Opinion
23A-MI-2318
06-14-2024
Asher Hill, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Frank Vanihel, et al., Appellees-Defendants
APPELLANT PRO SE Asher Hill Carlisle, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Monika Prekopa Talbot Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2207-MI-368 The Honorable Robert E. Hunley II, Judge
APPELLANT PRO SE Asher Hill Carlisle, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Monika Prekopa Talbot Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vaidik, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] After being pepper sprayed by a correctional officer, Department of Correction inmate Asher Hill sued the officer, the facility's warden, and an investigator. The trial court granted summary judgment for all three defendants, and Hill appeals. We affirm as to the warden and the investigator but reverse as to the correctional officer.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Hill is an inmate at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. One day in July 2021, he complained to Officer Mark Smith that a kosher meal he had received was missing boiled eggs. Officer Smith brought a second meal container to Hill's cell and unlocked and opened the cuff port on the cell door. Hill handed the original container to Officer Smith and took the second container but kept one arm hanging out of the cuff port. Hill then told Officer Smith that the replacement meal was also missing eggs. Officer Smith said Hill wasn't going to get another meal. Hill asked to speak with a sergeant, leaving his arm hanging out of the cuff port to keep Officer Smith from closing it. Officer Smith said he wasn't going to get a sergeant and ordered Hill to remove his arm from the cuff port. Hill refused and again asked to see a sergeant.
[¶3] After this had gone on for about thirty seconds, Officer Smith walked to a nearby set of steps and put down the original meal container. As he started walking back toward Hill's cell, he took his pepper spray from his belt. At that point, with Officer Smith a few feet away from the cell door, Hill pulled his arm back through the cuff port. Officer Smith took the last two to three steps to get to the cell door and then sprayed the pepper spray through the cuff port into the cell for a few seconds. Hill reached a hand through the cuff port and pulled the flap up, and Officer Smith sprayed more pepper spray. Hill released the flap and pulled his hand back into his cell. Officer Smith closed and locked the cuff port and walked away. This entire interaction was captured on surveillance video (without audio).
[¶4] Hill was given a decontamination shower twenty to twenty-five minutes after being sprayed. He declined medical care but claims he suffered injuries to his eyes, genitals, and legs.
[¶5] Hill filed a grievance against Officer Smith and asked for the incident to be investigated. A few weeks later, Investigator Randy VanVleet responded that the matter was under investigation. Hill filed a grievance appeal and was again informed that the matter was being investigated. When Hill requested a status update a few days later, Investigator VanVleet explained: "It was determined by the Administration the physical force was done properly therefore no investigation has been done." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. Hill filed a second-level appeal with the Department of Correction, which was denied. According to Hill, he spoke to Warden Frank Vanihel, and Warden Vanihel said he told Investigator VanVleet not to investigate the incident because he had heard that Hill threatened Officer Smith.
[¶6] Hill sued Officer Smith, Warden Vanihel, and Investigator VanVleet under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hill claimed that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Hill alleged that Officer Smith's use of pepper spray was "unnecessary" and "malicious" and that Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet improperly refused to investigate the incident. Id. at 39-44.
[¶7] The defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued: (1) Hill "refused orders" and Officer Smith "used a minimal amount of force to regain compliance," so there was no Eighth Amendment violation; (2) Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet were not personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation; (3) "refusal to investigate" is not a cognizable claim; and (4) all the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 62. The trial court agreed with all these arguments and granted the defendants' motion.
[¶8] Hill now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] Hill contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. We review a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). That is, "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Even when the facts relevant to an issue are undisputed, summary judgment is inappropriate if those facts support conflicting reasonable inferences. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009).
I. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Officer Smith
A. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Smith's use of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment
[¶10] Hill first argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Smith violated the Eighth Amendment by using pepper spray. "The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and manifests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the government's criminal-law function." Smith v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 987 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), reh'g denied, trans. denied. After incarceration, only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The test is "whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id.
