Opinion
NO. 09-19-00343-CR
11-12-2020
AMANDA KALINA HINOJOSA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 18-08-10460-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Amanda Kalina Hinojosa for the first-degree felony offense of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)-(b). After she was admonished, Hinojosa entered an open plea of guilty, which the trial court accepted. Following a punishment hearing, the trial court found Hinojosa guilty and sentenced her to ten years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. Hinojosa timely appealed. In one issue, Hinojosa contends the trial court erred in assessing a $20 surety approval fee absent record evidence they released Hinojosa on personal bond. We affirm.
Background
The trial court filed a Criminal Bill of Costs totaling $319.00, which included a $20 assessment for a "Surety Bond Approval" fee. The record reflects that in August 2018, the trial court set ancillary bond conditions and that Hinojosa filed a motion to set bond, which the trial court reduced from the initial bond amount of $50,000 to $25,000. Hinojosa was subsequently released on bond, and during her release, repeatedly tested positive for drugs. In March 2019, trial court entered an order setting aside her bond and ordering the issuance of a capias for her arrest. Thereafter, Hinojosa again moved to set bond, which the trial court set at $50,000.
Hinojosa's mother testified at the punishment hearing regarding Hinojosa twice being released on bond. Hinojosa's mother explained that upon Hinojosa's first release from jail, Hinojosa moved back home with her. Her mother further confirmed the trial court revoked Hinojosa's bond, and she returned to jail. Hinojosa's mother testified she "left her there two months so she could learn her lesson[,]" before she bailed her out, and Hinojosa's grandmother paid the bond.
Standard of Review and Law
An appellant may challenge court costs for the first time on appeal. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Because most court costs are mandated by statute, we dispense with the need for an ordinary sufficiency review. See id. "[C]ourt costs are not part of the guilt or sentence of a criminal defendant" and do not have to be proven at trial. Id. at 390. Accordingly, we review an assessment of court costs on appeal to determine if there is a basis for the cost, not for the sufficiency of the trial evidence to prove each cost. See id.; see also Martinez v. State, 510 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
"An officer may not impose a cost for a service not performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.002. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.011 authorizes the imposition of multiple fees. See id. art. 102.011. One such fee authorized is "$10 for taking and approving a bond and, if necessary, returning the bond to the courthouse[.]" Id. art. 102.011(a)(5); see also Davis v. State, No. 03-16-00334-CR, 2017 WL 2333205, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (describing fees authorized by article 102.011).
Analysis
Hinojosa argues that the only allowable statutory fee pertaining to surety bond approval was Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 17.42, section 4(a). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art.17.42, § (4)(a). Hinojosa also asserts that absent evidence the court released her on a personal bond pursuant to article 17.42, the trial court erred in assessing the fee. We disagree. The provision she references pertains to a "personal bond office" and a "personal bond reimbursement fee" rather than a reimbursement fee for services of peace officers and specifically, "taking and approving a bond[.]" Compare id., with art. 102.011(a)(5).
As noted above, article 102.011(a)(5) expressly authorizes the imposition of such a fee. See id. art. 102.011(a)(5). Therefore, we must determine if there is a basis in the record supporting the fee's assessment not whether there is sufficient evidence. See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 390; Martinez, 510 S.W.3d at 208. The record reveals Hinojosa moved to set bond twice, which the trial court did, and Hinojosa was twice released on bond. The statute authorizes a $10 fee "for taking and approving bond[.]" Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011(a)(5). The record supports the assessment of a $10 "Surety Bond Approval" fee two times, totaling $20. See Martinez, 510 S.W.3d at 208-09 (explaining record support for five $50 charges for serving capias). We overrule Hinojosa's sole issue.
Conclusion
We hold the record provides a basis for assessing the $20 "Surety Bond Approval" fee listed in the itemized Bill of Costs. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice Submitted on October 14, 2020
Opinion Delivered November 12, 2020
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Johnson, JJ.