Opinion
2:24-cv-00571-JAD-MDC
10-30-2024
James E. Hill, Plaintiff v. Julie Williams, et al., Defendants
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND RESOLVING MOTIONS [ECF NOS. 3, 5, 6, 9]
State prisoner James Hill brings this pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when staff at High Desert State Prison (HDSP) were indifferent to his dental needs. Because Hill filed a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, I screen his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having done so, I find that Hill fails to state a colorable claim, so I dismiss his complaint with leave to file an amended complaint by August 22, 2024. I deny Hill's motion for appointment of counsel because he has not shown that exceptional circumstances exist here. I deny his motion for a preliminary injunction because that extraordinary relief is not merited. And I grant in part Hill's motion for clarification, explaining that he did not receive a response to his injunctive-relief motion because this action is still in the preliminary screening stage so the court did not order any party to file a response.
ECF No. 7.
ECF No. 6.
ECF No. 9.
Background
This is merely a summary of the allegations in the complaint and exhibits thereto, see ECF No. 1-1 at 2-13, and should not be construed as findings of fact.
While Hill was housed at Ely State Prison (ESP), he began the process of having all his teeth removed. After Hill was transferred to HDSP, he sent kites to dental on March 9, May 15, and June 17, 2022, to be seen for teeth pain. Prison staff responded to Hill's May 15, 2022, kite stating that he'd be scheduled to see a provider. But before he could be seen, Hill experienced extreme pain that made it difficult for him to do daily activities like eat, sleep, and exercise. So Hill extracted four of his teeth using a nail clipper. Hill extracted the last of these four teeth around July 6, 2022, which he reported to corrections officer Heidt.
Around July 11, 2022, Hill filed an informal grievance complaining that his kites to be seen for dental pain had not been answered, he was in extreme pain and had extracted teeth himself. The grievance appears to have been signed by “AW Williams” on August 15, 2022. In the grievance, Hill asked to have all his remaining teeth extracted in a single sitting, to be issued a full set of dentures, and to be placed on a liquid diet until the dentures arrived. Around September 6, 2022, C. Montgomery denied the grievance, explaining that the dental department received only one of the three kites that Hill claimed to have sent, but in any event, Hill had a dental appointment on July 27, 2022, during which three of his teeth were extracted. Because Hill has so few teeth remaining and no dentures, he cannot properly chew his food, which causes him severe gum and stomach pains and digestive issues.
B. Hill's causes of action
Based on these alleged events, Hill sues HDSP Associate Warden Julie Williams and grievance responder C. Montgomery. I liberally construe his complaint as bringing claims under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious dental needs. Hill seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2.
Id. at 4.
Discussion
A. Screening standard
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. All or part of the complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis in law or fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable, like claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest that clearly does not exist, as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations or fantastic or delusional scenarios.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
See id. at § 1915A(b)(1)(2).
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. 1915(e); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. In making this determination, the court takes all allegations of material fact as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,but a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996).
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Id.
B. Hill fails to state a colorable Eighth Amendment dental-indifference claim.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective standard-deliberate indifference.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (cleaned up).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014).
To establish the objective prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” “Serious medical needs can relate to physical, dental[,] and mental health.” To satisfy the deliberate-indifference prong, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury.
Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
Id. (cleaned up).
See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”).
Hill's complaint fails to state a colorable Eighth Amendment dental-indifference claim. Hill alleges that he was in the process of having all his teeth removed when he was transferred from ESP to HDSP. After Hill was transferred to HDSP, he sent three kites asking to see a provider about his teeth pain. Prison staff responded to the third kite, stating that Hill was scheduled to see a provider.
