Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ. Super. Ct. No. RIJ112823, Gary Vincent, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
David A. Goldstein for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
RICHLI Acting P.J.
Petitioner H.O. (Mother) filed this petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to her children F.R. and T.O. and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother argues (1) the social worker’s efforts in facilitating reunification services, as well as her knowledge of the case, were deficient; and (2) the social worker’s efforts to suspend her visitation right before the contested review hearing greatly prejudiced her. For the reasons provided below, we reject Mother’s contentions and deny the petition.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter initially came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in August 2006, after it was discovered Mother had repeatedly left her two young children (then 5-year-old F.R. and 2-year-old T.O.) alone in the apartment while she went to run errands and look for employment. The children were taken into protective custody, and a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support) was filed on their behalf.
The respective fathers of the children are not parties to this appeal. In fact, it appears the fathers have not been part of their respective children’s lives.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on September 20, 2006, the allegations in the section 300 petition were found true, and the children were placed in Mother’s care on family maintenance. Mother was ordered to participate in services. Her case plan required her to complete a parenting education class; attend individual and family counseling; obtain appropriate childcare for her children; meet the children’s emotional, physical, medical, and education needs; and avoid arrests and convictions.
On February 6, 2007, a 10-day referral was received alleging sexual abuse of F.R. by an out-of-home minor perpetrator. The referral was investigated by DPSS as to allegations of failure to protect but was closed as unfounded. It was found that Mother had taken the appropriate actions to protect her son. However, Mother had failed to send F.R. to school following the incident; F.R. had missed 27 days of the semester.
Specifically, on January 15, 2007, Mother had sent then 5-year-old F.R. to spend the day with the family of her boyfriend. A 12-year-old boy in that home took off F.R.’s pants and inserted a Popsicle stick into F.R.’s anus until it hurt. The boy then approached F.R. from the rear, placed his limp penis up to F.R.’s anus, and simulated a motion of sexual intercourse. Another boy, aged 9, was present and watched the incident. F.R. reported the incident to Mother, who in turn took him to the hospital for an evaluation; however, she did not want to make a police report.
The perpetrator and F.R. attend the same school.
Mother had been adequately complying with her family maintenance case plan, and, at the six-month review hearing on March 20, 2007, services were continued. DPSS was ordered to pay for services to aid Mother in completing her individual and family therapy. DPSS was also ordered to assist Mother to see if F.R. could attend another school or a school outside the district.
On June 12, 2007, a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387 was filed, noting the previous disposition had been ineffective in protecting the children as evidenced by Mother’s arrest on June 8, 2007, thereby leaving the children with no provisions for care or support. Mother was arrested for refusing to cooperate with the police and ticketed for driving without a license. Further observations revealed that the children were dirty, there was only enough food in the home for one day, there was no electricity, and the family was using candles for light. The social worker observed a burn on F.R.’s foot, and the children reported they had last eaten the previous day. The children were formally detained the following day and placed in a confidential foster home.
Mother’s behavior had become erratic, and DPSS was concerned with her mental stability. She had refused to send F.R. to school until the school board accepted his transfer to a new school. When the new school accepted the transfer, she sent F.R. to school with no shoes and clothes that were too tight or which exposed the child’s genitals. In addition, in a meeting with the school board to discuss F.R.’s attendance, Mother had yelled and used profanity. Mother’s therapist confirmed that Mother had been seeing him since April 2007 and that she had a “definite problem with her anger and that she needed to learn how to handle her anger.”
The social worker indicated that mother had failed to benefit from her services and that she had become uncooperative with DPSS. In one incident, Mother had refused to allow the social worker to enter her home or see the children until police insisted she do so. During the interview, Mother began screaming at the interpreter, claiming it was the social worker’s fault for failing to protect F.R. and then the interpreter’s fault, pointing her finger in the interpreter’s face and “encroaching on her space.” Mother’s behavior escalated; when the police asked her to calm down, she refused and was arrested.
