Opinion
CV-23-00482-TUC-JAS (MSA)
06-20-2024
Marcus Hinton, et al., Plaintiffs, v. County of Cochise, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Maria S. Aguilera, United States Magistrate Judge.
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Marcus, Vanessa, and Veronica Hinton sue Cochise County, the Cochise County Sheriff, several Sheriff's deputies, and the Cochise County Fire Chief (collectively, the County Defendants). They also sue their former landlords, Doni and William Maers. The County Defendants move to dismiss the complaint. For the following reasons, the Court will recommend that their motion be granted in part. The Court will also recommend that Plaintiffs' claims against the Maerses be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim.
These factual allegations are taken from the complaint. (Docs. 1, 1-1.)
On the night of November 17, 2021, the home Plaintiffs were renting mysteriously caught fire. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) The same night, Plaintiffs saw employees of the Cochise County Sheriff's Office walking through the premises, and “an unknown group of people vandalized [their] property, slaughtered [their] animals, stole multiple large item things from the property and more.” (Id.) An employee of the Sheriff's Office refused to allow Plaintiffs to file a report and told them that there would be no investigation. (Id.)
Plaintiff's offered a reward for information as to who had committed the crimes. (Id.) Within hours of posting the offer online, an employee of the Sheriff's Office contacted Plaintiffs and asked that they remove the posting. (Id.) The employee told Plaintiffs that the Sheriff's Office and other agencies had found the stolen property, and that Plaintiffs would need to pick it up at an address in Benson, Arizona. (Id.) The employee also stated that the Sheriff's Office had possibly identified a suspect. (Id.)
Plaintiffs met several Sheriff's deputies at the Benson address. (Id. at 2-3.) They expected the deputies to conduct a “raid” on the address, but the deputies informed them that no charges would be brought against the people who had stolen their property. (Id.) Plaintiffs noticed that the deputies were standing around with the thieves. (Id. at 3.) They called their attorney and tried to have him speak with the deputies, but the deputies refused. (Id.) The deputies told Plaintiffs to leave if they would not be taking their property. (Id.) Confused by the deputies' aggressive behavior, Plaintiffs left and returned home. (Id.)
Later, Plaintiffs locked the gate to their home and left the premises in a vehicle. (Id.) As they drove away, they noticed a “brigade” of vehicles with trailers driving toward their home. (Id.) The vehicles belonged to the Sheriff's Office and the people who had stolen their property. (Id.) Plaintiffs returned home and found that the Sheriff's deputies had cut their lock and entered buildings on the property. (Id.) Plaintiffs saw the deputies planting suspicious items around the property and loading Plaintiffs' personal items into vehicles. (Id.) They also saw that their animals had been tortured and killed. (Id.) The deputies told Plaintiffs to take whatever they could and leave, and that they were not allowed to return to Cochise County. (Id.) Since then, Plaintiffs have been homeless. (Id. at 3-4.)
In October 2023, Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint against more than 50 defendants. Remaining are the ten County Defendants and the Maerses. Before the Court is the County Defendants' motion to dismiss, which has been fully briefed. (Docs. 22, 41, 52.) Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' brief regarding the Court's notice that it was considering a sua sponte dismissal of the Maerses. (Doc. 88.)
Discussion
I. The Business-Entity Plaintiffs
The complaint includes Truly Organic and Great Day Transportation as Plaintiffs. (Doc. 1.) Both are limited liability companies. (Doc. 84.) As such, they can proceed in this case only if they are represented by counsel. Rowlandv. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993). On April 12, 2024, the Court gave both entities until May 27 to retain counsel or else be dismissed. (Doc. 85.) That deadline has passed without counsel having made an appearance on their behalf, so the Court will recommend that they be dismissed without prejudice.
II. The County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
The County Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on several grounds. They argue that the Cochise County Sheriff and Fire Chief are nonjural entities that cannot be sued; that Plaintiffs' state-law claims are barred under Arizona's notice-of-claim statute and statute of limitation; that Plaintiffs have failed to state a federal claim; that they are entitled to qualified immunity; and that they are not subject to punitive damages as to certain claims. Each point is taken in turn.
