Opinion
CV155039805S
02-18-2016
William R. Hodkin v. Raymond Millan as Administrator of the Estate of Melissa J. Millan
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed February 19, 2016
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY (#103)
Jane S. Scholl, J.
This action stems from the death of Melissa J. Millan. Her father, the defendant Raymond Millan, was appointed administrator of her estate. The plaintiff, the decedent's ex-husband, claims that as a result of that appointment Millan stepped into the decedent's shoes for purposes of distribution of property pursuant to the parties' marital settlement agreement having the same rights and liabilities as the decedent would have had if living. In the plaintiff's nine-count amended complaint he alleges various claims regarding the defendant's failure to honor the terms of that agreement as well as claims that the decedent failed to disclose certain assets at the time of the dissolution along with claims of unjust enrichment, statutory theft, and conversion.
The defendant has moved to dismiss this matter. The defendant claims that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant is no longer the administrator of the estate. The parties agree that Millan is sued only in his capacity as administrator of the estate, and not in his individual capacity, and that he has resigned from that position and Paul Hudon has been appointed successor administrator. The defendant claims that this renders the claims against him moot and thus renders the court without subject matter jurisdiction. The court agrees.
General Statues § 45a-242 provides that: " [U]pon the death, removal or acceptance of the resignation of any fiduciary before the completion of such fiduciary's duties, the court of probate may appoint a suitable person to fill the resultant vacancy and such successor fiduciary shall give a probate bond . . . All suits in favor of or against the original fiduciary shall survive to and may be prosecuted by or against the person appointed to succeed such fiduciary." For purposes of this statute, General Statutes § 45a-199 defines a fiduciary as including " an executor, administrator, trustee, conservator or guardian." Therefore once the defendant resigned as administrator, and a new administrator was appointed in August of 2015, the person appointed as the new administrator should have been substituted as a defendant in this matter if the plaintiff intended to continue to prosecute this action. This has not been done.
" [J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable . . . [U]nder the law of this state the courts may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions on points of law . . . The first prong of the test requires that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . In absence of at least two actually existing parties before the Court, there is obviously no bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties, and thus there is no justiciable controversy. Any judicial decision issued in such a case would be an advisory opinion, procured by and for the sole benefit of the plaintiff, as the only existing legal entity that could gain or lose anything as a result of the court's ultimate decision . . . The second prong . . . requires that the parties' interests in the proceedings be adverse. The requirement of adversity ensure[s] that . . . judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . In this case, this prong is tightly intertwined with the first prong and just as obviously not satisfied, for in the absence of any actually existing legal entity as its opponent, the plaintiff and the opponent have no genuine adversity of interests, and thus there is no justiciable controversy between them . . . Failure to satisfy even one of the prongs results in dismissal of an action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lamar Advert. of Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV085020325S (Sheldon, J., Apr. 5, 2011) .
Since there is no proper defendant before the court, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
The plaintiff argues that an administrator can be held personally liable and that the misdesignation of the defendant in terms of capacity is simply a misnomer which does not involve the subject matter of the court. It is clear that " an administrator may be personally liable for: conversion; . . . self-dealing; . . . breach of express contracts for all debts in the continuation by the fiduciary of the business of the deceased, for debts arising out of a Will contest settlement and for expenses of administration generally; . . . neglect; . . . and torts omitted in the course of administering an estate or trust." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaworski v. Anderson, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 940537265, (Henessey, J., Aug. 21, 1997). However, here the defendant has not been named in his individual capacity. The summons is specifically directed to " Raymond Millan as Administrator of the Estate of Melissa Millan." Consequently, there is no misnomer or misdesignation of the party sued.
The plaintiff also argues that the naming of the wrong party is not a jurisdictional defect. But here the issue is not that the wrong party has been named, but that at this point the party who is named no longer has the legal status in which he was sued, since he is no longer the administrator of the estate, nor can the relief requested be ordered against him. Additionally, the plaintiff has failed to substitute the proper party, the current administrator of the estate, as required by statute.
Therefore the Motion to Dismiss is granted.