We review a trial judge's decision to limit expert testimony that departs from deposition testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md.App. 472, 489, 760 A.2d 294 (2000). It is well established that a trial judge has the power to exclude trial testimony that constitutes a material departure from what an expert witness testified to at deposition.

Of particular relevance, Maryland courts have attempted to mitigate contributory negligence’s "harsh justice" by "adopt[ing] a very restrictive rule about taking cases from the jury in negligence actions." Hill v. Wilson , 134 Md.App. 472, 760 A.2d 294, 305 (2000) (cited favorably in Milliman, Inc. v. Md. State Retirement & Pension Sys. , 421 Md. 130, 25 A.3d 988, 1013 (2011) ) (citation omitted). Thus, "the issue of contributory negligence is a question for the jury where there is a conflict of evidence as to material facts relied on to establish contributory negligence, or more than one inference may be reasonably drawn therefrom."

Whether this theory can prevail at trial remains to be seen; what matters here is that the issue turns on genuine disputes of fact that may not be resolved by summary judgment. Hill v. Wilson, 760 A.2d 294, 305 (Md. 2000) (explaining that even where the evidence of negligence is “slight,” so long as there is “any evidence” that is “legally sufficient” to support the claim, the issue must be left to the jury). Similarly, triable issues exist as to the injury and causation elements of Mr. Alcantar's claim.

, the issue must be “left to the jury.” Hill v. Wilson, 760 A.2d 294, 305 (Md. 2000) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).

We review a trial judge's decision to limit expert testimony that departs from deposition testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md. App. 472, 489 (2000). It is well established that a trial judge has the power to exclude trial testimony that constitutes a material departure from what an expert witness testified to at deposition.

The present case is wholly distinguishable, because as the Board opined, Milliman had numerous opportunities to detect and correct the coding error and also had a professional obligation to review and interpret the data provided by the System. More apt to our analysis is Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md.App. 472, 760 A.2d 294 (2000), in which our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals considered whether a patient was negligent in his claim against a physician, for the physician's alleged failure to properly diagnose and treat a serious infection. The physician contended that the patient was contributory negligent, because the patient was directed to return for treatment if his condition worsened and had failed to do so.

"A witness generally may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to the issues, and the witness's credibility is always relevant." Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md.App. 472, 480 (2000) (holding, in a medical malpractice action, that defendant-physician's statements in writings and lectures on risk management were relevant to impeach the physician's credibility).

Generally, a witness' credibility is always relevant. Smith v. State, 273 Md. 152, 157, 328 A.2d 274, 277 (1974); Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md. App. 472, 480, 760 A.2d 294, 298 (2000). We reiterated in Hill that "'any question which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by the witness in chief, or which tends to test his accuracy, memory, veracity, character, or credibility[ ]'" is proper.

Id. at 419, 959 A.2d 764. Excluding that kind of evidence "is a matter of basic fairness and of assuring that litigation is pursued in an efficient and professional manner." Id. Accord Hill v. Wilson, 134 Md.App. 472, 485, 760 A.2d 294 (2000) (It is "especially crucial" for the trial court to exclude evidence not disclosed by discovery when the disclosure is "`on the eve of trial . . . [where] the injury inherent in failure to make discovery is unfair surprise.'") (quoting Beck v. Beck, 112 Md.App. 197, 209, 684 A.2d 878 (1996)).

Plaintiffs rely on a separate line of cases holding that it is "not contributory negligence for a patient to follow a doctor's instructions or rely on the doctor's advice, to fail to consult another doctor . . . or to fail to diagnose her own illness." DiLeo v. Nugent, 592 A.2d 1126, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (citing Santoni v. Moodie, 452 A.2d 1223 (1982)); see also Hill v. Wilson, 760 A.2d 294, 307 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (affirming propriety of jury instruction that "reasonable and justified" reliance on a doctor's advice is not contributory negligence); Simmons v. Urquhart, 664 A.2d 27, 32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) ("[P]atients are entitled legally to rely on their physician's advice."). Even plaintiffs who "harbor[] suspicions about the efficacy of [their] treatment" remain entitled to rely on and follow their doctors' orders.