Berthoud, 57 Colo. at 378, 140 P. at 804. The decree was again before us in Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64 (1925), and both Home Supply and Berthoud were parties. This time, Berthoud contested the validity of the decree, arguing that the water court lacked the authority to decree any temporary amount of water or to fix any penalty or forfeiture for Berthoud's failure to build a pipeline. This court found against Berthoud and upheld the validity of the decree.

The court held that while the city had no authority to condemn property for use as a warehouse, and the entire proceedings and judgment therefore were void, still the court having jurisdicton over condemnation proceedings, plaintiff was estopped by his acquiescence, even though the judgment was void. ( Hinderlider v. Berthoud, 17 Colo. 504 [ 238 P. 64].) It is clear from the authorities that plaintiff in this case cannot recover the sums paid to the receiver for the reason that it procured his appointment and is therefore estopped to recover any sums paid to him.

We do not consider Morrison's contention that the School District's testimony in the unemployment compensation proceeding establishes "estoppel by judicial act." See Peters v. Peters, 82 Colo. 503, 261 P. 874, 876 (1927); Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64 (1925). That testimony is not part of the record in this case.

This doctrine has been applied to those seeking collaterally to attack decrees adjudicating water rights. Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64 (1925). Although it is generally held that the persons being estopped by his conduct must have been a party (or privy thereof) to the decree, the estoppel may be applied to third parties in a proper case.

This court has never recognized the right of parties to a water adjudication to complain of the results after the expiration of the statutory time for review, except on the ground of fraud. In Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 Pac. 64, it was said: "This court has a number of times held that after a period for review of an irrigation decree had expired and no appeal therefrom has been taken, a party thereto may not thereafter be heard to object to any of its provisions even on jurisdictional grounds and not at all except upon the ground of fraud." Defendants in the instant case as successors in interest to rights adjudicated in the decree cannot collaterally assail an adjudication which has been recognized for more than sixty years.

Appellant is estopped to assert the invalidity of the Federal Decree, for: One who recognizes a decree by participating in its benefit is estopped from denying its validity. Boulder Weld County Ditch Co. v. Lower Boulder Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 115, 43 P. 540; Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64. Appellant and his predecessors are guilty of laches and have waived any right to claim a change of condition.

So, in a situation such as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, the adjudication decree could not become final as to parties without notice who did not participate or accept its benefits or have knowledge of its rendition, as in the case before us, and, if it was not a final decree as to them, under the very terms of the statute it could not start the beginning of the period of limitation. We have no such situation shown here as in Boulder and Weld County Ditch Co. v. Lower Boulder Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 115, 43 Pac. 540, where the parties attacking the decree had participated in its benefits and accepted its fruits by using the water therein decreed to them, or as in Hinderlider, State Engineer v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 Pac. 64, where a party sought to accept the favorable provisions of a decree and at the same time nullify a forfeiture clause included without jurisdiction. We think defendants' answer was sufficient to constitute an actionable claim in response to plaintiff's prayer for an injunction.

Cases are cited in which the court, acting without jurisdiction, has rendered a decree adjudicating water rights, and one of the parties, after enjoying the benefits of such decree, seeks to avoid it. Hinderlider v. Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64; Boulder etc. County Ditch Company v. Lower Boulder Ditch Company, 22 Colo. 115, 43 P. 540.

See also Flint v. Powell, 10 Colo. App. 66, 50 P. 45; Lipe v. Fox, 21 Colo. 140, 40 P. 353; Goodknight Adm'r v. Harper, 70 Colo. 41, 43-45, 197 P. 237. Plaintiff in error having obtained a dismissal of the appeal on the strength of her proposition that the denial of revocation was not a final judgment and did not determine the heirship, and so having taken advantage of that proposition of law, she cannot now repudiate it and claim that the order was a final judgment. Hinderlider v. Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 512, 238 P. 64; Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 104, 239 P. 1023, 43 A.L.R. 547; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 15 Sup. Ct. 555, 39 L.Ed. 578; In re Maddison, (N. M.) 255 P. 630; 10 R.C.L. 698. But plaintiff in error says that the sufficiency of her plea of res adjudicata is admitted by filing a replication thereto.

Upon final hearing the trial court denied his motion and the plaintiff husband is here with this writ of error for review of its judgment. In a recent case, Hinderlider, et al. v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64, we reannounced the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that a party who procures or gives his consent to a decree, even though it be void as beyond the power of the court to pronounce, is estopped to question its validity. But if it be assumed for our present purpose, but not so deciding, that the plaintiff in error may have his contentions determined by a writ of error, and that this writ of error lies, we think the decree of the county court was right and should be affirmed for the following additional reasons.