However, a habeas petitioner "may not ... transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881, 118 S.Ct. 208, 139 L.Ed.2d 144 (1997) ; see also Carter v. Koenig, 2019 WL 6331375, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019) ("fact that Petitioner characterizes [ Section 1170.95 claims] claims as a violation of his federal constitutional rights is not sufficient, without more, to state a federal claim"), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6330638 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) ; accord Contreras v. Rackley, 2018 WL 1258234, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) (claim that petitioner was denied "due process" and "equal protection" by allegedly erroneous application of state sentencing law to find petitioner ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36, did not raise a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim); Hillard v. Kernan, 2017 WL 201612, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (same where petitioner alleged a "due process" violation for failure of state courts to give full consideration to petitioner's evidence, where the record was clear that the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36); Cooper v. Supreme Court of California, 2014 WL 198708, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014) (same for "due process" challenge to denial of Proposition 36 application); but see Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d at 846 n.2 (observing that due process challenge based on the denial of Proposition 36 resentencing without a hearing may be cognizable where the petitioner raises a question that is not yet clearly decided). The Clayton footnote provides: