Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1915 (RWR).
March 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, is incarcerated at the Rivers Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina. He is serving a sentence for violating the conditions of his parole. Plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against employees of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency ("CSOSA"), Flonisha Merrit, Community Supervision Officer ("CSO"), Ronald Jackson, Supervising CSO, and Renee Barley, FOIA Officer for the CSOSA. ("Federal Defendants"). Plaintiff also named as defendants the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia and Gladys Herring ("DC Defendants"). The Federal Defendants filed notice of removal of the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446.
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Court concludes that the that the complaint fails to state a claim against the DC Defendants and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against the Federal Defendants, the motions to dismiss will be granted. Background
Plaintiff's claim arises from his parole revocation by the United States Parole Commission ("USPC"). On November 5, 1981, in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, plaintiff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 40 years and 33 months for murder in the second degree while armed, attempted robbery, assault and destruction of property. Complaint ("Compl."), Exhibit ("Ex.") D E. Plaintiff was released on parole on December 1, 1998. Id., Ex. E.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 12, 2004, while he was on parole, he was sentenced to six days in jail after being convicted of driving while intoxicated and driving without a permit. Compl., p. 2. He claims that upon his release he reported to CSO Merrit and Supervising CSO Jackson. Id. On June 3, 2004, plaintiff alleges he signed a contract with defendants Merrit and Jackson which provided that CSOSA would pay for plaintiff's 54 treatment sessions in the "Next Step" program. Id. On March 11, 2004, CSO Merrit recommended to the USPC that a parole violator warrant be issued against plaintiff based on incurring new criminal charges and testing positive numerous times for drug and alcohol use. Id., Ex. E. The USPC issued a parole violator warrant on June 7, 2004. Id., Ex. D.
Plaintiff claims that defendants Merrit and Jackson breached their contract with him regarding his treatment sessions by requesting the parole violator warrant. Compl., p. 3. Plaintiff contends his due process rights were violated because the Federal Defendants failed to inform the USPC of the treatment program contract. Id. at 4. He also contends that this material should have been provided to him pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request. Id. Plaintiff requests damages in the amount of $1 billion. Id. at 5.
Standard of Review
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to present a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Taylor v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). "Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Pitney Bowles v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F.Supp. 2d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1998). The Court is not limited to the allegations of the complaint to determine whether it has jurisdiction; rather, it may consider material outside of the complaint for this purpose. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Discussion
Plaintiff's claim involves the circumstances of his parole revocation in 2004 by the USPC. The parole officers named in the complaint are employed by the CSOSA, a law enforcement agency within the executive branch of the federal government. See D.C. Code § 24-133(a)(2001); see also In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 435 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 885 (2005). Although plaintiff names DC Defendants in his complaint, he has made no factual allegations against these defendants. Moreover, in August, 1998, parole authority over D.C. Code offenders was transferred from the D.C. Board of Parole to the Parole Commission. See D.C. Code § 24-1231 (2001); see also Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As such, the DC Defendants are not liable for actions taken during plaintiff's parole revocation.
Federal Defendants, among other grounds, contend that the complaint should be dismissed because a breach of contract claim seeking the amount of monetary relief requested by plaintiff must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The Tucker Act vests with the Court of Federal Claims original jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Federal district courts, in comparison, have concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions of this nature, as long as the claim does not exceed $10,000 in amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). "Absent other grounds for district court jurisdiction, a claim is subject to the Tucker Act and its jurisdictional consequences if, in whole or in part, it explicitly or `in essence' seeks more than $10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government." Kidwell v. Dep't of the Army, Bd. for Correction of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The Court's initial task is to review the complaint itself to determine whether a plaintiff seeks monetary relief. Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A plaintiff may not evade the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction by artfully pleading his case such that a demand for equitable relief disguises a claim for money. See Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284; Bublitz v. Brownlee, 309 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[D]istrict courts will not have jurisdiction where a plaintiff casts his complaint as seeking equitable relief merely as a pretext in an attempt to avoid the Court of Federal Claims' exclusive jurisdiction."). The Court may look to the substance of the complaint, not only to its form. Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 284. "If a court determines that the plain effect of a favorable judgment would be financial gain for the plaintiff, then the Tucker Act controls." Bliss v. England, 208 F.Supp.2d 2, 6 (D.D.C. 2002).
The claim in this case is clearly one based on breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that the parole officers violated an agreement that he had with them and the "Next Step" treatment program. Plaintiff does not seek equitable or declaratory relief. In fact, the complaint requests $1 billion in damages. Therefore, plaintiff's case must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.
Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the District of Columbia or its employees and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the Federal Defendants. Therefore, the motions to dismiss will be granted and the case dismissed. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Order.