Opinion
No. CV 03-0348152S
December 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, John W. Hoffer, appeals a decision of the defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) of the city of Danbury, upholding the issuance of a zoning permit by the zoning enforcement officer (ZEO) to the defendant, Covenant Construction, LLC. Covenant is the named applicant which filed for a zoning permit under § 10.B.1, entitled "Zoning Permit" of the city of Danbury zoning regulations for a single-family dwelling to be built on the property located at 12 Oak Ridge Avenue (the property) in Danbury, Connecticut. (Return of Record [ROR], Item 1.) Hoffer is co-trustee of a trust holding title to 10 Oak Ridge Avenue in Danbury. (ROR, Item 2.) This property abuts the subject property. (ROR, Item 2.)
"While a zoning permit is required for any land use project or construction there are no statutory provisions governing the procedures for applying for a zoning permit or the requirements for issuing one." R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 6-6, p. 153. "Zoning permits usually only require a decision [of the ZEO] whether the proposed use or structure complies with the zoning regulations." Id., p. 154.
A zoning permit was granted by the ZEO on October 17, 2002. (ROR, Item 4.) On November 12, 2002, Hoffer filed an appeal with the ZBA pursuant to General Statutes § 8-7. (ROR, Item 1.) On December 1 and 7, 2002, a published notice for the hearing on Hoffer's appeal appeared in the Danbury News-Times. (ROR, Item 3.) At the December 12, 2002, hearing, the ZBA denied the appeal and upheld the decision of the ZEO. (ROR., Item 7.) Hoffer appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Legal notice of the ZBA's decision to sustain the issuance of the zoning permit was published in the Danbury News-Times on December 20, 2002. (ROR, Item 7.) Hoffer served the chairman by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with him at his usual dwelling place, the clerk of the ZBA and the Danbury town clerk at their place of business, and Covenant at the usual place of abode of its registered agent in Danbury on January 2, 2003. (Marshal's Return.) Covenant filed an answer on February 25, 2003, and the ZBA filed its answer on March 12, 2003. The return of record was filed on April 4, 2003. Thereafter, the parties timely filed briefs. The appeal was heard by the court, Frankel, J., on September 8, 2003.
FACTS
Hoffer's property, to which he holds title as a co-trustee, is located at 10 Oak Ridge Avenue. His property abuts Covenant's property which is located at 12 Oak Ridge, the parcel involved in the zoning permit application. After the ZEO's decision to issue the zoning permit, Hoffer filed an appeal with the ZBA of the city of Danbury. (ROR, Item 2.) He stated in his "Explanatory Statement For Appeal" that the decision of the ZEO violated a development restriction, constituted an illegal subdivision pursuant to General Statutes § 8-18, and the ZEO relied on the planning department's determination that the proposed division did not constitute a subdivision or resubdivision when only the planning commission may make that determination. (ROR, Item 2.) On December 1, and 7, 2002, the ZBA published a legal notice that at its regular meeting on December 12, it would hear Hoffer's appeal "for correction of an alleged error in a decision of the [ZEO]." (ROR, Item 3.)
On December 11, 2002, in response to a request by the ZEO, assistant corporation counsel for Danbury issued an opinion in which she concluded that the ZEO had acted "properly in issuing the zoning permit based on the Planning and Zoning Department's determination that Parcels A and B are not a subdivision or resubdivision," because (1) the division of the lots, which occurred in 1952 and depicted on map no. 1338, was prior to the adoption of subdivision regulations in 1958 and (2) map no. 11297, dated September 17, 2002, had combined some of these lots into two larger parcels. (ROR, Item 5.) A hearing before the ZBA was held on December 12, 2002; (ROR, Item 7); where Hoffer's counsel argued that the property at issue is one parcel subject to development restrictions which the ZEO did not take into consideration. In addition, Hoffer maintained there was a question as to whether the split of the property constituted a subdivision or resubdivision, a determination over which the ZEO has no authority, but, rather, requires action by the planning commission. (ROR, Item 9.) Covenant responded that the lots have always been referred to as parcels of land and never as one lot and that map no. 1338 is not of an improved subdivision because its existence was prior to any subdivision regulations and of a planning commission in Danbury. (ROR, Item 9.) In its decision dated December 23, 2002, the ZBA stated: VOTED TO UPHOLD THE DECISION AND DENY THE APPEAL of John W. Hoffer, Trustee, 10 Oak Ridge Ave. (#G15315), for correction of an alleged error in a decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer. The reason stated for this decision was "[d]ue to all the conflicting maps and deeds that were presented, the Board feels this is a matter that should be decided in the Court system." (ROR, Item 8.)
