As a general rule, an amendment which adds a new party will not be permitted once the limitation period has run; the purpose of the rule is to prevent prejudice to the added party. Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960). However, there is an exception in favor of relation back when the new party has actual knowledge of the claim and the old and new parties have a sufficient identity of interests that it can be assumed or proved relation back is not prejudicial.
In Washington, negligence claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2); Hill v. Withers, 55 Wash.2d 462, 464 (1960). By statute, this limitations period can be tolled for negligence claims involving allegations of childhood sexual abuse under certain circumstances:
This requirement stems from the historical view that the addition of a new party by amending the complaint constituted a new cause of action, so commencement of a "new" cause of action did not relate back to the filing of an earlier action. Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 467, 348 P.2d 218 (1960). ¶20 The only issue disputed here is the third condition — whether the delay was due to inexcusable neglect.
In both situations, there is often a second person either with the same or a similar name as the person sued or who does business under a name similar to that of the person sued, and, ordinarily, it is the rights of that second person that are at issue. See, for example, McSwain v. Tri-State Transportation, 301 Md. 363, 483 A.2d 43 (1984); Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Woodfin Equities Corp., 344 Md. 399, 687 A.2d 652 (1997); Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 320 A.2d 266 (1974); Abromatis v. Amos, 17 Md. 394, 96 A.2d 554 (1916); and W.U. Tel. Co. v. State, Use Nelson, 82 Md. 293, 33 A. 763 (1896), all involving misnomers in which we found no error either in allowing the plaintiff to amend a pleading to state the correct name of the defendant sued or treating a judgment entered as being against the intended defendant, and Hill v. Withers, 348 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1960), Enserch Corp. v. Parker, supra, 794 S.W.2d 2, and Leonard v. City of Streator, 447 N.E.2d 489 (Ill.App. 1983), involving mistaken identities, where the issue was whether the intended defendant — the second one sued — had sufficient connection with and knowledge of the action so as not to be prejudiced by being brought into it after limitations had run. In resolving whether to allow an amendment to rename the defendant sued or to add another party as a defendant, these cases often speak of who the "intended" defendant was, and Ms. Hagler has latched on to that language as support for her proposition that the action should be treated as against her son, rather than her husband.
Under the rule as it existed before 1966, a new and unrelated party could not be added after the statute of limitations had run. See Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960). Thus, the old rule was generally applied only to cases of mistaken capacity, misnomer or oversight.
In cases involving an amendment, made after the applicable limitation period has run, the general rule has developed that RPPP 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds a new party or parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings — whether plaintiff or defendant. Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960); 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 15.15, p. 1041. The clear reason for the rule is to prevent prejudice to the added party in exposing it to liability and thus giving the plaintiff a new cause of action after the running of the limitation period.
We think her plea of limitations is therefore good. Cf. Alexander v. Rose, 181 Md. 447. See also Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218, and the cases collected in 8 A.L.R.2d 6, 112, 120. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Although we have acknowledged that misnomers in the service of process can be corrected so long as notice has been given to the appropriate person, the circuit court may not enforce a judgment against a non-party. Id. (citing McSwain v. Tri-State Transportation, 301 Md. 363, 483 A.2d 43 (1984); Harford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Woodfin Equities Corp., 344 Md. 399 687 A.2d 652 (1997); Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15 320 A.2d 266 (1974); Abromatis v. Amos, 127 Md. 394 96 A. 554 (1916); W.U. Tel. Co. v. State, Use Nelson, 82 Md. 293 33 A. 763 (1896); Hill v. Withers, 348 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1960),Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2 (1990); Leonard v. City of Streator, 113 Ill. App.3d 404, 69 Ill. Dec. 272, 447 N.E.2d 489 (Ill.App. 1983)). PORTION OF ORDER DECLARING DR. ARTHUR KOBRINE RESPONSIBLE FOR REASONABLE EXPENSES FOR REMOVAL OF RIP-RAP REVERSED.
Nevertheless, we believe the analysis in Reichelt applies here. Seaport places principal reliance on Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960). However, as Orear notes, Hill is a prediscovery rule case; it is not a product liability case; and most importantly, the plaintiff in Hill knew or should have known the proper party to sue.
(Italics ours.) According to the North Street court, the emphasized portion of the rule was added in 1966, and prior to that time, the old rule was only applied to cases of mistaken capacity, misnomer or oversight, citing two Washington cases, Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960) and DeSantis v. Angelo Merlino Sons, Inc., 71 Wn.2d 222, 427 P.2d 728 (1967). Noting that the new version of CR 15(c) creates a more liberal rule for relating back of amendments, the North Street court held that the new rule "still does not permit joinder if the plaintiff's delay is due to inexcusable neglect."