Following their removal, Mother had supervised visits with the children. Mother acted inappropriately during the visits, continually telling them they would be moved back into her home “today.” In addition, Mother continued to be uncooperative, failing to disclose her new address, and became angry at the interpreter and the social worker, claiming she was going to get her lawyer or sue the social worker. Mother repeatedly arrived about 45 minutes late for visits and displaying rude, angry, and argumentative behavior toward the staff, social worker, interpreter, and foster mother. Moreover, she failed to show up for an August 2007 visit, and when she had telephone contact with the children, she allowed them to speak to some man, even after the foster mother informed Mother that that was not allowed. However, Mother demonstrated affection towards the children, bringing toys and snacks.
The social worker opined Mother had failed to benefit from family maintenance services due to her anger and distrust of the system. Mother’s therapist noted Mother had been “greatly affected by her son’s sexual abuse, and she has responded with frustration, anger, anxiety, depression, fear and excessive worry. She is very fearful and does not trust the system.” The therapist further reported that “[t]herapy has focused on anger resolution, improving communication and coping skills, problem solving issues, parenting training and the importance of cooperating with the school district and child protective services.”
On July 3, 2007, Mother filed a petition for an emergency hearing, correction and clarification of detention report, and numerous supporting documents, essentially alleging that the children were being harmed in their foster home and that T.O. had been injured and requesting that the children be transferred to another home. In her petition for correction and clarification of detention report, Mother explained the programs she had completed and noted all the instances in which the detention report was false and how the social worker had intimidated her and misrepresented things in the report. At one point, Mother alleged that the social worker, Catherine Shorter, “initiated, instigated and set up” her arrest. (Underscoring omitted.) Mother also accused the school district of sexual harassment and sexual discrimination and claimed false accusations were made concerning her son’s genitals being exposed.
At a hearing on July 5, 2007, the court ordered DPSS to investigate the children’s care and treatment at the foster home as well as T.O.’s injury.
On July 5, 2007, Mother filed additional documents, which appeared to essentially be the same as the ones previously filed. Mother again filed additional documents in support of her petitions on July 23, 2007.
On July 27, 2007, the social worker received a voice mail message from F.R.’s father, who said, “[Mother] tried to make a deal with me saying she would remove the child support claim and asked me to just give the money to her. She also asked me to hire a lawyer so that I could get the children from . . . and then give them to her . . . [.] I am concerned about what is going on with the children.” He further stated that he was “tired” of Mother and that he “did not want anything to do with her” and “wished that she would stop bothering him.” Mother also had “negative interactions” with F.R.’s therapist, to the point where the therapist was reluctant to provide services to the child.
DPSS’s thorough investigation of the foster home revealed that T.O. was injured accidentally. Both children denied any abuse occurring in the home of the foster parent. It was noted that T.O. received immediate attention when she fell, having been taken to the doctor.
As of July 20, 2007, the children had been moved to another Spanish-speaking foster home (a home requested by Mother), and a Spanish-speaking social worker had been assigned to Mother’s case. In August 2007, the new social worker, SW Alison Amaro, attempted to contact Mother several times. When SW Amaro eventually spoke with Mother, Mother refused to give her a contact number and stated the social worker could call her friend’s number. SW Amaro requested that they meet in person to establish a working relationship and to review the case plan. However, Mother refused to meet unless her attorney was present. Mother appeared angry, uncooperative, defensive, and argumentative toward SW Amaro.
SW Amaro attempted to meet Mother prior to her scheduled 5:00 p.m. visit on September 6, 2007. By 5:35 p.m. Mother still had not arrived, and the children and the foster mother, as well as SW Amaro, left. Mother eventually arrived at 5:40 p.m. and became angry and verbally abusive toward Foster Family Agency staff when she learned the children had been allowed to leave. SW Amaro attempted to speak with Mother again in October and November 2007, but Mother was uncooperative, hanging up the telephone at one point and refusing to provide DPSS with her current contact information.
On October 23, 2007, new counsel (Attorney Dennis Moore) was appointed for Mother at her request.
By December 2007, the children had been adjusting and developing well in the foster home of Mr. and Mrs. R. The foster parents had provided for the children’s emotional, financial, educational, and medical needs, and the children were thriving in the home.
Throughout this case, Mother had been provided with numerous referrals for parenting classes, general counseling, individual counseling, childcare services, classes to understand her son’s victimization, and bus passes. However, it appears Mother failed to obtain a stable home or employment, or benefit from the services provided.