Hoffer challenges the decision on the following grounds: (1) the ZBA failed to provide adequate notice of the hearing on December 12, 2002, therefore, the ZBA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render a decision on the appeal and (2) the parcel constituted a subdivision or resubdivision of the property, therefore, it required the approval of the planning commission and not of the ZEO of the planning and zoning department.
AGGRIEVEMENT
The first issue to be decided by this appeal is whether the plaintiff is aggrieved. Aggrievement is a standing requirement that "implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction." Zoning Board of Appeals v. Planning Zoning Commission, 27 Conn. App. 297, 300, 605 A.2d 885 (1992); see also Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 409, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002) ("to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved"). "The jurisdictional requirement of aggrievement serves both practical and functional purposes in assuring that only those parties with genuine and legitimate interests are afforded an opportunity to appeal . . . Aggrievement falls within two broad categories, classical and statutory. The factors involved in whether classical aggrievement exists are tempered by the subject matter of the litigation. A party has been classically aggrieved if it successfully demonstrates a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as the concern of all members of the community as a whole, and successfully establishes that this specific, personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision . . . Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, which grants appellants standing by virtue of a particular legislation, rather than by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case." (Citations omitted.) Zoning Board of Appeals v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 300-01.
"The burden of demonstrating aggrievement rests with the plaintiff . . . The question of aggrievement is one of fact to be determined by the trial court . . . We will reverse the trial court only if its conclusions are clearly erroneous and violate law, logic, or reason or are inconsistent with the subordinate facts . . . In this case, statutory aggrievement is conferred on any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board. General Statutes 8-8 (a)(1). Thus, pursuant to § 8-8 (a)(1), a person may derive standing to appeal based solely on his status as an abutting landowner or as a landowner within one hundred feet of the subject property . . . The statute requires only that there be land affected by the decision of the zoning authority, and that the party seeking to appeal owns property abutting that land" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zoning Board of Appeals v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 27 Conn. App. 301-02.
Section 8-8 states: "(a) As used in this section: (1) `Aggrieved person' means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, `aggrieved person' includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board." General Statutes § 8-8 (a)(1).
Covenant correctly claims that Hoffer brought this appeal in his name only, in his individual capacity, and not as co-trustee of the trust, which owns the abutting property. Covenant argues, therefore, that because Hoffer does not own individually the property at 10 Oak Ridge Avenue, this appeal should be dismissed since Hoffer has not met his burden of establishing that he is aggrieved.
On June 24, 2003, however, Hoffer filed a motion to correct his name to reflect that he holds title to 10 Oak Ridge Avenue in his capacity as co-trustee. This motion was granted on July 14, 2003, by the court, Fischer, J. As co-trustee of a trust which holds title or ownership to 10 Oak Ridge Avenue and abuts 12 Oak Ridge Avenue, the subject property, this court finds that Hoffer is an aggrieved party under § 8-8 (a) (1).
NOTICE
The next issue is whether the ZBA's prehearing notice published in the Danbury News-Times on December 1, and 7, 2002, was proper. The legal notice referred to Hoffer's appeal as "02-115 — John W. Hoffer, Trustee, 10 Oak Ridge Avenue (#G15315), Appeal for correction of an alleged error in a decision of the Zoning Enforcement Officer." (ROR, Item 3.) Hoffer argues that because the notice identified the property of the applicant, and not the property which is the subject of the appeal, the notice was improper. Covenant responds that anyone having an interest in land use issues near 10 Oak Ridge Avenue was apprised of the pendency of the appeal and informed of the right to be heard, and, in addition, anyone interested in the abutting property also would be interested in issues relating to 10 Oak Ridge Avenue. Covenant, therefore, contends that the notice was proper.
