Opinion
No. 100951
09-18-2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Bridgette D. Pozzuto Urban & Pozzuto, L.L.C. 55 Public Square Suite 2001 Cleveland, OH 44113 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Carl A. Murway Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P. 200 Public Square Suite 3500 Cleveland, OH 44114 John D. Zoller Zoller & Biacsi Co., L.P.A. 3611 Prospect Avenue East Cleveland, OH 44115
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-12-342739
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Bridgette D. Pozzuto
Urban & Pozzuto, L.L.C.
55 Public Square
Suite 2001
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Carl A. Murway
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P.
200 Public Square
Suite 3500
Cleveland, OH 44114
John D. Zoller
Zoller & Biacsi Co., L.P.A.
3611 Prospect Avenue East
Cleveland, OH 44115
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Defendant Scott A. Stewart appeals from the judgment entry of divorce issued by the trial court, challenging several discovery and other pretrial issues, the equitable distribution of marital assets, and an award of attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} Stewart married Elizabeth A. Hoag on May 17, 2003. The couple had two children during their marriage. Hoag filed for divorce on July 11, 2012. Thereafter, the couple entered into a shared parenting plan, and stipulated to the value of their personal vehicles and the marital residence. The parties limited their discussion of the facts to only those related to the assigned errors. We shall do the same.
{¶3} Stewart appeals the final entry of divorce, advancing 17 assigned errors. Our review is hampered by the fact that Stewart included few citations to authority or the standards of review, in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7). The few citations included are blanket recitations of black letter law without any accompanying analysis linking the law to the facts of the case. Nevertheless and for the sake of simplicity, Stewart's arguments will be combined where appropriate, and addressed in the most logical order.
{¶4} In his first, second, and third assignments of error, Stewart challenges several pretrial discovery and evidentiary rulings. We find no merit to the first three assignments of error.
{¶5} A trial court enjoys broad discretion in the regulation of discovery matters. State ex rel. Duncan v. Middlefield, 120 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-6200, 898 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 27. A trial court's decision in a discovery matter normally is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13. Similarly, the admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial court. Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, 834 N.E.2d 323, ¶ 20.
{¶6} Stewart complains the trial court abused its discretion by extending discovery deadlines and by precluding his own testimony demonstrating the cost to repair the marital home and his expert's testimony regarding the valuation of Stewart's consulting business. The trial court excluded the former because Stewart's testimony violated the rule against hearsay, and the latter because the expert's report was produced untimely. The expert's testimony was meant to establish an alternate valuation of Stewart's consulting business to contrast with Hoag's expert's opinion of the same. Stewart's testimony was meant to demonstrate the true value of the marital home for the purposes of equitably dividing the parties' marital assets.
{¶7} Stewart has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial court afforded all parties a lenient discovery period by extending the discovery deadlines until the final pretrial conference, corresponding to the ever-shifting trial date. For example, the trial court granted Stewart's motion to compel discovery filed on October 4, 2013, despite being filed outside the court's discovery deadline. The final pretrial conference occurred on August 27, 2013. Stewart, as the beneficiary of such leniency, can hardly claim the court abused its discretion by disregarding the original discovery deadlines. Stewart failed to produce his expert report within those lenient discovery deadlines, delaying production until less than a month before the November 4, 2013 trial. Hoag produced her expert report on July 11, 2013, before the final pretrial conference and within the discovery deadlines, with the exception of one document the court also excluded, at Stewart's urging, for being produced after the discovery deadlines. The trial court applied the same rationale to Stewart's expert and, further, allowed Stewart's expert to present rebuttal evidence of the business's valuation, but deemed the expert incredible. Stewart has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion.
{¶8} Finally, with respect to the trial court's exclusion of Stewart's statements regarding any cost of repair to the marital home, Stewart attempted to substantiate the repair cost with a contractor's proposal, in violation of Evid.R. 802. The contractor did not testify. Stewart offered no argument in support of the admissibility of the contractor's estimate presented through Stewart's testimony. The trial court rightfully excluded the document because it contained hearsay. Accordingly, we overrule Stewart's first three assignments of error. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Stewart's evidence or imposing discovery deadlines on both parties.
{¶9} In his fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth assignments of error, Stewart claims the trial court's allocation and valuation of marital assets was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit to any of these assigned errors.
{¶10} "The trial court's valuation of an asset in a divorce case is a question of fact reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard." Rossi v. Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144, 2014-Ohio-1832, ¶ 17, citing Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 24. A trial court's valuation of an asset will not be overturned if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence. Id., citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), and Haynes v. Haynes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92224, 2009-Ohio-5360.
{¶11} Stewart advances several arguments attacking the trial court's ultimate valuation o