A. Nonjural Entities
“Governmental entities have no inherent power and possess only those powers and duties delegated to them by their enabling statutes. Thus, a governmental entity may be sued only if the legislature has so provided.” Braillardv. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2010) (citing Schwartz v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Ct., 925 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996)). A “nonjural” entity is one that has not been authorized to sue or be sued. McKee v. State, 388 P.3d 14, 21 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2016).
The County Defendants argue that the Cochise County Sheriff and Fire Chief are nonjural entities that must be dismissed. Their argument is unavailing. Courts have found that county sheriff's offices and city fire departments are nonjural entities. Braillard, 232 P.3d at 1269 (sheriff's office); Vicente v. City of Prescott, No. CV11-8204-PCT, 2012 WL 1438695, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2012) (fire department). Plaintiffs, however, did not sue a sheriff's office or a fire department; they sued the Sheriff and Fire Chief. (Doc. 1 at 1, 10, 31.) Under state law, county officers can be sued. See Sanchez v. Maricopa County, 541 P.3d 566, 571 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2023) (observing that “plaintiffs have sought relief for the tortious acts of a sheriff's deputies by suing the relevant sheriff' (footnote omitted)). As such, the Court rejects the County Defendants' argument.
The County Defendants assert that Cochise County does not have a Fire Chief. The Court need not address this issue, as it will recommend dismissing the Fire Chief based on Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim.
B. Notice of Claim
Under state law, a person who has a claim against a public entity or employee must file an administrative notice of claim “within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). When, as here, “a person asserts claims against a public entity and public employee, the person ‘must give notice of the claim to both the employee individually and to his employer.'” Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 160 P.3d 223, 230 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007) (quoting Crum v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Ct., 922 P.2d 316, 317 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996)). The notice must “contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity . . . or public employee to understand the basis on which liability is claimed” and “contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). “Arizona courts have consistently required strict compliance with . . . § 12-821.01.” Pinal County v. Fuller, 429 P.3d 570, 574 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2018). A notice that does not strictly comply with the statute “is barred and no action may be maintained thereon.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).
The County Defendants have shown that Plaintiffs did not strictly comply with § 12-821.01. They submit the sworn statement of the Interim Clerk of the Cochise County Board of Supervisors, who asserts that she is the only person authorized to accept service on Cochise County, and that there is no record that Plaintiffs ever served a notice regarding the issues raised in this lawsuit. (Doc. 22-2.) In response, Plaintiffs concede that they did not serve a notice of claim. However, for two reasons, they say that they were not required to. As discussed below, neither reason is persuasive.
Plaintiffs' first argument centers on when their claims accrued. A plaintiff must file a notice within 180 days after his claim accrues. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Under the statute, “a cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” Id. § 12-821.01(B). This provision is “construed in accordance with the common law discovery rule, which ‘provides that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury was caused by the defendant's [tortious] conduct.'” Little v. State, 240 P.3d 861, 864 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2010) (quoting Stulce v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1999)). Under the discovery rule, “the core question is whether a reasonable person would have been on notice to investigate.” Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 996 (Ariz. 2002).
Plaintiffs say that their claims have not yet accrued, as “[t]o current day [they] are unaware of [the] complete and present cause of action,” including “the cause of why [the County Defendants] conjured these acts.” However, the complaint makes clear that their claims accrued in November 2021. They knew then that they had been damaged, as their property had been stolen, their animals had been killed, and they had been banished from their home and Cochise County. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.) And they knew or reasonably should have known the cause of that damage, as it was the Sheriff's deputies who had refused to charge the thieves, assisted the thieves in taking additional property, and told them not to return. (Id. at 3.) At the least, these facts were sufficient to alert a reasonable person to investigate whether Cochise County and its employees were liable. See Humphrey v. State, 466 P.3d 368, 377 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2020) (stating that the discovery rule “does not permit plaintiffs to ignore their affirmative duty to ‘timely inquire whether any basis exists for legal action'” (quoting Walk, 44 P.3d at 997)). Thus, Plaintiffs' argument fails.