Hill saw a dentist on July 27, 2022, and had three teeth extracted. About two weeks before Hill's appointment with the dentist, he filed a grievance complaining that he had extreme teeth pain, had extracted four teeth himself, and needed the remaining teeth pulled and to be issued dentures and a liquid diet before he got the dentures. Julie Williams signed for receipt of Hill's grievance in her capacity as associate warden or grievance coordinator about one month after Hill submitted it. Around three weeks later, C. Montgomery denied the grievance, noting that Hill had an appointment with the dentist and had teeth extracted shortly after he filed the grievance. Hill alleges that because he has so few teeth and no dentures, he cannot properly chew his food, which causes him severe gum and stomach pains and digestive issues.
Generously construed, the complaint plausibly states that Hill has a serious need for medical care like having his remaining teeth extracted and being issued dentures and placed on a liquid diet until he receives dentures. So the complaint's allegations satisfy the first prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. But there are no factual allegations that either Montgomery or Williams is responsible for Hill's dental care. At best, the complaint states that Montgomery and Williams each knew from the grievance process that Hill received care from a dental provider shortly after he filed his grievance. But allegations that a prison official merely denied an administrative grievance typically fail to state a constitutional violation.
See Ramierz v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (reiterating that “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”).
Allegations that a grievance responder knew about an ongoing denial of recommended medical care and “failed to act to prevent further harm” may be enough to plausibly state that the deliberate-indifference prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis is satisfied. But Hill offers no factual allegations that Montgomery or Williams knew that he had an ongoing denial of dental care. And there are so few facts pled in the complaint that it is impossible to tell if any unidentified HDSP staff member is liable for delaying or denying Hill's dental care.
See Snow, 681 F.3d at 989 (finding evidence that warden and associate warden knew about ongoing denial of recommended hip surgery through grievance process and “failed to act to prevent further harm” sufficient to survive summary judgment).
For instance, there are no factual allegations that any other prison staff knew about Hill's dental condition, let alone knew that it negatively affects his ability to eat, and failed to act to prevent further harm. Hill does not allege that removing all his teeth and replacing them with dentures is a treatment plan that was ordered by a medical or dental provider. Hill pleads no facts about the appointment that he purportedly had with the dental provider in July 2022, like whether he asked that provider to remove all his teeth and issue him dentures and a liquid diet in the meantime. And Hill does not allege whether he appealed the denial of his informal grievance and, if so, what information he conveyed to the grievance responder.
The complaint fails to plausibly state that Montgomery, Williams, or any other prison staff was indifferent to Hill's need for dental care. This is Hill's first attempt to plead a dentalindifference claim, and it does not yet appear that he cannot state additional facts to state a colorable claim. So I dismiss Hill's dental-indifference claim without prejudice and with leave to amend it.
C. Leave to amend
Because it appears that Hill could cure the deficiencies of his Eighth Amendment dentalindifference claim, I grant him leave to file a first amended complaint to attempt to replead that claim. If Hill chooses to amend, he should plead true facts to show that any member of prison staff-even if he does not know their true name-was aware of his dental or digestive conditions and purposefully acted or failed to act in response to his need for dental care. If Hill chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint replaces the original complaint, so it must be complete in itself. This means that Hill's amended complaint must contain all claims, defendants, and factual allegations that he wishes to pursue in this lawsuit. Hill must file the amended complaint on this court's approved prisoner-civil-rights form, and it must be titled “First Amended Complaint.” He must follow the instructions on the form. He need not and should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each count, Hill should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate his civil rights. And he must file the amended complaint by August 22, 2024.
See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989).
D. Motion for appointment of counsel
A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights actions. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” But the court will appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional circumstances.” “When determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, a court must consider the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” “Neither of these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.”
Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981).
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. (cleaned up).
Id.
Like many inmate plaintiffs, Hill moves the court to find and appoint him a free attorney, arguing that the issues in this action are complex, and counsel will be better able to present his claims. Although Hill has not yet articulated a colorable claim for relief, the matters at issue here are not overly complex, and Hill has shown an ability to communicate the basis of his disputes to the court pro se. Moreover, I cannot conclude on this record that Hill is likely to succeed on the merits of any claim for relief. I do not find exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel in this action. The motion for appointment of counsel is therefore denied.
ECF No. 3.