The allegations in the supplemental petition were found true at the contested jurisdictional hearing on December 19, 2007. The children were declared dependents of the court and maintained in their foster home. Mother was provided with reunification services and ordered to continue to participate. The updated case plan required Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation, attend an anger management program, and obtain childcare. The court advised Mother at that time that her failure to cooperate in the case plan, except for good cause, might be used as evidence in any subsequent hearings.
By June 2008, Mother continued to be uncooperative with DPSS and SW Amaro. She had failed to maintain contact with DPSS; was unwilling to respond to telephone calls from SW Amaro; had changed her telephone number without notifying DPSS; and had failed to disclose her current circumstances, such as employment status, transportation, living condition, household changes, etc. She had failed to submit documentation of a psychological evaluation or complete anger management classes, despite being provided with referrals. Mother continued to insist that SW Amaro communicate with her only through her privately retained attorney, Mark Ellis (her third attorney in this case). Accordingly, SW Amaro provided Attorney Ellis with referrals for Mother.
In September 2008, Attorney Ellis filed a motion to withdraw as Mother’s counsel. The motion was granted, and Attorney David Goldstein was appointed -- Mother’s fourth counsel in this case.
Mother’s anger management counselor reported that it appeared Mother was not benefitting from the program. Subsequently, Mother harassed this counselor and threatened her if she did not recant her statements to DPSS. This counselor later called DPSS to report these incidents and to express concern for her safety. Mother appeared on September 3, 2008, while the counselor was with other clients, and cried and told the clients that the “Government” had paid the counselor off to take Mother’s children. Law enforcement was called. The incident left the other clients sad and frightened; the counselor began the process of filing a restraining order against Mother both in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties.
Additionally, Mother continued to act inappropriately during visitation, discussing the case with the children, becoming demanding and argumentative in front of the children, continuing to make disparaging remarks about the social worker and the system, and being uncooperative with the foster mother. She paid more attention to F.R. than to T.O. and failed to discourage F.R. from hitting and threatening his sister. During these incidents, T.O. turned to the foster mother for emotional support. Both children referred to Mr. and Mrs. R. as “mom and dad” and appeared to have suffered emotional distress when they were not allowed to go with the R.’s on a family vacation.
F.R. had shown behaviors causing great concern: He had hit his sister in the face with a Rosary bead; had drawn pictures of him killing his sister; had threatened to kill his sister with a gun; had threatened to kill a female classmate at school; had used a jump rope to tie a classmate to a pole to a point where the child suffered bleeding rope burns to his torso; and had simulated killing both T.O. and the foster parent’s biological son. F.R. was referred to a therapist and a pediatric neurologist. He was diagnosed with Aspergers Syndrome, attention deficit disorder, tic disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder. Medication was prescribed, and F.R. continued to be under medical care.
The foster mother was concerned with the children’s behavior after visits with Mother. For example, F.R. demonstrated increased aggression toward his sister following visits with his mother. T.O. had begun wetting and soiling herself after each visit with Mother; medical professionals opined it was due to psychological stress. By September 2008, T.O. reported that she did not want to attend visits with Mother.
On December 4, 2008, DPSS filed an ex parte application to suspend visitation, due to the children’s continual negative emotional reactions before and after their visitation with Mother. In a recent incident, on November 25, 2008, Mother acted inappropriately toward T.O. to the point that Mother was tightly grasping the child while the child cried and attempted to get free; she screamed, “That witch (CSSW Amaro) has no right to be here”; and she cursed at the staff in front of the children. Mother’s behavior scared the children, and they did not want to stay for the visit. T.O. later recounted the incident to the foster mother and stated that she never wanted to visit Mother again. Following that visit, F.R. behaved aggressively, spewing words Mother had yelled at staff during the visit. The court granted the request and suspended Mother’s visits with the children.
The contested section 366.22 hearing was held on December 16, 2008. Following admission of evidence and argument from counsel, the juvenile court found that it was not in the children’s best interest to continue services. The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Visits continued to be suspended for T.O.; however, the court ordered visits between F.R. and his maternal great-aunt. After two successful visits with the aunt, DPSS was to set up visits with Mother, the aunt, and F.R. The court also noted that if everything went well during those visits, similar visits would be set up with T.O.