Plaintiffs' second argument is that the County Defendants stripped them of their constitutional rights, and “[i]n order for [them] to abide by strict compliances of filings defendants would have to have at minimum reinstated [their] constitutional rights.” They also say that Sheriff's deputies threatened them with criminal charges if they “continued questioning or submitted any documents legally.” However, Plaintiffs filed a complaint which, although far from a model of clarity, provides some factual basis for their claims and states the amount of their alleged damages. That is essentially what a notice of claim requires, so it is unclear why Plaintiffs could not have filed one before the deadline.
Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01. Therefore, the Court will recommend that their state-law claims against the County Defendants be dismissed.
Arizona's notice-of-claim statute does not bar Plaintiffs' federal claims. See Felder v. Casey,, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) (observing that a state cannot “place conditions on the vindication of a federal right”).
C. Statute of Limitation
Under state law, “[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12821. Accrual under § 12-821 occurs at the same time it does under § 12-821.01(B). Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 98 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007). This means that Plaintiffs' state-law claims accrued in November 2021, and that they had until November 2022 to file suit. They filed this lawsuit in October 2023, almost one year after the deadline. Therefore, the Court will recommend that their state-law claims be dismissed as time-barred.
Plaintiffs' federal claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. Bonelli v. Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2022). They are timely.
D. Failure to State a Claim
1. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the well-pleaded factual allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In determining whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim, the Court remains cognizant that it must “construe pro se complaints liberally, especially in civil rights cases.” Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014).
2. Analysis
At the outset, the Court observes that Plaintiffs' complaint does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [they are] entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Quite the opposite: most of the allegations in their 40-page, mostly single-spaced complaint are vague, confusing, inconsistent, or redundant. This makes judicial review exceedingly difficult. The Court assumes, based on the complaint's numerous references to “civil rights,” that Plaintiffs attempt to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With that understanding, each County Defendant is addressed in turn.
Cochise County.
As a municipality, Cochise County cannot be held liable “under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted by its employees or agents.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Cochise County can be held liable only for constitutional violations that result from “(1) official policies; (2) pervasive practices or customs; (3) failures to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) decisions or acts by policymakers.” Sabbe v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 84 F.4th 807, 829 (9th Cir. 2023) (citingMonell, 436 U.S. at 690-95). Here, Plaintiffs allege that various Cochise County employees engaged in wrongful conduct, but they do not allege that such conduct was the product of Cochise County's official policy or unofficial practice or custom. Nor do they allege facts indicating that Cochise County failed to adequately train, supervise, or discipline its employees, or that their injuries were the product of a decision by a Cochise County policymaker. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Cochise County.
Cochise County Sheriff and Cochise County Fire Chief.
A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because one of his subordinates inflicts a constitutional injury. Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022). A supervisor can be held liable “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018)). Here, the section of the complaint dedicated to the Cochise County Sheriff merely repeats the same allegations made against Cochise County. There are no allegations that the Sheriff personally had any involvement in Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Sheriff. As for the Cochise County Fire Chief (who does not even exist), Plaintiffs allege that he is liable “[i]f at any point he was knowledgeable of the transgressions of Cochise [C]ounty Sheriff and did nothing.” (Doc. 1 at 31.) Since there is no allegation of personal involvement, Plaintiffs also have failed to state a claim against the Fire Chief.
Veronica, Cochise County Internal Affairs.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Long, 442 F.3d at 1185). Plaintiffs allege that Veronica “[d]enied [them] the right to file” and “[b]erate[d] and dehumanized” them. (Doc. 1 at 22.) Many pages later, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he sheriff office was contacted and refused [Plaintiffs] the right to file a report and . . . told [Plaintiffs that the fire and theft of their property] would not be investigated.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) It is unclear whether Veronica is the person who refused to let Plaintiffs file a report. In any event, Plaintiffs do not explain, and the Court cannot discern, what federal constitutional right or law was violated when they were prevented from filing a police report. As for Veronica's allegedly abusive statements, “[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (alterations in original) (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Veronica.
Jane or John Doe, Cochise County Internal Affairs.
Plaintiffs allege that Doe “told [them that they] had to deal with the same ones who victimized [them].” (Doc. 1 at 24.) This vague allegation does not implicate a potential violation of the Constitution or a federal law. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Doe.
Jane Doe, Cochise County Dispatch Respondent.