E. Motion for a preliminary injunction
Hill moves for a preliminary injunction to “end his suffering” brought about by the denial of dental care. Restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of right.” The Supreme Court clarified the standard for this form of equitable relief in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., instructing that the plaintiff “must establish that [he or she] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [he or she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [his or her] favor, and that an injunction [or restraining order] is in the public interest.”
ECF No. 6.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
Id. at 20.
A plaintiff who seeks a mandatory injunction-one that goes beyond simply maintaining the status quo during litigation-bears a “doubly demanding” burden: “he must establish that the law and facts clearly favor his position, not simply that he is likely to succeed.” The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored” and “should not issue in doubtful cases.” Additionally under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, any restraining order or preliminary injunction granted with respect to prison conditions “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.”
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
Id. (cleaned up).
For injunctive relief to issue in any case, “there must be “a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” “This requires a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself.” The necessary nexus exists “where the preliminary injunction would grant ‘relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” “Absent that relationship or nexus, the district court lacks authority to grant the relief requested.”
Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
Id.
A prisoner seeking a remedy for unsafe conditions does not have to await a tragic event such as an actual assault before obtaining relief. But “[a]n inmate seeking an injunction on the ground that there is a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue must adequately plead such a violation.” And the inmate must demonstrate that prison officials are “knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they will continue to do so.” But the fact “[t]hat prison officials' current attitudes and conduct must be assessed in an action for injunctive relief does not mean, of course, that inmates are free to bypass adequate internal prison procedures and bring their health and safety concerns directly to the court.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845.
Id. at 845-46 (cleaned up).
Id. at 846.
Id. (cleaned up).
Because Hill has yet to plead a colorable claim for relief, this court lacks the authority to grant him injunctive relief like requiring prison officials to take certain action about his dental and related digestive conditions. But even if the lack of a viable claim was not an issue, I would deny his request for injunctive relief for three reasons. First, the motion does not analyze the standard for obtaining injunctive relief outlined above. Second, the motion is not properly supported. Third, although I do not take lightly accusations that prison staff have been indifferent to a prisoner's serious dental needs, there is no plausible allegation or evidence that prison officials are knowingly disregarding Hill's need for dental care. Hill's motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore denied.
ECF No. 6.
F. Motion for clarification
What remains is Hill's request for the court to clarify why he did not receive a response to his injunctive-relief motion. When Hill filed his injunctive-relief motion, docket text was automatically generated stating that a response was due by May 13, 2024. But no response was actually due because the court had not screened or docketed Hill's complaint, ordered that any defendant be served with a copy of the complaint and a summons, or ordered that any party respond to the injunctive-relief motion. As explained in the advisory letter that the court sent to Hill when he initiated this action, “The court will review your complaint before docketing and service of defendants.” Review means that the court will “screen” the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a colorable claim for relief or seek monetary damages from any defendant who is immune from that relief.“This process may take many months.” The letter reiterated that “the court will order service upon defendants when it is time to do so.” That time has not yet come.
ECF No. 9.
See ECF No. 6 (docket text).
ECF No. 2 at 1 (cleaned up).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
In summary, Hill did not receive a response to his injunctive-relief motion because the court did not order any party to file a response. Hill's motion for clarification is therefore granted in part.
ECF No. 9.
Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a decision on the May 3, 2024, application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7) is DEFERRED, and the April 23, 2024, application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is DENIED as incomplete and moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 6) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for clarification (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED IN PART as to clarifying that Hill did not receive a response to his injunctive- relief motion because the court had not ordered that any response be filed. This motion is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend to plead a more complete Eighth Amendment claim about dental indifference by August 22, 2024. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must use the approved form and will title it “First Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint will be screened in a separate screening order, and the screening process will take many months. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by August 22, 2024, this action will be subject to dismissal without prejudice for failing to state a claim and closure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to FILE the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and SEND plaintiff the approved form for filing a § 1983 prisoner complaint, instructions for the same, and a copy of his complaint (ECF No. 1-1).