The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected this reading, indicating that: 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). 337 Ark. at 473, 989 S.W.2d at 531.
In reviewing a circuit court's decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hodges v. Lamora , 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). Furthermore, we look only to the allegations in the complaint and not to matters outside the complaint.
We treat only the facts alleged in the complaint as true but not a plaintiff's theories, speculation, or statutory interpretation. Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). Finally, our standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit judge abused his or her discretion.
In deciding whether a motion to dismiss a complaint was properly granted, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). Furthermore, we look only to the allegations in the complaint and not to matters outside the complaint.
Assignments of error unsupported by convincing argument or authority will not be considered on appeal, unless it is apparent without further research that the point is well taken. Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). Mary's second point on appeal is her claim that the court erred in admitting the report of Dr. DeYoub into evidence.
This court has stated on numerous occasions that we do not consider assertions of error that are unsupported by convincing legal authority or argument, unless it is apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 338 Ark. 752, 1 S.W.3d 443 (1999); Ellis v. Price, 337 Ark. 542, 990 S.W.2d 543 (1999); Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). Accordingly, we summarily affirm on this issue.
We do not hear arguments on appeal that are not supported by authority and where it is not apparent, without further research, that the arguments are well-taken. Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999); Gnas v. Burger Assocs., Inc., 295 Ark. 569, 750 S.W.2d 58 (1988). [27] Based on the above authorities and the totality of the circumstances in this case, we hold that even if Robin was in custody, she made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her Miranda rights.
For the second point on appeal, appellant contends that judgment was entered for the incorrect amount, and that the invoice was for an additional $49.50. [1] The appellant cites no authority for its arguments. It is well-settled that we do not consider arguments on appeal that are not cited by authority and where it is not apparent, without further research, that the arguments are well-taken. Hodges v. Lamora, 227 Ark. 740, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999); Gnas v. Burger Assocs., Inc., 295 Ark. 569, 750 S.W.2d 58 (1988). [2] We also decline to address the merits of the appellant's arguments because the abstract is flagrantly deficient.
Under these conditions taxpayers are entitled to broad relief. For convenience, we label this type of case a "public funds" exaction case. Pledger v. Featherlite Precast Corp., 308 Ark. 124, 128, 823 S.W.2d 852 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). In my opinion, these principles would likewise apply in determining the propriety of expending an appropriation for the purchase of land on behalf of a county. Compare Venhaus, supra (declaring the obverse principle that a quorum court cannot underfund necessary services but must appropriate a "reasonable" amount therefor).
Under these conditions taxpayers are entitled to broad relief. For convenience, we label this type of case a "public funds" exaction case. Pledger v. Featherlite Precast Corp., 308 Ark. 124, 128, 823 S.W.2d 852 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Hodges v. Lamora, 337 Ark. 470, 989 S.W.2d 530 (1999). As one of my predecessors's stated, "[a]lthough ultimately the propriety of a particular expenditure is resolved by thejudiciary, great weight must be given legislative declarations of public purpose."