Hodges v. Miller

4 Citing cases

  1. Continental Oil Co. v. Osage Oil Refining Co.

    69 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1934)   Cited 17 times

    Stahl v. Van Vleck, 53 Ohio St. 136, 41 N.E. 35; Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Webb, 149 La. 245, 88 So. 808. The conduct of the lessor may create an estoppel which will preclude him from asserting a termination of the lease because of non-production at the expiration of the definite term. Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, 84 W. Va. 67, 99 S.E. 274; Hodges v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 244 S.W. 634. Production by another, without the lessee's assent and against his will, will not extend the lease beyond the definite term. Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 385, 12 S.E. 522, 526.

  2. People's Trust Co. v. Riley

    300 S.W. 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 1 times

    Suffice it to say that we think that the lost profits alleged were shown and were arrived at with reasonable certainty under the uncontroverted evidence. In a supplemental argument appellant urges as fundamental error that appellee's pleadings of his cross-action were fatally defective, in that they showed no loss to appellee, its contention being that, conceding that the injunction was wrongful, it could only delay the cutting of said timber while the injunction was in force; that appellee was entitled upon hearing to have same dissolved, and, after its dissolution in November, 1926, notwithstanding the expiration of his lease contract meantime, he was entitled to have a reasonable time, not to exceed the length of time he was restrained by the injunction, in which to cut and remove said timber, citing Hodges v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 244 S.W. 634; T. P. Coal Oil Co. v. Patton (Tex.Com.App.) 238 S.W. 202; and Knox v. Brown (Tex.Com.App.) 277 S.W. 619. These cases announce the rule that, where one wrongfully causes the breach of a contract, particularly where time is of the essence thereof, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong, but that the other party to the contract is entitled to a reasonable additional time to that fixed in the contract in which to perform.

  3. Stine v. Oasis Oil Co.

    290 S.W. 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs, having repudiated the lease and instituted suit to cancel it, were in no position to claim a forfeiture for failure to drill after such repudiation. Hodges v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 244 S.W. 634, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Hodges (Tex.Com.App.) 260 S.W. 168. It was alleged and the proof showed that one of the triplicate original leases that had been delivered to the lessee Cumley had been recorded in the deed records of Clay county, and that the same showed the word "the" had been substituted for the word "each" in that portion of the lease shown above, and by way of alternative relief plaintiffs prayed that that record be so corrected in that respect so as to be made to speak the truth.

  4. Silverman v. Emerson

    257 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)   Cited 3 times

    The trial court having found that appellees were entitled to the nine months' and two days' extension of time, and there being both pleadings and evidence sufficient to sustain said finding, the court was authorized to enter judgment giving said extension of time. Texas Pacific Coal Oil Co. v. Patton (Tex.Com.App.) 238 S.W. 202; Corsicana Petroleum Co. v. Owens, 110 Tex. 568, 222 S.W. 154; Stahl v. Van Vleck, 53 Ohio St. 136, 41 N.E. 35; Hodges v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 244 S.W. 634; 13 Corpus Juris, pp. 315, 689. We have examined the assignments of error in appellant's brief and do not think they show any reversible error.