Opinion
No. 21524
Decided January 31, 1966.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of felonious escape and brought error.
Affirmed
1. ESCAPE. — Incarceration — Mandatory — Statute — Constitutionality — Vacuum. Where defendant contended that imposition of mandatory two-year incarceration following escape, as provided by statute, before prisoner may apply for parole or be discharged, is unconstitutional in that it could result in keeping person beyond maximum sentence imposed, held, in view of fact that defendant is not in that category and has approximately some eight years left to serve on his maximum sentence he cannot have statute tested in vacuum and on hypothetical matters not germane to his situation.
Error to the District Court of Fremont County, Hon. Max C. Wilson, Judge.
Robert G. Fredrickson, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, Frank E. Hickey, Deputy, Robert C. Miller, for defendant in error.
This writ of error was issued and the briefs submitted prior to our rulings in Silva v. People, 158 Colo. 326 407 P.2d 38.
Two of the issues raised in the case at bar, (a) the question of dual punishment and (b) the matter of proof and identity, were fully treated in the Silva case and require no reiteration.
One other point was raised in the summary of argument by the plaintiff in error. He states that the imposition of a mandatory two-year incarceration following escape, as provided in C.R.S. '53, 39-18-4 (2), before a prisoner may apply for parole or be discharged, is unconstitutional in that it could result in keeping a person beyond the maximum sentence. He cannot have the statute tested in a vacuum and on hypothetical matters not germane to his situation.
The judgment is affirmed.