II DISCUSSION
A. Social Worker’s Efforts in Facilitating Reunification
Without citation to any authority whatsoever, Mother claims SW Amaro’s efforts in facilitating reunification with Mother was deficient, as was her basic knowledge of the case.
“When an appellant [here petitioner] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Magan v. County of Kings (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 468, 477, fn. 4 [waiver resulting from failure to cite legal authority]; Akins v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1, 50 [waiver of contention by failure to cite any legal authority]; Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [where point is merely asserted by appellant without argument or authority, “it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by reviewing court”]; People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282-283 [contentions “bereft of factual underpinning, record references, argument and/or authority” deemed waived].)
We are not inclined to do the work of Mother’s counsel in locating the relevant legal authority: “If and when we are required to perform tasks which are properly those of appellants’ counsel, we necessarily relegate farther into the background appeals waiting their turn to be decided. It is unfair to litigants thus affected that we do this.” (Haynes v. Gwynn (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 149, 151.) Consequently, we treat these contentions as waived.
In any event, Mother’s contentions are without merit. The record overwhelmingly supports SW Amaro’s assertions that Mother was uncooperative and hostile, and there is no indication in the record to suggest that SW Amaro failed to facilitate reunification services for Mother or that her basic knowledge of the case was deficient. Following Mother’s statement that SW Amaro should contact her attorney, SW Amaro acceded to Mother’s wishes and gave Mother’s attorney the referrals. The record indicates the social worker made many attempts to work with Mother. However, cooperation was Mother’s responsibility. It was not the social worker’s duty to contact Mother’s attorney “to try to resolve the mother’s anxiety about meeting with the social worker,” as Mother suggests. The record overwhelmingly indicates that Mother could not cooperate with anyone in this case as evidenced by her uncooperative, argumentative, and angry behavior toward SW Shorter, SW Amaro, the interpreter, the police, the staff at the Family Agency Service, her therapist, her counselor, and the foster mother. As the juvenile court pointed out, “It’s symbolic of the entire case[;] Mother doesn’t cooperate with anybody.”
Mother’s claim that the social worker failed to “discuss the issue of relative placement with the children” is waived. “As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.]” (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590.) Here, Mother failed to raise any issue of relative placement, even though she was represented by counsel and was well versed in filing documents and petitions. Moreover, the children were placed with Mr. and Mrs. R at Mother’s request. She cannot now complain the social worker failed to facilitate relative placement.
In conclusion, we cannot agree with Mother’s implied assertion that the reunification services were inadequate. “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in the ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification services were provided. The reality is that Mother has not reunited with the children because her own bad choices have created roadblocks to reunification.
B. Suspension of Visitation
Mother also contends, again without any citation to authority, that the social worker’s efforts to suspend Mother’s visitation right before the contested review hearing “greatly prejudiced” her. (Capitalization omitted.) Despite Mother’s waiver of this issue for failing to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; Magan v. County of Kings, supra,105 Cal.App.4th at p. 477, fn. 4), Mother’s argument as a whole is without merit.
There is no indication in the record that Mother was prejudiced by the social worker’s efforts to suspend her visits with the children. In fact, as evidenced by the juvenile court’s findings and visitation order, there was no prejudice at all. The court stated, “. . . I am still going to try to find some way to salvage the mother and her relationship with the children, if I can.” Accordingly, the court set up visits with F.R. and his maternal aunt; if those visits went well, Mother would be allowed to attend those visits. In addition, if Mother acted appropriate and the visits went well, the court would establish similar visits with Mother and T.O.
We also reject Mother’s implied argument that the court erred in suspending the visits ex parte on December 4, 2008. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that visitation was detrimental. The social worker reported that the children manifested extreme emotional stress and aggression, especially F.R., before and after visits, and that T.O. expressed a desire to stop the visits. While we do not subscribe to the theory that visitation may be dictated by the children (see In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51), we do feel the child’s desires, in light of manifested anxiety and emotional trauma, can be a dominant factor. (See In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) In addition, Mother’s behavior at the last visit prior to suspension was out of control to the point T.O. was frightened. The record of the child’s fear of Mother establishes substantial evidence to support the detriment finding necessary to suspend visitation. (See In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581.)
III DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
We concur: GAUT J., KING J.