Opinion
No. 715 C.D. 2012
11-07-2012
Denise Hinson, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Denise Hinson appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) dismissing her statutory appeal from a three-month suspension of the vehicle registration for a 1999 Plymouth sedan pursuant to Section 1786(d)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code), as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1). We affirm.
Section 1786(d)(1) provides that "[t]he Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter."
On September 16, 2011, Geico Indemnity Company (Geico) terminated Hinson's liability insurance for her sedan. By letter dated September 27, 2011, the Department of Transportation (Department) notified Hinson of the termination of her insurance and requested that she provide information regarding whether she had obtained insurance with a different carrier, obtained insurance within 30 days of the cancellation or if Geico had reinstated her policy. The Department did not receive a reply from Hinson. On November 13, 2011, the Department sent Hinson a letter notifying her that her vehicle's registration had been suspended for three months.
Hinson filed a timely appeal from the vehicle registration suspension. The trial court held a de novo hearing on March 20, 2012. At the hearing, the Department produced evidence, which was admitted without objection by the trial court, which showed that Hinson's sedan was required to be registered and that Geico electronically notified the Department of the cancellation of Hinson's policy. Hinson testified that her son had been paying for her insurance, but had failed to pay the premium because he had been laid off. She also testified that the insurance was reinstated on November 15, 2011, and that the car had not been driven during the two-month period that the insurance had lapsed.
The trial court dismissed Hinson's appeal on March 20, 2012. Hinson filed an appeal with this court. Hinson filed a 1925(b) statement in which she argued, inter alia, that the suspension should be rescinded because she needs her car for her ministry and the car was not operated during the coverage lapse. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion stating that the Department met its initial burden to prove that a lapse in financial responsibility occurred by showing that the law requires Hinson's sedan to be insured and by submitting into evidence Geico's electronic notice of cancellation. The trial court stated that Hinson acknowledged that her insurance had lapsed and failed to demonstrate that she fell under one of the statutory defenses under Section 1786(d)(2)(i-iii) of the Vehicle Code. The trial court concluded that it could not sustain Hinson's appeal based on the equitable consideration that Hinson needed the car for her ministry and the argument that the car was not operated during the two-month lapse.
The statutory defenses are that (1) the lapse in coverage was for less than 31 days and the vehicle was not operated during this period; (2) the owner was a member of the armed forces and coverage lapsed while the owner was on temporary, emergency duty and the vehicle was not operated during this period; and (3) the coverage was terminated or lapsed simultaneously with or subsequent to the expiration of a seasonal registration as provide in Section 1307(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1307(a)(1). --------
The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in rejecting Hinson's equitable arguments and in dismissing Hinson's statutory appeal. We note that the trial court, in considering such appeal, was limited to determining whether "the vehicle is registered or of a type required to be registered" and whether "there has been either notice to the department of a lapse, termination or cancellation in the financial responsibility coverage as required by law for that vehicle or that the owner, registrant or driver was requested to provide proof of financial responsibility to the department, a police officer or another driver and failed to do so." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(i) and (ii). The Vehicle Code further provides that "[n]otice to the department of the lapse, termination or cancellation or the failure to provide the requested proof of financial responsibility shall create a presumption that the vehicle lacked the requisite financial responsibility." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786 (d)(3)(ii). Such a "presumption may be overcome by producing clear and convincing evidence that the vehicle was insured at all relevant times." Id.
Here, the Department produced evidence that Geico terminated Hinson's insurance on September 16, 2011. Hinson acknowledged that she did not reacquire insurance until November 15, 2011. Thus, the trial court correctly determined the Department met its initial burden and that Hinson had not met her burden.
The trial court also properly rejected Hinson's arguments that the suspension should be rescinded on the grounds that she needs her car for her ministry and the car was not operated during the two-month lapse in coverage. As we have repeatedly stated, the statutory scheme is clear and simply does not allow the court to resort to equitable remedies as requested by Hinson. See Banks v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (stating that trial courts do not have the discretion to consider hardship or other equitable factors when deciding whether a suspension is mandated under Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of November, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge