Here, the trial court's remarks indicate the court is likely to make the misdemeanor sentence concurrent, but the sentence nonetheless must be imposed. (See Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 723-724.) On remand, the court may pronounce judgment on the misdemeanor count in appellant's absence if he knowingly chooses not to appear and his counsel so informs the court.
. (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 724.)
The pronouncement of judgment is a judicial act [citation], and is to be distinguished from the ministerial act of entering the judgment as pronounced in the minutes or records of the court." (People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 13, disapproved on another ground in Karaman, supra, at pp. 345-346, fn. 11; see Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 723724; §§ 12, 1202, 1445.) Recording unpronounced terms in the minutes or in the abstract of judgment cannot substitute for actually imposing a sentence on all counts.
The parties draw our attention only to the missing sentence for count 4, but the resentencing transcript reveals that a sentence also was not pronounced for count 5. " 'After a conviction, following either a plea or verdict of guilty, the court must pronounce judgment upon the defendant (Pen. Code, §§ 1191, 1193, 1202, 1445), i.e., impose a fine or sentence of imprisonment.'" (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 723.) That judgment must include a sentence for all counts of conviction.
The court had a duty to pronounce judgment on each count of which defendant was convicted. (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 724.) The trial court only pronounced judgment as to count 1.
The court had a duty to pronounce judgment on each count of which defendant was convicted. (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 724). The People request remand, arguing that the trial court did not impose a sentence on count 2.
Once the prior sentence had been vacated by this court, the sentencing court was under a mandatory duty to pronounce judgment upon him. (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 723-724.)
The prison terms of those sentenced under the former law were subject to recalculation by the Community Release Board, forerunner of our current Board of Parole Hearings. (See, generally, In re Gray (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 255, 259–260, 149 Cal.Rptr. 416 ; Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 724–725, 177 Cal.Rptr. 868 [Board of Prison Terms, formerly Community Release Board]; Lopez v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1059–1060, fn. 4, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 239 P.3d 1228 [Board of Parole Hearings, formerly Board of Prison Terms].) Any concern that the People would be acting vindictively, I believe, is adequately addressed through the trial court's traditional powers of supervision and approval of plea bargains.
In short, resumption of criminal proceedings is mandatory after a finding of non-MDSO status." (Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 721.) In full, Penal Code section 1606 provides: "Outpatient status shall be for a period not to exceed one year.
Pronouncement of judgment includes sentencing. (See Hoffman v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 715, 723 [" 'After a conviction, following either a plea or verdict of guilty, the court must pronounce judgment upon the defendant [citation], i.e., impose a fine or sentence of imprisonment.' "] Thus, our Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that the provisions in section 1193 regarding waiver of the right to be present at pronouncement of judgment govern a defendant's waiver of his "right to be present at sentence."