Other states also follow the presumption disfavoring prejudice or bias on the part of the judge. See Pizzuto v. State, 10 P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000) ("[E]ven where a trial judge is exposed to prejudicial information, judges are usually presumed to be `capable of disregarding that which should be disregarded' in our judicial system."); Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) ("A judge is presumed by law to be unbiased and unprejudiced. A mere allegation of bias without a specific factual showing in support is insufficient to require disqualification."); State v. Lake, 98 Wn. App. 1020 (Wash.Ct.App. 1999) (prejudice is not presumed, and the party claiming bias or prejudice must support the claim with evidence of the judge's actual or potential bias).

"We have the plenary power to order a brief stricken from our files for the use of impertinent, intemperate, scandalous, or vituperative language on appeal impugning or disparaging this court, the trial court, or opposing counsel." Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 175-76 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (quoting Pitman v. Pitman, 717 N.E.2d 627, 634 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). While we choose not to strike Wilder's entire brief

There will be no reversal of a trial court discovery order without a showing of prejudice.Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 181 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Nat'l Eng'g & Contracting Co. v. C & P Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 676 N.E .2d 372, 375 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ). “Discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. It is within the discretion of the trial court to place bounds on the duration of discovery.” Smith v. Taulman, 20 N.E.3d 555, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (quoting Mut. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 659 N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans.

However, a judge is presumed by law to be unbiased and unprejudiced. To overcome this presumption, the party seeking to disqualify a judge must establish actual personal bias. Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).Although Mother did not appear at the evidentiary hearing on the termination petition, she was represented by counsel.

However, a judge is presumed by law to be unbiased and unprejudiced. To overcome this presumption, the party seeking to disqualify a judge must establish actual personal bias. Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Father was represented by counsel throughout the two-day hearing.

The first recusal motion also made allegations that the trial judge treated Clements, as a pro se litigant, differently from Albers, who was represented by counsel, as reflected in the manner in which it ruled on motions filed by Albers versus motions filed by Clements. Generally, however, adverse rulings are not enough to demonstrate judicial bias. Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). The trial judge's rulings in this matter do not demonstrate the existence of bias on his part.

Upon review of a judge's failure to recuse, we will assume that a judge would have complied with the obligation to recuse had there been any reasonable question concerning impartiality, unless we discern circumstances which support a contrary conclusion. Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Moore v. Liggins, 685 N.E.2d 57, 63 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)); see also Leisure v. Leisure, 589 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 605 N.E.2d 755 (Ind.1993). Ind. Trial Rule 79(C) governs the disqualification or recusal of a judge and provides:

In addition, the ruling is sustainable on grounds that Greenwell has not demonstrated the requisite prejudice. See Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("'[e]rroneously excluded evidence requires reversal only if the error relates to a material matter or substantially affects the rights of the parties'") (quoting Indianapolis Podiatry, P.C. v. Efroymson, 720 N.E.2d 376, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied)).

Despite the exclusion of the evidence based upon the Rape Shield Statute, we conclude that any error was harmless and did not affect Mother's substantial rights because the excluded testimony was cumulative of other admitted evidence.See, e.g., Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 180 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence was harmless because the excluded testimony was cumulative of other evidence). Although the State objected to some questions regarding S.L.'s prior miscarriage, her accusations against Lipscomb, and her sexual history, other evidence of these events was admitted during the factfinding hearing without objection. Evidence was admitted that S.L. was, at the time of the hearing, pregnant with her boyfriend's baby. S.L. testified that she had previously been pregnant.

Consequently, Illiana has not demonstrated that its substantial rights were prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion of Boilek's testimony. See, e.g., Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 180 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence was harmless because the excluded testimony was cumulative of other evidence). III.