Hively v. Dept. of Employment Services

12 Citing cases

  1. Lincoln Hockey v. Dept. of Emp. Serv

    810 A.2d 862 (D.C. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    "However, `even where the words of a statute have a "superficial clarity," a review of the legislative history or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that could be ascribed to statutory language may reveal ambiguities that the court must resolve.'" Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C. 1996) (citation omitted). In that event, this court will "look to policy and the statute's `manifest purpose' in order to assist" in the interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.

  2. Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    123 A.3d 199 (D.C. 2015)

    Sullivan, supra note 12, 829 A.2d at 224 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C.1996) (emphasis added).Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

  3. Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    123 A.3d 199 (D.C. 2015)

    Sullivan, supra note 12, 829 A.2d at 224 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C.1996) (emphasis added).Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

  4. Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.

    123 A.3d 199 (D.C. 2015)

    Sullivan, supra note 12, 829 A.2d at 224 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1163 (D.C.1996) (emphasis added).Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

  5. National Geographic Society v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

    721 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1998)   Cited 16 times
    Rejecting claimant's reliance on the same report because the report "simply urges the retention of a provision of the law which authorized attorney's fees ‘where a claim is contested and not voluntarily paid by the employer and insurance carrier ....’ Nothing in the cited provision provides a persuasive reason for ignoring the plain language of [subsection] (b)."

    Brown argues that this court should give deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute it administers. See Lee v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 509 A.2d 100, 102 (D.C. 1986); Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1160-61 (D.C. 1996). We must decide whether DOES correctly interpreted § 36-330(b) as authorizing an award of attorney's fees and costs to Brown under these circumstances.

  6. In re K.G.

    178 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2018)   Cited 5 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that "proof that a juvenile has committed an offense with a firearm—a weapon that can cause direct, physical ‘significant harm’—is sufficient information to justify a presumption of detention," whereas in the absence of a firearm, "other case-specific information that similarly demonstrates that an individual juvenile ... presents a threat of direct, ‘significant’ harm to the person or property of others is necessary to satisfy the strictures of § 16-2310"

    Thus we look beyond the text of this phrase and place it in the context of the statute as a whole, its legislative history, and its animating purpose. SeeWashington v. District of Columbia, 137 A.3d 170, 174 (D.C. 2016) ("in expounding a statute, we must ... look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy"); District of Columbia v. Place , 892 A.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C. 2006) ("Statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."); Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 681 A.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C. 1996) ("Ambiguous [statutory] provisions are to be ‘construed with reference to the statute's manifest purpose.’ ").

  7. Artis v. Dist. of Columbia

    135 A.3d 334 (D.C. 2016)   Cited 5 times

    But, even if the words of a statute have “superficial clarity, a review of the legislative history or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that could be ascribed to statutory language may reveal ambiguities that the court must resolve.” Lincoln Hockey LLC v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 810 A.2d 862, 868 (D.C.2002) (citing Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C.1996) ); see also Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (if statute is ambiguous “our task is to search for an interpretation that makes sense of the statute and related laws as a whole[ ]”); Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006) (“A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”). B.

  8. Gause v. U.S.

    959 A.2d 671 (D.C. 2008)   Cited 4 times

    District of Columbia v. Tarlosky, 675 A.2d 77, 80-81 (D.C. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lanier v. District of Columbia, 871 F.Supp. 20, 24 (D.D.C. 1994)). See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Craig, 930 A.2d 946, 953 n. 7 (D.C. 2007) (holding that this Court's prior decision interpreting and applying the federal Anti-Injunction Act were "persuasive when construing" the District's own similar statute despite lack in language uniformity between statutes); Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1162 (D.C. 1996) (holding that despite a change in the statutory language, where a District statute replaced the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the coverage area was not altered). Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the FJSSA, defendants have an "unqualified" right to "jury selection records."

  9. Burge v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp. Serv

    842 A.2d 661 (D.C. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    In claiming entitlement to benefits, Ms. Burge relies heavily on a letter from Dr. Edward Lewis, dated December 13, 2000, stating that her work-related injury had reached a point at which playing professional basketball was no longer an option for her. Even though this letter provides a diagnosis of Ms. Burge's condition that renders her incapable of playing professional basketball in the future, this court will nevertheless affirm the Director's decision so long as it is otherwise supported by substantial evidence. See Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 681 A.2d 1158, 1160-1161 (D.C. 1996) ("we sustain the agency decision even in cases in which other, contrary constructions may be equally as reasonable as the one adopted by the agency"). More importantly, Dr. Lewis' letter was written after Ms. Burge voluntarily chose to leave the game of basketball to pursue other interests. While its effect on these proceedings might (or might not) have been different if it had been written earlier, it is clear from the record that during the period between Ms. Burge's injury in August 1998 and Dr. Lewis' diagnosis in December 2000, Ms. Burge made decisions concerning her basketball career that were entirely independent of her injury. Dr. Lewis' letter cannot overcome that fact, nor can it retroactively alter or nullify the reasons for her decision to end her career in professional basketball.

  10. Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

    826 A.2d 310 (D.C. 2003)   Cited 13 times
    Noting that pollution exclusion is "replete with language used in environmental statutes and regulations" and finding "considerable support in reason and authority" for view that exclusion contains terms of art in environmental law

    " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 202 cmt. b. "Even though words seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the circumstances are disclosed." Id. at § 214 cmt. b. To paraphrase Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 681 A.2d 1158 (D.C. 1996), "even where the words of a [contract] have a 'superficial clarity,' a review of the . . . history [of the relevant provision] or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that could be ascribed to [contractual] language may reveal ambiguities that the court must resolve." Id. at 1161 (quoting Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C. 1983)).