The decretal language after paragraph 55 then echoes this key language of a money judgment: "IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Elizabeth A. Harshaw is hereby awarded a judgment in the sum of Four Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars & 00/100 ($435,000.00) in her favor and against the defendant." See Hilliard v. Jacobs , 916 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind. App. 2009) (holding that "any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due , whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment, is a ‘judgment for money’ " (emphasis in original)); United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ira , 577 N.E.2d 588, 593 (Ind. App. 1991) ("The key to a money judgment is the statement of an amount due. A money judgment must be certain and definite.

"IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Elizabeth A. Harshaw is hereby awarded a judgment in the sum of Four Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars & 00/100 ($435,000.00) in her favor and against the defendant." See Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind. App. 2009) (holding that "any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due, whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment, is a 'judgment for money'" (emphasis in original)); United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ira, 577 N.E.2d 588, 593 (Ind. App. 1991) ("The key to a money judgment is the statement of an amount due.

A ‘money judgment’ is "any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due , whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment." Hilliard v. Jacobs , 916 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. "The key to a money judgment is the statement of an amount due.

A judgment for money is "any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due , whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment." Hilliard v. Jacobs , 916 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis original). Prejudgment interest is awarded to fully compensate an injured party for the lost use of money.

[10] A money judgment is “any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due, whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment.” Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (emphasis removed), trans. denied.

No. 916 N.E.2d 689.March 4, 2010.

The order, which concluded that the parties had settled their dispute and enforced their settlement agreement, merely acknowledged and ratified the agreement and did not alter its terms. [10] In his motion for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and now on appeal, Hair relies on Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. In every case we considered in Hilliard , we looked to the nature of the underlying transaction to determine whether a particular court order was the legal equivalent of a money judgment.

We have held that any order that requires the payment of a sum of money and states the specific amount due, whether labeled as a mandate or a civil money judgment, is a "judgment for money." Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689, 695 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. Thus, the portion of the agreed judgment requiring Handshoe to pay a civil penalty constitutes a money judgment for which he cannot be found in contempt.

[5] Whatever can be said about the petition for judicial review called for in Indiana Code section 9–25–6–16, we know that it is not the agency-deferential review set forth in the AOPA. What is at issue here is essentially a question of statutory interpretation—whether the BMV has any discretion in deciding to suspend Gurtner's license. Such questions are purely of law and therefore reviewed de novo. Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689, 692–93 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied.

Our recitation of the underlying facts is substantially taken from the three prior Court of Appeals opinions spawned in this case. See Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied; Hilliard v. Jacobs, 874 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.Ct. App. 2007), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 287, 172 L.Ed.2d 150 (2008); Jacobs v. Hilliard, 829 N.E.2d 629 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), reh'g denied, trans.