Plaintiffs allege that Doe “[h]umiliated an[d] dehumaniz[ed]” them and “stated [they] had no rights” and that “the sheriffs didn't need a warrant.” (Doc. 1 at 28.) It is not clear what Doe did to humiliate and dehumanize Plaintiffs. Regardless, abusive statements are not actionable under § 1983. Oltarzewski, 830 F.2d at 139. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Doe.
Jane Doe, Female Officer in Video.
Plaintiffs allege that Doe was “knowledgeable of the transgressions of Cochise [C]ounty Sheriff and did nothing.” (Doc. 1 at 34.) Police officers can be held liable for not intervening “when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen,” but only if they had a “realistic opportunity” to do so. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000) (first quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994); and then quoting Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts indicating that Doe had a realistic opportunity to intercede in a specific violation of their federal rights. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Doe.
Deputy Curtis Watkins.
Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Watkins “[t]hreaten[ed], stat[ed].” (Doc. 1 at 26.) They do not specify what he threatened or stated or explain how his threat or statement violated their federal rights. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Deputy Watkins.
Operations Commander Robert Watkins.
Plaintiffs allege that OC Watkins “[s]tated [they] could not file a report unless it came through him” and “[s]tated [they] had no rights in Cochise [C]ounty.” (Doc. 1 at 28.) As alleged, OC Watkins allowed Plaintiffs to file a report. It is not clear how their federal rights were violated simply because they had to file their report through him. And while the alleged statement about Plaintiffs not having rights is reprehensible, it is not clear how that mere statement actually violated their rights. See Oltarzewski, 830 F.2d at 139.
Sergeant Tal Parker.
Plaintiffs allege that Sergeant Parker “[w]as the officer who threatened to arrest [them] because [they] demanded that whoever was in power of [their] items be arrested and charges filed.” (Doc. 1 at 29.) A mere “threat to do an act prohibited by the Constitution is [not the] equivalent to doing the act itself.” Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). As such, Sergeant Parker's threat is not actionable. See Hume v. Maynard, 108 F.3d 1385, 1997 WL 121201, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the defendant's threat to arrest the plaintiff's was not actionable under § 1983).
Plaintiffs also allege that Sergeant Parker “never let [them] identify [their] stolen possessions,” and that he later “put together a group of his deputies and friends [and] several trucks and trailers with the original thieves and took it all back to [their] property without [their] permission.” (Doc. 1 at 29.) They allege that Sergeant Parker “[c]ut a lock again and began planting evidence or destroying what was left.” (Id.) As to the alleged planting of evidence, while “there is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government,” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), Plaintiffs do not allege that they were subjected to criminal charges.
Liberally construed, these allegations might support an unreasonable-search claim. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2013) (holding that a search occurred when officers entered a home's curtilage “to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner”). However, Plaintiffs allege that the deputies stated they entered with the landlords' permission. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) This raises issues of consent and apparent authority. See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 306 (2014) (stating that consent searches are constitutionally permissible); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990) (stating that searches authorized by a person with apparent authority do not violate the Constitution). The complaint's lack of factual content makes it difficult to determine whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim despite these issues. In any event, the Court need not address this potential claim further, as it will be recommending that Plaintiffs be given leave to file a second amended complaint.
E. Qualified Immunity
“To be entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, an officer must show that the allegations in the complaint do not make out a violation of a constitutional right or that any such right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 765 (9th Cir. 2023). A complaint may be dismissed only if the Court “can determine, based on the complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies.” Id. (quoting Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2023)). “If the operative complaint ‘contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,' then plaintiffs are ‘entitled to go forward' with their claims.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., 968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Here, the Court is unable to “determine, based on the complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies.” Hampton, 83 F.4th at 765 (quoting Polanco, 76 F.4th at 925). This is due to the complaint's many deficiencies. The complaint is short on facts. Most of the facts it does contain are vague and confusing. Even the letter attached to the end of the complaint does not provide a complete and coherent narrative. In these circumstances, the Court cannot determine whether or not Plaintiffs have alleged the violation of a clearly established federal right. As discussed below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiffs be granted leave to file an amended complaint. Along with that, the Court will recommend deferring a ruling on the issue of qualified immunity. See Victoria v. City of San Diego, 326 F.Supp.3d 1003, 1019-20 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (deferring a ruling on qualified immunity until after the plaintiff filed a more detailed complaint); Lambertson v. Lewis, No. 12-cv-05122, 2014 WL 2110054, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (same).