Hoffer's claim is not persuasive. "Compliance with prescribed notice requirements is a prerequisite to valid action by a land use commission and failure to give proper notice is a jurisdictional defect . . . Without proper public notice, zoning authority actions are null and void . . . A defect in the content of the notice cannot be cured through proof that some members of the public received actual notice, or appeared at the hearing. The burden of proving that the notice was defective rests on the persons asserting its insufficiency." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazarko v. Zoning Commission, 50 Conn. App. 517, 519-20, 717 A.2d 853, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 941, 723 A.2d 318 (1998). "The purpose of the notice requirement is fairly and sufficiently to apprise those who may be affected by the proposed action so as to enable them to prepare intelligently for the hearing." Edward Balf Co. v. East Granby, 152 Conn. 319, 325-26, 207 A.2d 58 (1965). "There is, [however,] no requirement that the published notice describe the proposed action in detail or with exactitude." Wells v. East Windsor, 185 Conn. 556, 559, 441 A.2d 174 (1981). "Not all flaws in the notice are fatal." Cocivi v. Planning Zoning Commission, 20 Conn. App. 705, 708, 570 A.2d 226, cert. denied, 214 Conn. 808, 573 A.2d 319 (1990).
In Nazarko v. Zoning Commission, supra, the court stated that the published notice "failed to describe the subject property by metes and bounds, by specific address or by reference to the nearest street. Id., 520. The court concluded that the notice was insufficient because it failed to include the second lot number through which the access driveway traversed. Id. In Koepke v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 223 Conn. 171, 610 A.2d 1301 (1992), the court concluded that the published notice failed to identify the subject matter of the appeal, the location of the property at issue, the owner of the property or the proposed used of the property. Id., 176. It also noted that "[a] member of the public reading the newspaper notice would have no way of knowing, and no reason even to suspect that the plaintiff's property, the erection of a radio antenna, and public safety communication networks were in any way affected by the appeal of [the applicant]." Id. Because this appeal to the zoning board involved the erection of a radio antenna, an issue of substantial public concern, the court indicated that the public's opportunity to participate at the hearing was compromised by the inadequacy of the notice. Id., 176-77.
Cases addressing this issue indicate that several characteristics go into an adequate legal notice that must then be evaluated on a case by case basis. Sullivan v. Town of Monroe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 00 370545 (June 30, 2000, Mottolese, J.). "No hard and fast rule is discernible." Id. In the present case, the notice is sufficiently detailed to inform the public of the date, time and place of the ZBA hearing at which the proposed action was to take place and apprised those landowners with an interest in issues relating to the subject property to prepare for the hearing. A member of the public reading the newspaper notice would be apprised of the appeal, as well as anyone with interests in the abutting property of 10 Oak Ridge Avenue. There is no reason to believe that anyone opposing the appeal was not sufficiently notified. Although, as Hoffer contends, greater specificity in the notice might be desirable, the notice in the present case is not so inadequate as to not meet the statutory criteria. The ZBA had jurisdiction, therefore, to hear the appeal.
DISCUSSION STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well settled law in Connecticut "that the decisions of zoning authorities are [given considerable deference and they should be] overruled only when it is found that [the agency] has not acted fairly, with proper motives and upon valid reasons . . . Where it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing, courts should be cautious about disturbing the decision of the local authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 433, 438, 101 A.2d 284 (1953). A zoning board of appeals conducts a "de novo" hearing from the action of the zoning enforcement officer and is required "to find the facts and to apply the pertinent zoning regulations to those facts." Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 Conn. 80, 86-87, 626 A.2d 744 (1993). A court in considering an appeal of a decision by a zoning board of appeals, however, is not allowed to undertake a trial "de novo to substitute its findings and conclusions for [that] of the board." Verney v. Greenwich Planning Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 578, 580, 200 A.2d 714 (1964). The question before this court is "whether the action of the [ZBA] is reasonably supported by the evidence in the record" and is not arbitrary or illegal. Bora v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn. 297, 299-300, 288 A.2d 89 (1972). "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the board acted improperly." Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 435, 440, 586 A.2d 590 (1991).
