Opinion
NO. 2017-CA-0841
08-01-2018
JO SCHERNBECK HODDINOTT v. REGINALD KENNING HODDINOTT, III
LEDET, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
Although I agree the trial court's judgment should be reversed, I would reach that result by finding the September 3, 2014, Consent Judgment does not encompass the tort claim asserted by Jo Schernbeck Hoddinott against her former husband, Reginald Hoddinott, III. Indeed, the trial court's ruling, granting Mr. Hoddinott's peremptory exception of res judicata, is based on the finding that the Consent Judgment includes the tort claim because there was no reservation of rights to bring the tort claim.
On this narrow issue, the governing standard of review is de novo because the following principles apply here:
Whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law. . . . When appellate review is not premised upon any factual findings made at the trial level, but instead is based upon an independent review and examination of the contract on its face, the manifest error rule does not apply. In such cases, appellate review of questions of law is simply whether the trial court was legally correct.
The governing principle here is that "[a] compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that was compromised." La. C.C. art. 3080. A peremptory exception of res judicata is the proper procedural mechanism to assert the defense that a suit is barred by a compromise agreement. Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741, 747, n. 7 ("Brown").
Here, as in Brown, Ms. Hoddinott does not attack the validity of the compromise agreement—the Consent Judgment; rather, she contends that it does not extend to her tort claim. Addressing a similar issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Brown enunciated the following four-prong test, derived from former La. C.C. art. 3073 (now La. C.C. art. 3076), for determining the scope of a compromise agreement:
Nor does Ms. Hoddinott dispute that the Consent Judgment is a valid compromise agreement. See La. C.C. art. 3071 (providing that "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship").
1. Transactions regulate only the differences which appear clearly to be comprehended in them by the intention of the parties;Brown, 630 So.2d at 748; see also Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112, p. 3 (La. 6/27/18), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2018 WL 3151456, *4 (citing Brown, 630 So.2d at 748) (observing that "[t]he compromise instrument is governed by the same general rules of construction applicable to contracts").
2. Whether it be explained in a general or particular manner;
3. Unless it be the necessary consequences of what is expressed; and
4. They do not extend to differences which the parties never intended to include in them.
Applying the four-prong Brown test, the starting point is the language of the compromise agreement. Brown, 630 So.2d at 752. The pertinent language in the Consent Judgment is as follows:
• "[A]ny and all pending Rules, Motions, and/or Exceptions filed by either party regarding fault, co-habitation and spousal support are hereby dismissed with prejudice";
• "[A]ny claims made pursuant to Art. 103(4) for a divorce based on physical violence and/or Art. 113 for interim support based upon an Art. 103(4) divorce based on physical violence are hereby dismissed with prejudice"; and
• "[A]ny claims made pursuant to Art. 112 and La. R.S. 9:327 for final periodic spousal support based upon domestic abuse are hereby dismissed with prejudice."
The language of the Consent Judgment limits the claims released to those asserted under specific code articles and statutory provisions providing relief for spouses who were victims of domestic abuse—La. C.C. art. 103(4) providing for an immediate divorce; and arts. 112 and 113, and La. R.S. 9:327 providing for interim and final periodic spousal support based on domestic abuse. As Ms. Hoddinott contends, "the inclusion of the code articles and statutes in the dismissal provisions was not superfluous; rather, it expressed an unequivocal intent to dismiss only the referenced causes of action." See Wolcott v. Trailways Lines, Inc., 34,071, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d 1054, 1058 (reasoning that "where there is specific language naming certain parties, there is a lack of intent to include those parties which are not named in the release").
The Legislature this year amended both La. C.C. arts. 112 and 113. See 2018 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 265 (H.B. 125).
