Auth. of Hall County v. Shubert, 96 Ga. App. 222 ( 99 S.E.2d 708) (1957), and held that the phrase to "sue or be sued" in the hospital Authority Act, Code Ann. Ch. 99-15 (the predecessor to Code Ann. Ch. 88-18) subjected the hospital authority to suits for damages for personal injuries. In Hipp v. Hosp. Auth. of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174 ( 121 S.E.2d 273) (1961), the Court of Appeals reiterated that "... the issue is settled, and the defendant hospital authority is subject to suit just as any private corporation." Id. at 175.
Thus, the doctrine of charitable immunity would not extend to any negligence of the appellee hospital, assuming it qualifies as a charitable entity, in failing to provide a sufficient number of competent and adequately instructed employees for its staff. See Y.M.C.A., supra; Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 104 Ga. App. 174, 177 (2) ( 121 S.E.2d 273). Appellants averred, inter alia, in their complaint that appellee hospital "was at such time required to provide a staff adequately trained to exercise a reasonable degree of medical care and skill in the delivery of health care," that it "failed to provide staff who were qualified to adequately diagnose and to treat myocardial infarction," and that it "failed to properly refer [deceased] to a facility capable of handling acute myocardial infarctions at a proper time."
The court further held that Hall must yield to the Supreme Court's holding in Knowles. In Hipp v. Hospital Authority, 104 Ga. App. 174 ( 121 S.E.2d 273) (1961), the court was once again asked to consider the question of sovereign immunity for a hospital authority and held that the issue was considered to be settled as a hospital authority is subject to suit the same as any private corporation. In 1964, Code Chapter 99-15 was repealed and Chapter 88-18 was enacted to replace it. (Ga. L. 1964, p. 598.)
A reading of the cited cases suggests that the duty of care, as distinguished from ultimate liability for negligence, may arise from defendant's awareness of the opportunity for crime created by the circumstances of employment, even if defendant is actually unaware of the employee's criminal tendencies. See, e. g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 236 F.2d 673 (1956); Hipp v. Hospital Auth. of City of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961).
Abraham v. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 633, 446 P.2d 821 (1968); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382, 384-385 (1951); Stevens v. Lankard, 31 A.D.2d 602, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (1968), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 640, 254 N.E.2d 339 (1969).But cf. Hipp v. Hospital Authority of City of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273, 275 (1961). Furthermore, even where the employer knows of a criminal record and still hires the employee, this does not automatically make out a prima facie case of negligent hiring.
The acts of one or more persons are actionable negligence if it is shown that the defendant owes the plaintiff, as an individual or one of a class, a duty and such duty is breached. Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696; Bennett v. T. F. Distributing Co., 117 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59; Collins v. Arkansas Cement Co., 8 Cir., 453 F.2d 512; Gardner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So. 621; Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 98 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 236 F.2d 673; Nordman v. Natl. Hotel Co., 5 Cir., 425 F.2d 1103; Johnston Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409; Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 Cir., 243 F.2d 331; Hipp v. Hospital Authority of City of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273. An employer may become primarily liable for a personal assault by an employee upon another, if such employer has failed to exercise due care to avoid the selection or retention of such employee. Morris Hotel v. Henley, 145 Ala. 678, 40 So. 52; Honeycutt v. Pizitz, 235 Ala. 507, 187 So. 91; 34 A.L.R.2d 385 and later case cited at page 246 at Section 9; Jones v. Alden Mills, 150 Miss. 90, 116 So. 438. A hammer, when put to a tortious use, is a deadly weapon.
E.g., Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Freeman v. Bell, 366 So.2d 197 (La.App. 1978).E.g., Hipp v. Hospital Auth. of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961); Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979).E.g., Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Stevens v. Lankard, 31 A.D.2d 602, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1968).
" In support of this statement, Prosser cites the following cases: Hall v. Smathers, 240 N.Y. 486, 148 N.E. 654 (1925); Kendall v. Gore Properties, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 236 F.2d 673 (1956); Hipp v. Hospital Authority of City of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961); Georgia Bowling Enterprises v. Robbins, 103 Ga. App. 286, 119 S.E.2d 52 (1961); De la Bere v. Pearson, Ltd., 1 K.B. 280 (1908). In all these cases the injury occurred during the employer-employee relationship, except for the case of De la Bere v. Pearson, Ltd., supra, which involves a financial adviser who agreed to recommend a "good stockbroker" and thus assumed a duty to use due care.