Opinion
Case No. 3:19-CV-02047
05-06-2021
LaMonte HOBBS, Plaintiff, v. LUCAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.
Francis J. Landry, Wasserman, Bryan, Landry & Honold, Perrysburg, OH, for Plaintiff. Evy M. Jarrett, John A. Borell, Sr., Kevin A. Pituch, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney - Lucas County – Adams, Toledo, OH, for Defendants.
Francis J. Landry, Wasserman, Bryan, Landry & Honold, Perrysburg, OH, for Plaintiff.
Evy M. Jarrett, John A. Borell, Sr., Kevin A. Pituch, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney - Lucas County – Adams, Toledo, OH, for Defendants.
ORDER
James G. Carr, Sr. U.S. District Judge
This is an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Plaintiff, LaMonte Hobbs, alleges that the Lucas County Sheriff's Office discriminated against him on the basis of race and gender when it terminated him from his position as a Corrections Officer.
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against various individuals and government entities. The following defendants remain in the case: former Lucas County Sheriff John Tharp in his individual and official capacities, current Lucas County Sheriff Michael Navarre in his individual and official capacities, and the Lucas County Sheriff.
Pending is defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 13). For the reasons described below, I grant the motion.
Background
Plaintiff Hobbs worked as a Corrections Officer at the Lucas County Corrections Center (LCCC) from May 2005 until November 2017, when LCCC terminated him.
Plaintiff claims that "he was meeting or exceeding legitimate employer expectations as a corrections officer." (Doc. 11, pgID 77). Defendants disagree, asserting that LCCC terminated plaintiff for assaulting an inmate, an offense for which he was convicted shortly before his termination.
Defendants attach to their Answer a copy of the November 10, 2017 indictment against plaintiff for first degree misdemeanor assault in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 12-1). They also attach a copy of the sentencing judgment entry against plaintiff, which orders him to serve a sentence of 180 days in prison for the assault offense. (Doc. 12-2). The Court suspended the sentence, placed plaintiff on probation, and required him to complete community service in lieu of incarceration. Id.
In support of his discrimination claims, plaintiff identifies several individuals whom he alleges are similarly situated to him but whom his employer treated more favorably than him.
Because plaintiff is African American, he identifies eleven non-African American employees who are allegedly similarly situated. Plaintiff claims that these employees "did not suffer termination for serious offenses or, if they were terminated, had their terminations reduced to suspensions or other lesser discipline." (Doc. 11, pgID 76).
And because plaintiff is male, he identifies four female employees who are allegedly similarly situated. Plaintiff alleges that these employees also "did not suffer termination for serious offenses or, if they were terminated, had their terminations reduced to suspensions or other lesser discipline." (Id. , pgID 77).
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
The same standard applies to a Rule 12(c) motion as to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. E.g. , Grindstaff v. Green , 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget , 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).
When ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, I consider all available pleadings and can also consider "any documents attached to, incorporated by, or referred to in the pleadings," public records, and "matters of which the court may take judicial notice." Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, LLC , 702 F.Supp.2d 826, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (O'Malley, J.).
Discussion
Defendants make three main arguments in their motion. First, defendants argue that I must dismiss the claims against former Sheriff Tharp and current Sheriff Navarre in their individual capacities because Title VII does not allow for individual liability. Second, defendants argue that I must dismiss the claims against former Sheriff Tharp in his official capacity because he is no longer the Lucas County Sheriff. Lastly, defendants argue that LCCC had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing plaintiff, and therefore, his discrimination claims are not plausible.
A. Individual Capacity Claims
Defendants ask me to dismiss plaintiff's discrimination claims against former Sheriff Tharp and current Sheriff Navarre in their individual capacities. They argue that Title VII does not allow lawsuits against employers in their individual capacities.
I agree. It is well settled in the Sixth Circuit that "a supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held personally or individually liable under Title VII." Little v. BP Expl. & Oil Co. , 265 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2001) ; see also Smith v. Bd. of Trustees Lakeland Cmty. Coll. , 746 F. Supp. 2d 877, 891 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (O'Malley, J.) (dismissing Title VII claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities).
Moreover, plaintiff concedes in his opposition brief that he cannot bring Title VII claims against the former and current sheriff in their individual capacities. (Doc. 14, pgID 104).