DECISION OF THE BOARD
On September 17, 2002, after Covenant filed an application for a zoning permit, the planning department of the city of Danbury determined that map no. 11297, which depicted the subject property divided into two parcels, did not constitute a subdivision or resubdivision under § 8-18 and approved the map for recording in the Danbury land records. (ROR, Item 4.) By final decision dated December 23, 2002, the ZBA upheld the granting of the zoning permit and denied Hoffer's appeal. (ROR, Item 8.)
Hoffer argues that the proposed split of the parcel as shown on map no. 11297 constitutes a subdivision or resubdivision of the property, and, therefore, necessitated the approval of the Danbury planning commission, and not the approval of the ZEO. He claims that the original recorded map, no. 1338 dated 1952, showed how this property was conveyed, and because the new map, no. 11297, filed by Covenant, depicted a split of the subject property creating an additional building lot, the proposed split required a determination by the planning commission as to whether it was a subdivision or resubdivision, but that was not done. (ROR, Item 4.) Based on that reasoning, Hoffer concludes that it was improper for the ZEO to have issued a zoning permit. As additional support, Hoffer contends that the letter dated December 11, 2002, from Danbury's assistant corporation counsel failed to apply correctly the definition of "resubdivision" contained in § 8-18. That statute defines the term as a change in a map of an approved or recorded subdivision if such change "(c) diminishes the size of any lot shown thereon and creates an additional building lot, if any of the lots shown thereon have been conveyed after approval or recording of such map." General Statutes § 8-18. In the present case, Hoffer argues, there exists a recorded subdivision map, referring to no. 11297, in which lots thereon have been conveyed after the recording of the original map no 1338, and, therefore, any change in the subsequent map that creates an additional building lot must be a resubdivision. As a resubdivision, the map had to be submitted to the planning commission under § 8-26.
Assistant corporation counsel stated in her letter that, because the planning and zoning department had the authority to make a determination that the parcel was entitled to a "first cut," then the ZBA had the authority to review that determination. (ROR, Item 5.) She further concluded that the language in General Statutes § 8-26 never stated that a "first cut" of a parcel had to be submitted to the planning commission or that the ZEO could not grant a zoning permit without a prior determination by the planning commission as to whether the property was a subdivision or resubdivision. (ROR, Item 5.) Finally, she reasoned, that even if a court were to find that the map, no. 11297, did constitute a subdivision, the creation of parcels A and B still would not qualify as a resubdivision inasmuch as the requirements set forth in § 8-18 had not been satisfied. (ROR, Item 5.) "The board . . . is entitled to technical and professional assistance regarding matters beyond its expertise"; Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 435, 443, 586 A.2d 590 (1991); especially "a matter . . . within the technical expertise of an attorney." Id.
Covenant claims that there is substantial support in the record for the ZBA's affirmance of the decision of the ZEO. The evidence Covenant presented showed that the original map. no. 1338, which was filed prior to the enactment of subdivision regulations in Danbury, consisted of six lots: lots R109 through R114, and that subsequently these six lots were modified into two parcels, A and B, depicted on map no. 11297. (ROR Item 4.) This evidence further showed that on map no. 11297, parcel A has a single-family house on it and consists of lots R109 through R111 and part of R112, and parcel B, comprised of lots R113, R114, and part of R112 is a vacant lot. (ROR, Item 4.) Based on this evidence, Covenant maintains that the zoning permit, which permits the building of a single-family dwelling on the property known as parcel B of 12 Oak Ridge Avenue, was a "first cut" and neither a "subdivision" nor "resubdivision" of 12 Oak Ridge Avenue.
