Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc.

22 Citing cases

  1. Bleish v. Moriarty

    Civil No. 11-cv-162-LM (D.N.H. Jul. 6, 2012)

    Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 n.2 (2007) ("[a]ssuming without deciding that such a claim is cognizable under § 1983 . . ."); Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2001)). In Harrington, the court of appeals "assume[d], without deciding, that malicious prosecution can embody a Fourth Amendment violation," 610 F.3d at 30, but resolved the question before it without saying what the elements of such a claim might be. That, in turn, explains why Bleish draws the elements of her Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim from Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737 (1981), a case decided under the common law of New Hampshire. Because Bleish has not even stated the elements of a federal Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, this court is in no position to determine that all the elements of such a claim have been established by the undisputed evidence of record.

  2. Aranson v. Schroeder

    140 N.H. 359 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that a litigant acts without probable cause when he or she acts "without any credible basis in fact and such action is not warranted by existing law or established equitable principles or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."

    See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681 (1977). [1] The plaintiffs characterize their action as a variant of the tort of malicious prosecution, see Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739, 433 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1981), which originated in the misuse of the criminal process and has been adopted to redress malicious civil prosecution as well, see Kolka v. Jones, 71 N.W. 558, 559 (N.D. 1897). In the civil arena, wrongs of this sort are frequently presented as abuse of process actions.

  3. Young v. Clogston

    127 N.H. 340 (N.H. 1985)   Cited 10 times
    Finding that the trial court's dialogue with a witness "could have colored the jury's decision as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct and was improper"

    The law in this State regarding the granting of directed verdicts is clear. "A trial court may grant a directed verdict `only when all of the evidence viewed most favorably to the opponent so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no contrary verdict based upon that evidence could ever stand.'" Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 740, 433 A.2d 1322, 1325 (1981) (quoting Stock v. Byers, 120 N.H. 844, 848, 424 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1980)). In granting the directed verdict for the defendant, the court found the plaintiff negligent and held that her negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

  4. Johnston v. Flatley Realty Investors

    480 A.2d 55 (N.H. 1984)   Cited 4 times

    The absence of probable cause is an essential element in the plaintiff's case-in-chief in an action for malicious prosecution. See Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739, 433 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1981). The trial court's instruction correctly informed the jury that the eviction order could not be used to establish probable cause to arrest the defendant for a crime.

  5. Gelinas v. Mackey

    123 N.H. 690 (N.H. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that the jury could properly have determined that no damages had been incurred for loss of use of the plaintiff's vehicle despite evidence that rental of a comparable vehicle would have cost $20 a day, but the plaintiff did not rent a substitute vehicle and presented no evidence that she either "needed the vehicle or was inconvenienced by its loss. . . ."

    This court will not set aside a verdict as excessive unless it appears that no reasonable person could have made such an award. Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 742, 433 A.2d 1322, 1326 (1981). Here, medical experts testified that the plaintiff, who is thirty-four years old, has a forty percent permanent partial disability from a ruptured disc and backstrain.

  6. Conley-Lepene v. Lepene

    2:20-cv-00452-JCN (D. Me. Dec. 11, 2023)

    Defendant contends that probable cause exists for his claim in the New Hampshire state court proceeding because in asserting the claim, he relied on the advice of his counsel. See Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739-40, 433 A.2d 1322, 132425 (1981) (“commencement of proceedings upon the advice of counsel establishes probable cause”). Plaintiff argues that “advice of counsel” is an affirmative defense, which Defendant waived by not asserting the defense in response to Plaintiff's complaint.

  7. Farrelly v. City of Concord

    902 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D.N.H. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Under the common law of New Hampshire, and under the circumstances of this case, “[t]o succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, [Farrelly] must prove that he was subjected to a criminal prosecution instituted by the defendant[s] without probable cause and with malice, and that the criminal proceeding terminated in his favor.” Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739, 433 A.2d 1322 (1981) (quoting Stock v. Byers, 120 N.H. 844, 845, 424 A.2d 1122 (1980); citing Robinson v. Fimbel Door Co., 113 N.H. 348, 350, 306 A.2d 768 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Hampshire law, “[p]robable cause in the malicious prosecution context has long been defined as such a state of facts ... as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.”

  8. Farrelly v. City of Concord

    Civil No. 10-cv-583-LM (D.N.H. Oct. 1, 2012)

    Under the common law of New Hampshire, and under the circumstances of this case, "[t]o succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, [Farrelly] must prove that he was subjected to a criminal prosecution instituted by the defendant[s] without probable cause and with malice, and that the criminal proceeding terminated in his favor." Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739 (1981) (quoting Stock v. Byers, 120 N.H. 844, 845 (1980); citing Robinson v. Fimbel Door Co., 113 N.H. 348, 350 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Hampshire law, "[p]robable cause in the malicious prosecution context has long been defined as such a state of facts . . . as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty."

  9. Farrelly v. City of Concord

    Civil No. 10-cv-583-LM (D.N.H. Sep. 27, 2012)

    Under the common law of New Hampshire, and under the circumstances of this case, "[t]o succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, [Farrelly] must prove that he was subjected to a criminal prosecution instituted by the defendant[s] without probable cause and with malice, and that the criminal proceeding terminated in his favor." Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737, 739 (1981) (quoting Stock v. Byers, 120 N.H. 844, 845 (1980); citing Robinson v. Fimbel Door Co., 113 N.H. 348, 350 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Hampshire law, "[p]robable cause in the malicious prosecution context has long been defined as such a state of facts . . . as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty."

  10. Dennis v. Town of Loudon

    Civil No. 11-cv-302-JL (D.N.H. Sep. 20, 2012)

    Nothing in this interaction, or anywhere else in the record, could lead a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Akerstrom instituted criminal charges against Dennis with malice. Dennis's reliance upon the New Hampshire Supreme Court's opinion in Hogan v. Robert H. Irwin Motors, Inc., 121 N.H. 737 (1981), is not persuasive. Hogan did not address what type of evidence is required to prove malice, but primarily discussed whether the advice of the defendant's attorney was sufficient to establish probable cause to commence proceedings against the plaintiff.