons for not according the Washington State decision great weight. See Berry, 622 F.3d at 1236 (holding that a decision of another agency is ordinarily entitled to great weight when that agency's disability program bears a "marked similarity" to the Social Security disability program); Wash. Admin. Code § 182-512-0050 (2014) (previously codified as Wash. Admin. Code § 388-475-0050) (providing for use of the five-step Social Security analytic framework).
The ALJ's error was not harmless because we cannot say that it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. See Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). We therefore reverse the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to remand to the agency for further proceedings. See id. at 1100-02.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.