At the ZBA hearing concerning the appeal on December 12, 2002, the ZEO testified that he had granted Covenant's application because: (1) the planning department had determined that map no. 11297 depicted neither a subdivision nor resubdivision and (2) that map showed the creation of two legally conforming lots, parcels A and B, from six nonconforming lots. (ROR, Item 9.) The letter from the city of Danbury assistant corporation counsel was entered into the record setting forth the legal analysis confirming that the combination of lots at 12 Oak Ridge was not a subdivision nor a resubdivision. (ROR, Item 5.) At the hearing, Covenant also argued that map no. 11297 was not a subdivision or resubdivision based on the definition in § 8-18, and since the city had not yet enacted subdivision regulations when map no. 1338 had been filed in 1952, any modification to map no. 1338 could not be a subdivision by definition. (ROR, Item 9.)
The ZBA unanimously upheld the decision of the ZEO. In determining the standard of review to be employed, Covenant argues that this court should look to the transcript of the hearing for the reason the decision was upheld and not only to the reason stated by the ZBA in its letter. Covenant maintains that substantial evidence exists in the record in support of the ZBA's findings for it to have concluded "that the [ZEO] acted correctly in issuing the permit." Even if this court were to engage in a more searching review of the entire record, Covenant claims, there is substantial evidence demonstrating that the ZBA's decision was the result of honest, reasonable judgment, with proper motives, and after a full hearing. Finally, Covenant argues that, although this court should not conduct a de novo review, Hoffer's claims still would fail because: (1) based on § 8-18, the combination of the six lots comprising parcels A and B does not satisfy the definition of a subdivision and resubdivision; (2) subdivision regulations were not adopted by the city until June 3, 1957, more than five years after the recording of map no. 1338, and, therefore, map no. 1338 cannot be that of a subdivision; (3) map no. 11297 combines the six lots comprising 12 Oak Ridge Avenue into two parcels, A and B, fewer than the three parcels required to meet the statutory definition of a subdivision; and (4) map no. 11297 by definition under § 8-18 is not a resubdivision, inasmuch as the original map no. 1338 of 12 Oak Ridge Avenue was not changed by either diminishing the size of the six lots or increasing their number.
To determine whether the decision of the ZBA to uphold the granting of the zoning permit was proper, this court must ascertain if that decision is reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 217 Conn. 440. By definition, a "first cut" or the division of one lot into two lots is not considered to be a subdivision and, because a "first cut" does not implicate public safety concerns or construction requirements, it is exempt from municipal review. R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 10-9, pp. 213-14. It is a second cut that results in a subdivison. Id., § 10.9, p. 215. A subdivision is defined as "the division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts or lots subsequent to the adoption of subdivision regulations . . . for the purpose . . . of sale or building development." General Statutes § 8-18. A "resubdivision" is described as "a change in a map of an approved or recorded subdivision . . . if such change (a) affects any street layout shown on such map, (b) affects any area reserved thereon for public use or (c) diminishes the size of any lot shown thereon and creates an additional building lot, if any of the lots shown thereon have been conveyed after the approval or recording of such map." General Statutes § 8-18. Whether the parcel of land is a "first cut" or subdivision, it requires a zoning permit for any construction or erection of a building on the lot and then that proposed use or structure must comply with the zoning regulations. R. Fuller, supra, § 6-6, pp. 153-54.
In the present case, Covenant followed the prescribed procedures and applied for a zoning permit to construct a single-family dwelling at 12 Oak Ridge Avenue. If 12 Oak Ridge Avenue constitutes a "first cut," then a zoning permit was all that is required, but if it is a subdivision, then the planning commission was required to have made that determination before any building could be erected on the parcel.
