The reasoning advanced by Petitioner is not persuasive in demonstrating conflict jurisdiction. However, having examined the decision below, we believe the District Court, insofar as it holds the judgment of December 18, 1968 was "final" under the definition of that term as set forth in Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 534, has erred in the application of the principle set forth in that case so as to generate a conflict of the type reviewable by this Court. See Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Company v. Pope, Fla. 1961, 127 So.2d 441.

Cf. Cone v. Benjamin, 142 Fla. 604, 195 So. 416 (1940). In Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1951), this Court explained: There are, however, exceptions to this general rule.

"The portion of the order which struck appellant-defendant's counterclaim with prejudice was final and appealable. Cf: Schwertfeger v. Constant, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 173; Leeward Hart Aeronautical Corp. v. South Central Airlines, Fla.App. 1966, 184 So.2d 454; and Hillsbow Plantation v. Plunkett, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 534. The general rule is that a judgment, order or degree to be appealable as final must dispose of all issues or causes in the case; but the rule is relaxed where the judgment, order or decree adjudicates a distinct and severable cause of action.

Section 59.02(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. "A judgment is `final' for the purposes of an appeal when it terminates a litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined." Hillsboro Plantation, Inc., v. Plunkett, Fla., 55 So.2d 534, 536. Manifestly, the order sought to be reviewed — even assuming such an order to be authorized under our practice — does not meet this test. The appellant argues, however, that even if the order is not a "final judgment," this court may treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari and proceed to a review of the order under the provisions of Section 59.45, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., that "If an appeal be improvidently taken where the remedy might have been more properly sought by certiorari, this alone shall not be a ground for dismissal; but the notice of appeal and the record thereon shall be regarded and acted on as a petition for certiorari duly presented to the supreme court."

(internal citations omitted)); id. at 414 (explaining that "a final judgment, order, or decree" of a court "is one that puts an end to the action or cause . . . determines the merits of the controversy or the rights of the parties and leaves nothing for future determination"); Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1951) ("A judgment is 'final' for the purposes of an appeal when it terminates a litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined."); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1952) ("We have held as a general proposition that when a final decree or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction becomes absolute it puts at rest and entombs in eternal quiescence every justiciable, as well as every actually adjudicated, issue.").

State v. White , 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160, 165 (1898) ; see alsoState Rd. Dep't v. Crill , 99 Fla. 1012, 128 So. 412, 414 (1930) (defining "a final judgment, order, or decree" as "one that puts an end to the action or cause and leaves nothing to be determined"). Put another way, an order cannot be "final or appealable unless it determines the merits of the controversy or the rights of the parties " conclusively. Id. (emphasis supplied); see alsoHillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett , 55 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1951) ("A judgment is ‘final’ for the purposes of an appeal when it terminates a litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but no enforce by execution what has been determined." (emphasis supplied)).

In our opinion, this was a final order; therefore, because it was not timely appealed, we are without jurisdiction to consider this point. See, e.g., Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952); and Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So.2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Appellant in his third point on appeal contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Jerold Feuer, attorney for the intervenor, and taxing the fees against him.

The question raised by appellee's motion is whether the "Final Judgment" in favor of Chief Pontiac in 1967 was a mere interlocutory order which may be considered upon appeal from the final judgment rendered on July 1, 1968, or whether it was in fact a final judgment rendered in November, 1967, requiring appellate review, if desired, at that time. In Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534, at page 535 (Fla. 1951), the Supreme Court of Florida speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts stated: "In courts of other jurisdictions, it appears to be generally held that, if a decree dismissing one or more of a larger number of defendants whose interests are not all connected with the others finally settles the cause as respects those defendants dismissed, such decree is final and appealable. Ghaster v. City of Fostoria, 115 Ohio St. 210, 152 N.E. 651, 46 A.L.R. 1439; Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 39 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 114 A.L.R. 726; and the cases cited in the annotation in 80 A.L.R. at page 1192 et seq."

In order to answer this question, it must be determined, under the facts of this case, whether the judgment herein was final as against Margaret Judah Rice. In Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1951), the Florida Supreme Court stated at page 536: "A judgment is `final' for the purposes of an appeal when it terminates a litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. * * *"

The order did not relate to venue or jurisdiction and therefore cannot be reviewed by interlocutory appeal. The portion of the order which struck appellant-defendant's counterclaim with prejudice was final and appealable. Cf: Schwertfeger v. Constant, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 173; Leeward Hart Aeronautical Corp. v. South Central Airlines, Fla.App. 1966, 184 So.2d 454; and Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, Fla. 1951, 55 So.2d 534. The general rule is that a judgment, order or decree to be appealable as final must dispose of all the issues or causes in the case; but the rule is relaxed where the judgment, order or decree adjudicates a distinct and severable cause of action. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 95 (1957).