Therefore, I dismiss plaintiff's claims against former Sheriff Tharp and current Sheriff Navarre in their individual capacities.
B. Official Capacity Claims Against Former Sheriff Tharp
Defendants also ask me to dismiss plaintiff's claims against former Sheriff Tharp in his official capacity because he is no longer the sheriff and therefore cannot be liable under Title VII.
I agree with this argument as well. The Supreme Court has held that a lawsuit against an individual in his or her official capacity should be "treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Former Sheriff Tharp is no longer associated with the entity here, which is the Lucas County Sheriff's Office. See Lucas County Sheriff's Office , https://www.co.lucas.oh.us/530/Sheriff (listing Michael Navarre as the current Sheriff). Therefore, plaintiff cannot sue him in his official capacity. See Welles v. Chattanooga Police Dep't , No. 1:07-CV-71, 2007 WL 3120823, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.) (dismissing defendant sued in his official capacity because he was no longer chief of the police department).
Notably, plaintiff does not even address defendants’ argument regarding the official capacity claims against former Sheriff Tharp. He does not provide any basis on which I could find that these claims should remain in the case.
Therefore, I dismiss plaintiff's claims against former Sheriff Tharp in his official capacity.
C. Remaining Claims
Since I have dismissed the individual capacity claims against Sheriff Navarre and the individual and official capacity claims against former Sheriff Tharp, remaining are the official capacity claims against Sheriff Navarre and the claims against the Lucas County Sheriff.
As I explained above, suing a supervisor in his or her official capacity is the same as suing the entity itself. See Kentucky, supra , 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. Plaintiff has alleged claims against both here. He sues Sheriff Navarre in his official capacity and the entity, the Lucas County Sheriff. Because these are all claims against the entity, I consider them together.
Defendants ask me to dismiss these claims as well, arguing that LCCC had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing plaintiff, and therefore, plaintiff's claims are not plausible. Defendants also assert that the individuals plaintiff identifies as similarly situated are not, in fact, similarly situated because none have criminal records.
Plaintiff responds that discovery is necessary to determine whether these individuals were similarly situated. He claims that his allegations are sufficiently specific to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
I disagree. Plaintiff's allegations regarding similarly situated employees are not sufficiently specific as a matter of law.
A complaint must provide the grounds for a plaintiff's entitlement to relief and include "more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. I must accept all of plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but I do not need to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Alshaibani v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP , 528 F. App'x 462, 463-64 (6th Cir. 2013).
The plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, meaning that the plaintiff has pled "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868. Whether an inference is plausible "depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. , 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to show that his discrimination claims are facially plausible. In particular, he has not provided enough factual support regarding the individuals he claims are similarly situated. To be sure, plaintiff need not provide independent evidence in support of his allegations at this point in the case. But he needs to allege with some specificity how these individuals are similarly situated.
Regarding both the non-African American and female employees whom plaintiff identifies, he states merely that they "did not suffer termination for serious offenses or, if they were terminated, had their terminations reduced to suspensions or other lesser discipline." (Doc. 11, pg ID 76-77). Alleging that other employees committed "serious offenses," without more, is insufficient to make out a facially plausible claim of discrimination under the controlling Sixth Circuit law.
To establish that other employees are similarly situated, the Sixth Circuit requires a plaintiff to show that they are similarly situated in "all relevant respects." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Relevant factors include "whether the employees (1) engaged in the same conduct, (2) dealt with the same supervisor, and (3) were subject to the same standards." Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety , 942 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient for me to conclude that he could plausibly satisfy this Sixth Circuit standard. He has not done so. Plaintiff does not provide any information about the alleged "serious offenses" that these employees committed. His statement is conclusory and not grounded in factual support.
Again, plaintiff need not provide supplemental evidence in support of his claims at this juncture. But he cannot rely solely on his own conclusion that the offenses were "serious." Without more, I cannot find that plaintiff's discrimination claims are facially plausible. He has not sufficiently alleged that his employer treated similarly situated employees less favorably than it treated him.
Therefore, I dismiss plaintiff's race and gender discrimination claims against Sheriff Navarre in his official capacity and against the Lucas County Sheriff.
Conclusion
It is, therefore,
ORDERED THAT defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 13) be, and the same hereby is granted.
So ordered.