The fact of marital domicile within the forum has been considered an important factor to consider in determining whether a forum state may reasonably exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary defendant. For example, in Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that in personam jurisdiction could be exercised over the nonresident husband in a divorce action which contained a prayer for the payment of alimony, costs and attorney fees because, inter alia, "the wife was effectively abandoned in Oklahoma and her right, if any, toalimony accrued at least in part in Oklahoma." 465 P.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
We are of the opinion that this section of the statute as authoritatively interpreted by Cresent Corporation v. Martin, 443 P.2d 111, 113 (Okl. 1968), clearly does require that the cause of action arise from activities within the state and affirm the judgment. Appellants meet the statutory "arising from" provision with the argument that since the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), does not prohibit Oklahoma courts from acquiring in personam jurisdiction in this type of case, and inasmuch as the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Vemco Plating, Inc. v. Denver Fire Clay Co., 496 P.2d 117, 119 (1972), and Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 462 (1970), has stated, as a general proposition, that § 1701.01 et seq., "was intended `to extend the jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts over nonresidents to the outer limits permitted by the' United States Constitution's due process requirements," we should conclude that the "arising from" requirement contained in the statute is obviated. Appellants' premise, though facially plausible, is based on a misconstruction or a misapprehension of both federal and state law.
In 1970 this court concluded that an Oklahoma court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a marital action where the record showed that the defendant had five contacts with the State of Oklahoma. Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Okla. 1970). However, it was not until 1978 in Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) that the United States Supreme Court applied a similar theory to a marital proceeding.
12 OS 1701.03. Notice by publication was authorized under 12 OS 170.1 and 170.6. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has consistently held that its long-arm statute extends the jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by due process requirements of the United States Constitution. Barnes v. Wilson, 580 P.2d 991 (Okla 1978); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48 (Okla 1976); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla 1970); and see Worldwide Volkswagen, supra, 444 US at 290. Thus, our analysis may focus solely on the constitutional questions presented.
"That the court erred in sustaining defendant's Motion to Vacate, based upon lack of jurisdiction to enter an in personum judgment." In Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970), it was held that "minimum contacts" existed so that the District Court could exercise in personam jurisdiction. The opinion contains the following:
Plaintiff relies on cases from other states holding parties liable for alimony where they were served beyond the borders of the forum state. Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal.App.2d 443, 14 Cal Rptr 417 (1961), cert denied 368 U.S. 985 (1962); Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971); Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert denied 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla 1970); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis. 2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970). Mizner and Soule involved application of California's long-arm statute conferring jurisdiction over a nonresident who was a resident at the time the cause of action arose.
We have found no Arizona authority in point. Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal.App.2d 443, 14 Cal.Rptr. 417 (1961), Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis.2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970), Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla.Sup. 1970), Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971). Appellant claims that the minimum contacts which enable Arizona to assert In personam jurisdiction over appellee are that before leaving Arizona he voted there, owned a home there, paid Arizona taxes, and held an Arizona driver's license.
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970). "In the case before us, the product being sold and distributed by the petitioners is by its very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma.
But see Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okl. 1965). Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 462 (Okl. 1970). The order of the trial court overruling Bardahl's objection to jurisdiction and denying its motion to quash is affirmed without prejudice to Bardahl's right to renew the objection at any proper subsequent stage of the proceedings in the case.
12 O.S. 1976 Supp., § 187 and 12 O.S. 1971, § 1701.03[ 12-1701.03].George v. Strick Corporation, 496 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1974); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okla. 1975); Vemco Plating, Inc. v. Denver Fire Clay Company, 496 P.2d 117 (Okla. 1972); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970). The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), provided guidance for establishing where, in a particular case, the "outer limits" of due process fall.