Pursuant to § 8-18, there are three requirements for a subdivision: (1) a division of a parcel of land into three or more parts or lots; (2) the purpose is for immediate or future sale or building development; and (3) the division must occur subsequent to the adoption of subdivision regulations. General Statutes § 8-18. The record indicates that the original map, no. 1338 of 12 Oak Ridge Avenue, recorded in 1952, included six lots (R109 through R114), that were owned by West Terrace Danbury. (ROR, Item 4.) For approximately fifty years, this property has contained a single-family residence in accord with the deed restriction. Since that map was recorded five years prior to the adoption of subdivision regulations and the planning commission in the city of Danbury, it fails to fulfill the criteria of § 8-18, and, by definition cannot be a subdivision. See R. Fuller, supra, § 10.9, p. 214.
Parcel B, for which a zoning permit was granted to Covenant, was partitioned from the 12 Oak Ridge Avenue property. Map no. 11297 illustrates that partition. (ROR, Item 4.) The planning department stamped that map with the statement: `This does not constitute a subdivision or resubdivision under Section 8-18 of Connecticut General Statutes. Approved for filing by the Planning Department" signed and dated September 17, 2002. (ROR, Item 4.) Inasmuch as the ZBA correctly upheld the ZEO's conclusion that map no. 1338 is not a subdivision, map no. 11297, by statutory definition, cannot be a resubdivision.
For map no. 11297 to be considered a subdivision as Hoffer contends, it must satisfy the requirements of § 8-18. As discussed earlier, 12 Oak Ridge Avenue as shown on map no. 1338 incorporated six lots into two parcels on map no. 11297; parcel A, resulting from a combination of lots R109 through R111 and a portion of R112, and parcel B, resulting from a combination of lots R113, R114 and the remaining portion of R112. (ROR, Item 4.) The record does not support a conclusion that map no. 11297 is a second cut or subdivision. Rather, the record supports the conclusion that it is a "first cut" or the first division of the tract of that land into no more than two parts. The split of the parcel did not constitute, therefore, either a subdivision or resubdivision of the property, and, subsequently, required no approval by the Danbury planning commission. The record shows that the ZBA properly upheld the ZEO's action of issuing a zoning permit for the building of a single-family house. In light of the definitions of a "subdivision," "resubdivision" and "first cut," the ZBA did not make an unreasonable interpretation that map no. 11297 was a "first cut."
Hoffer further contends that the planning department lacked the authority to make the determination that map no. 11297 is not a subdivision or resubdivision. In support thereof, Hoffer relies on a sentence in § 8-26 that states: "The commission shall have the authority to determine whether the existing division of any land constitutes a subdivision or resubdivision under the provisions of this chapter [chapter 126 municipal planning commissions]." It is Hoffer's position that pursuant to that statute, it is only the planning commission, not the planning and zoning department, that has the power to decide whether the division is a subdivision or resubdivision and in the absence of a decision by the planning commission, a zoning enforcement officer may not issue a zoning permit. This misinterprets § 8-26. Where the division of property occurs after the adoption of subdivision regulations by the town or city, it constitutes a "second cut" of the parcel and constitutes a subdivision requiring submission to the planning commission. See Goodridge v. Newtown Zoning Board of Appeals, 58 Conn. App. 760, 765-66, 755 A.2d 329, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 930, 761 A.2d 755 (2000). Any division occurring, however, before the adoption of subdivision regulations or a "first cut" is not a subdivision requiring submission to the planning commission. See id. Nothing in § 8-26 states that a "first cut" of a tract of land must be submitted to the planning commission or that a ZEO cannot issue a zoning permit without a prior determination by the planning commission.
Map no. 1338 depicts a tract of land available for sale or development but is not a subdivision because regulations governing subdivisions did not exist in Danbury in 1952 when that map was recorded. Further, the combination of lots comprising 12 Oak Ridge Avenue into parcels A and B is not a subdivision or resubdivision, but a "first cut." The ZEO, and not the planning commission, therefore, had the authority to determine that map no. 11297 was not a subdivision when he issued a zoning permit for the building of a single dwelling on parcel B, in accordance with the Danbury zoning regulations.
CONCLUSION
The action of the ZBA is reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. Accordingly, Hoffer's appeal is dismissed.
FRANKEL, JUDGE.