Opinion
No. 77204-COA No. 77207-COA
06-26-2020
IN THE MATTER OF THE HILLYGUS FAMILY TRUST DATED AUGUST 17, 1993 ROGER HILLYGUS, Appellant, v. ROBIN RENAE RENWICK; AND KAYCEE ZUSMAN, Respondents. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF SUSAN HILLYGUS, A PROTECTED PERSON ROGER HILLYGUS, Appellant, v. ROBIN RENAE RENWICK; AND KAYCEE ZUSMAN, Respondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Roger Hillygus appeals from a district court order approving the second annual accounting and report of guardian in related trust and guardianship actions. Second Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Washoe County; Frances Doherty, Judge.
Roger is the former trustee of the Hillygus Family Trust and the former guardian of Susan Hillygus. At the time of the relevant proceedings below, respondents Robin Renae Renwick and Kaycee Zusman were the co-guardians of Susan, and Zusman was the trustee. Renwick and Zusman ultimately moved to deem Roger a vexatious litigant based upon his numerous, purportedly frivolous, and harassing filings. Zusman also filed the trustee and guardian's second annual accounting, second annual report of the guardian, and a request for professional fees. Roger opposed the motion and filed an objection to the accounting, report, and the request for fees. After a hearing on the matter, the court deemed Roger a vexatious litigant and provided a lengthy explanation of its reasoning. It further approved the second annual accounting, second annual report, and the request for professional fees. The order also provided notice that, since no stay had been entered on appeal in relation to a prior order allowing Susan's home to be sold, the home could be sold. Additionally, the order confirmed a successor co-guardian and trustee, replacing Zusman in these roles with Deborah S. Bowers and Lund Enterprises dba Fiduciary Services of Nevada. Roger moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and this appeal, which challenges multiple decisions by the district court, followed.
As an initial matter, Roger presents several challenges to the district court's jurisdiction to enter the orders at issue in these appeals. First, Roger asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders because his prior appeals in Docket Nos. 72175-COA and 72176-COA remained pending at the time these orders were entered. But while a perfected appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction as to issues that are pending on appeal, "the district court retains jurisdiction to enter orders on matters that are collateral to and independent from the appealed order, i.e., matters that in no way affect the appeal's merits." Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855, 138 P.3d 525, 529-30 (2006). And here, the district court orders at issue in these cases related to matters that did not affect the merits of the prior appeals. This includes the portion of one of the challenged orders that touches on the sale of Susan's residence. While this order noted that, since no stay had been entered, there was no prohibition on the sale of the home, the district court did not revisit the propriety of selling the residence, which was at issue in the prior appeals. Under these circumstances the pending appeals in Docket Nos. 72175-COA and 72176-COA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to enter the challenged orders.
To the extent Roger presents a similar challenge to the court's jurisdiction to enter certain orders, which appears to be based on a 2015 appeal he filed in Docket No. 69143, that argument likewise is without merit. Because the appeal in Docket No. 69143 was dismissed by the supreme court for lack of jurisdiction due to being premature, see In re Hillygus Family Tr. Dated Aug. 17, 1993, Docket No. 69143 (Order Dismissing Appeal, December 8, 2015), jurisdiction never vested in the appellate courts and the filing of the appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. See NRAP 4(a)(6) (stating that "[a] premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction").
Roger further argues that the district court judge did not have jurisdiction to enter the challenged orders because the case had been transferred to another department by way of an administrative order prior to these orders being entered. But a review of the administrative order shows that it provided some leeway for the various district court departments to coordinate on when the transfer would happen in certain situations. And with regard to the cases at issue here, the record indicates that the transfer of these matters did not happen until December 3, 2018, which was after the relevant orders were entered. Therefore, this argument lacks merit.
Turning to the merits of the challenged orders, Roger argues that allowing Susan's home to be sold violated the terms of the trust. But this court has already ruled on that issue and affirmed the district court's decision allowing the home to be sold. See In re Hillygus Family Tr. Dated Aug. 17, 1993, Docket Nos. 72175-COA and 72176-COA (Order of Affirmance, September 21, 2018). And the law of the case doctrine prevents that issue from being revisited. See Recontrust Co., N.A. v. Zhang, 130 Nev. 1. 7-8, 317 P.3d 814, 818 (2014) ("The law-of-the-case doctrine refers to a family of rules embodying the general concept that a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established as law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Roger likewise continues to challenge the placement of Susan in an Alzheimer's facility, but to the extent he challenges the original placement, that issue also cannot be revisited as it too was affirmed in the prior appeals. See In re Hillygus Family Tr. Dated Aug. 17, 1993, Docket Nos. 72175-COA and 72176-COA (Order of Affirmance, September 21, 2018); Recontrust Co., N.A., 130 Nev. at 7-8, 317 P.3d at 818. And to the extent Roger is challenging Susan's continued placement in the Alzheimer's facility, he fails to provide any cogent argument demonstrating that grounds existed to warrant the district court revisiting Susan's living arrangement. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider issues that are not supported by cogent argument). Further, Roger failed to request or provide a transcript of the hearing at which the continued placement was addressed and we therefore presume that the missing transcript supports the district court's decision. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (explaining that the appellant is responsible for preparing an adequate appellate record and that "[w]hen an appellant fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing [documents] support[] the district court's decision"). Therefore, Roger's challenge in this regard fails.
Roger also summarily raises issues with respect to the court's approval of Deborah S. Bowers and Lund Enterprises dba Fiduciary Services of Nevada as successor co-guardian and trustee, which he suggests took place in accordance with an allegedly improper sale of Zusman's business. But despite making these assertions, he fails to develop cogent arguments on these points. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. For example, Roger asserts that the sale resulted in Susan not having sufficient funds to pay for her care facility, but he has offered no explanation as to how the sale led to this result. And while he also contends that the sale needed to be approved by the court, he fails to point to any basis for imposing such a requirement. Moreover, to the extent these issues were addressed at the hearing at which the successor co-guardian and trustee was confirmed, Roger failed to request the transcript and thus we presume the transcript would support the district court's decision to approve the successor co-guardian and trustee. See Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135.
Finally, in his various appellate filings, Roger raises a number of other issues for which he failed to develop any cogent argument. Given the lack of cogent argument presented on these points, we decline to consider those issues. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.
Based on the foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
To the extent that Roger submitted documents for our review that either were not presented to the district court or were not part of the record at the time he appealed, we did not consider them as we cannot consider matters that do not properly appear in the record on appeal. See Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981).
/s/_________, C.J.
Gibbons
/s/_________, J.
Tao
/s/_________, J.
Bulla cc: Hon. Frances Doherty, District Judge, Family Court Division
Roger Hillygus
Todd L. Torvinen
Washoe District Court Clerk