Nevertheless, evidence of the mock drowning drill was admissable sub judice because defense counsel opened the door during cross-examination of the witness. As a general rule, a party may re-examine a witness about matters brought out on cross-examination. Noeling v. State, 40 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1949); Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977). Testimony is admissable on redirect examination which tends to qualify, limit, or explain testimony elicited on cross-examination. Thornes v. State, 485 So.2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 1986); Hinton, 347 So.2d at 1080.

Nor could counsel have objected to the State's questioning Officer Morgan about the knife on redirect examination as such questions are within the scope of cross examination. Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (citing Noeling v. State, 40 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1949)).The Court further finds Defendant cannot demonstrate sufficient prejudice.

Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding Smith's answer admissible to rebut an inference created by questioning on cross-examination. Tompkins; Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977). The defense called Smith's former probation officer in an attempt to impeach Smith's testimony and now argues that the trial court improperly limited this witness' testimony.

Generally, testimony is admissible on redirect which tends to qualify, explain, or limit cross-examination testimony. Tampa Electric Co. v. Charles, 69 Fla. 27, 67 So. 572 (1915); Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977). Moreover, defense counsel's question on cross-examination could have led the jury to infer that Lisa had never complained to her mother about Tompkins.

(a) Detective Borrego was properly allowed to testify on redirect examination as to the content of an anonymous tip because the defense counsel, on cross examination of this witness, initially established the existence and nature of this tip and, thus, "opened the door" to further inquiry into the nature of the tip. Indeed, defense counsel's cross examination of Detective Borrego virtually established that the tip had implicated the defendant and consequently the defendant cannot be heard to complain when the state clarified this matter on redirect examination. See Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987); Wright v. State, 582 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977). (b) Officer Odom was properly allowed to testify on rebuttal that Willie Young was a "dope dealer" and that Odom did not have a blind date with Young as the defendant had claimed during his trial testimony.

Since the appellant's questions established that Willie Burnett's statement was the basis for the appellant's arrest, the door was opened for the state's questions which clarified the testimony elicited by the appellant. Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1985); Adamson v. State, 569 So.2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

We find no error, except as to the enhancement of sentencing and affirm. Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1988); Goodwin v. State, 405 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1981); Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977); Section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985); Section 90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes (1985); Maggard v. State, 399 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059, 102 S.Ct. 610, 70 L.Ed.2d 598 (1981); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977). As to the enhancement of the second degree murder sentence to a life felony and the enhancement of the attempted second degree murder to first degree murder charge, the court erred under the reasoning found in Willingham v. State, 541 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) and therefore we affirm all the convictions and affirm the sentencing except as to the two convictions which were enhanced as indicated above, and return the matter to the trial court for resentencing as to the conviction for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder.

In short, "a conviction could have been had without the statement at issue." Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (1977). Morgan has not demonstrated reversible error.

On redirect examination a witness may provide testimony "which tends to qualify, limit or explain testimony elicited on cross-examination." Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1977). Since the prosecutor challenged Castillo's credibility by raising his prior conviction, the trial judge should have permitted Castillo to explain and limit the impact of the cross-examination by clarifying on redirect examination that he had only a single prior conviction.

A party may examine a witness on redirect to rebut, explain, qualify, or limit testimony elicited on cross examination. Hinton v. State, 347 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The fact that appellant made no mention of Andrew or Andrew's testimony during direct examination is not a proper basis for excluding the testimony on redirect because the prosecutor's specific reference to Andrew's version of the events opened the door to this line of questioning.