F. Punitive Damages
The County Defendants interpret the complaint's excessively high damages request as seeking punitive damages, and they argue that such damages are unavailable as to certain claims. First, they argue that municipalities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 suits. They are correct. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Second, they argue that public entities and public employees are immune from punitive damages for state-law claims based on conduct taken in an official capacity. Again, they are correct. A.R.S. § 12-820.04. Therefore, the Court will recommend that Plaintiffs' request for such damages (to the extent they have made them) be stricken.
III. Sua Sponte Dismissal of the Maerses
A district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim, but it must first give notice that it intends to do so and provide the plaintiff an opportunity to respond in writing. Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs were given notice that the Court intended to recommend dismissal of the Maerses for failure to state a claim, as the complaint includes only one allegation against them, and that allegation does not suggest wrongdoing. (Doc. 87.) In response, Plaintiffs concede that they have not stated a claim. (Doc. 88.) Therefore, the Court will recommend that all claims against the Maerses be dismissed with leave to amend.
IV. Leave to Amend
“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). In this case, the complaint's primary defects are its lack of factual content, its vagueness, and its disorganization. In general, these types of defects can be corrected through amendment. As such, the Court will recommend that leave to amend be granted.
If the district court adopts the foregoing recommendations, then Plaintiffs' second amended complaint must comply with applicable pleading rules. As to formatting, the caption to their complaint (the squared-off part at the beginning of a court paper that states the names of the parties) must name all the defendants. See LRCiv 7.1(a)(3). If a person is not listed in the caption, the Court will presume that he or she is not a defendant. The complaint must be double-spaced. LRCiv 7.1(b)(1). The allegations must be stated “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). And the complaint's pages must be numbered. LRCiv 7.1(b)(1).
If Plaintiffs do not know the names of particular defendants, then they must name those defendants in the caption as “Unknown Party 1, Unknown Party 2,” and so on. Plaintiffs may include a relevant descriptor for each unknown party (e.g., “Unknown Party 1, Cochise County Sheriff's Deputy”).
As to content, the complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs' allegations must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). As this is a civil rights case, Plaintiffs' short, plain statements must tell the Court (1) the right they believe was violated, (2) the name of the defendant who violated that right, (3) exactly what that defendant did or failed to do, (4) how that defendant's action or inaction is connected to the violation of their rights, and (5) what specific injury they suffered because of that defendant's action or inaction. It is not proper to refer to all defendants generally. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Given the complaint's use of either the collective term ‘Defendants' or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.”).
As pro se litigants, Plaintiffs are entitled to some leeway. That said, their original complaint is woefully inadequate. “Prolix, confusing complaints such as the one[] plaintiffs filed in this case impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). If Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend, then they must make a sincere attempt to comply with the foregoing rules. If their second amended complaint is not a substantial improvement over the original complaint, then the Court may dismiss it for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and (d)-even if Plaintiffs are able to state a claim. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80 (affirming the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 even though the plaintiffs were able to state a claim).
Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiffs Truly Organic and Great Day Transportation should be dismissed for failure to obtain counsel. The Court also finds that the County Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part as follows: Plaintiffs' state-law claims should be dismissed with prejudice, their federal claims should be dismissed without prejudice, and certain requests for punitive damages should be stricken. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Maerses. Finally, the Court finds that leave to amend is proper.
Therefore, the Court recommends (1) that Plaintiffs Truly Organic and Great Day Transportation be dismissed without prejudice; (2) that the County Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 22) be granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above; (3) that Plaintiffs' claims against Doni Maers and William Maers be dismissed without prejudice; and (4) that Plaintiffs be given leave to file a second amended complaint.
This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The parties have 14 days to file specific written objections with the district court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The parties have 14 days to file responses to objections. Id. Objections and responses to objections may not exceed ten pages in length. LRCiv 7.2(e)(3). The parties may not file replies on objections absent the district court's permission. The failure to file timely objections may result in the waiver of de novo review. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).