SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3. Hodgson v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5511077, at *4 (D. Kan. 2014). Hendron, 767 F.3d at 956.
He argues this is a violation SSR 96-8p's requirement of a function-by-function consideration of each work-related ability before expressing the RFC in terms of the exertional categories. Id. (citing Alexander v. Barnhart, 74 Fed.Appx. 23, 28 (10th Cir. 2003); Hodgson v. Colvin, 2014 WL 5511077, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 2014); Guardado v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-199 CW-PMW, 2014 WL 61140, at *4 (D. Utah Jan. 8, 2014); Mitchell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:09-CV-1788-ORL-GJK, 2011 WL 161046, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2011)).
In her Reply Brief, Plaintiff argues that it is impossible to identify from the ALJ's decision how much sitting, standing, or walking Plaintiff can perform. (Reply 2). She argues based on Hodgson v. Colvin, No. 14-1106, 2014 WL 5511077, *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 2014) that Herndon does not apply in a situation such as this where the ALJ does not make a specific finding of the amount of time a claimant can sit or stand. Id. at 3.