In his brief filed in the prior appeal in this case, Mr. Hoddinott asserted two counter arguments, both based upon the reasoning set forth in Brown. His first counter argument was that although "the four corners of the Consent Judgment in the present matter do not expressly release Mr. Hoddinott from any tort liability, the necessary consequence of the dismissal of her allegations of domestic abuse with prejudice would bar Ms. Schernbeck [Hoddinott] from asserting the exact same allegations in a tort claim for damages." (Emphasis supplied). The trial court, agreeing with Mr. Hoddinott, cited Ms. Hoddinott's failure to include in the Consent Judgment an express reservation of her right to file a tort claim. Imposing such a requirement on her, however, is contrary to the well-settled jurisprudential principle that "[t]he scope of a compromise cannot be extended by implication." Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. v. Dixie Brewing Co., Inc., 15-1053, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/16), 200 So.3d 977, 982 (citing Ortego v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 96-1322, p. 7 (La. 2/25/97), 689 So.2d 1358, 1363).
Mr. Hoddinott's second counter argument was that the court was required to analyze the Consent Judgment as a whole to determine whether the parties comprehended, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a release of the tort claim when they executed the Consent Judgment. See Brown, 630 So.2d at 752. He emphasized that, under the terms of the Consent Judgment, he agreed to pay Ms. Hoddinott $4,000.00 per month in rehabilitative spousal support for a period of thirty-six months ($144,000.00 payable over three-years), which could not be terminated, increased, or decreased by either party for any reason whatsoever, in exchange for Ms. Hoddinott's dismissal of her claims based on physical violence and domestic abuse with prejudice. Mr. Hoddinott contended that he would receive no benefit from the Consent Judgment if the parties had intended to allow Ms. Hoddinott to assert a tort claim seeking damages for the exact same alleged injuries. Thus, he contended that a review of the terms of the Consent Judgment established that the parties intended to preclude any future litigation of the abuse allegations. I disagree.
Contrary to Mr. Hoddinott's contention, rehabilitative spousal support cannot be equated with tort damages. An agreement to pay rehabilitative spousal support cannot, without more, be the basis for a finding of a waiver of a tort claim for domestic abuse. Moreover, as Ms. Hoddinott pointed out, Mr. Hoddinott received a benefit in that he was relieved from the obligation under the code articles and statutory provisions from paying interim and final spousal support.
As this court noted in Fontana v. Fontana, 13-0916, p. 16, n. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/12/14), 136 So.3d 173, 183, rehabilitative spousal support (or alimony) has been explained as follows:
Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where the dependent spouse needs to improve his or her job skills in order to obtain a standard of living approaching that enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, and the spouse indicates a desire to enroll in an educational program to obtain job skills or intends to apply the alimony towards job training designed to lead to employment. Other circumstances that may justify an award of rehabilitative alimony include the fact that the requesting party sacrificed educational and employment opportunities during the marriage and was absent from the job market for a significant length of time.
In response to Mr. Hoddinott's attempt to equate rehabilitative spousal support to tort damages, Ms. Hoddinott, in her reply brief filed in the prior appeal in this case, noted the following:
[D]uring the legislative debate on what is now La. C.C. Art. 2315.8 (providing exemplary damages for certain acts of domestic abuse) and La. C.C. Art. 112 (providing mandatory final periodic spousal support for victims of domestic abuse), the Louisiana Legislature defeated and deleted a proposed provision which would have tied future tort claims to spousal support by mandating that the trial court consider the spousal support award in determining any subsequent award for exemplary damages based on domestic abuse. (See: SB 292 of 2014, Amendments Proposed by House Committee on Civil Law & Procedure to Reengrossed Senate Bill No. 292 by Senator Morrell, Amendment #3.) Moreover, during this same legislative session, La. C.C. Art. 118 was passed and provided that failure to bring an action for divorce pursuant to La. C.C. Art. 103(4) or (5) or final support pursuant to Article 112(B) shall in no way affect the rights of the party to seek other remedies provided by law.This year, however, the Louisiana Legislature repealed La. C.C. art. 118. See 2018 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 265 (H.B. 125) (repealing La. C.C. art. 118). --------
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the decision to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 95-1185, p. 13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/96), 670 So.2d 502, 511-12 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (quoting 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 763).