[¶11] Based on the surveillance video, we must agree with Hill that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The video shows that Officer Smith was several feet away from Hill's cell door when he took his pepper spray from his belt, that Hill pulled his arm back through the cuff port as soon as Officer Smith did so, and that Officer Smith then took two to three steps-lasting one or two seconds- before spraying. A trier of fact might conclude that Officer Smith acted appropriately during this compressed sequence of events. But a trier of fact could also reasonably conclude that Officer Smith had sufficient time to process Hill's compliance (albeit belated) and nonetheless chose to use the pepper spray solely to punish Hill for his obstinate behavior. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Smith violated the Eighth Amendment.
B. The trial court erred by finding that Officer Smith is entitled to qualified immunity
[¶12] The trial court also concluded that, even if Officer Smith's use of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that a public official is immune from a suit alleging a constitutional violation if the right at issue was not "clearly established" at the time of the public official's conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). "Whether qualified immunity applies turns on two questions: first, whether the facts presented, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, describe a violation of a constitutional right; and second, whether the federal right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021). This standard dooms Officer Smith's claim of qualified immunity.
[¶13] It has long been clearly established that using force simply to punish an inmate-for the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"-violates the Eighth Amendment. Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 987; see also Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace or other chemical agents . . . for the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain"). And as discussed above, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hill leads to the conclusion that Officer Smith had no need to use pepper spray and did so only to punish Hill for his earlier misconduct. Therefore, while Officer Smith may ultimately persuade a trier of fact to reach a different conclusion, he isn't immune from suit.
[¶14] In ruling otherwise, the trial court found that "[c]losely analogous cases point to a lack of constitutional violation in this case." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. The court cited two Indiana federal district-court decisions: Taylor v. Butts, No. 2:18-cv-00370-JPH-DLP, 2020 WL 2539266 (S.D. Ind. May 19, 2020), and Gray v. Crittendon, No. 3:19-CV-579-JD, 2023 WL 3863437 (N.D. Ind. June 7, 2023). Both cases are distinguishable. In Taylor, an inmate was pepper sprayed because he "was ordered to release possession of his cuff port but did not" (the inmate later acknowledged that the use of pepper spray was "justifiable"). 2020 WL 2539266, *2. In Gray, an inmate "was refusing orders to submit to restraints," and a correctional officer used pepper spray "to overcome [the inmate's] resistance without having to resort to a cell extraction." 2023 WL 3863437, *3. In short, the inmates in both cases had not yet complied with orders when pepper spray was used. Here, again, Hill had already removed his arm from the cuff port when Officer Smith used pepper spray, and a reasonable trier of fact could find that Officer Smith used the spray solely as punishment.
[¶15] Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Smith violated the Eighth Amendment, and he is not entitled to qualified immunity, the trial court erred by granting him summary judgment.
II. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet
[¶16] Hill also contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet on his "refusal to investigate" claim. As an initial matter, we note there is evidence Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet did investigate Hill's complaint against Officer Smith, at least to some extent. But that was not the trial court's basis for granting summary judgment. Rather, the court ruled that even when prison officials fail to follow their own grievance or investigatory procedures, such failure generally doesn't violate the federal constitution and cannot be the basis for liability under § 1983. The court cited Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996), Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1992), and Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1982).
[¶17] Hill doesn't address that caselaw on appeal. Instead, he cites Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015), and Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996), where the Seventh Circuit explained that "a prison official's knowledge of prison conditions learned from an inmate's communications can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient knowledge of the conditions to require the officer to exercise his or her authority and to take the needed action to investigate and, if necessary, to rectify the offending condition." But that principle applies when an inmate complains about an ongoing constitutional violation. See Perez, 792 F.3d 768 (inmate complaining about lack of treatment for serious hand injury); Vance, 97 F.3d 987 (inmate complaining about lack of treatment for broken arm). Here, Hill did not complain to Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet about an ongoing "condition" that needed to be "rectified"; he asked them to investigate a past constitutional violation by Officer Smith. Therefore, the cases he relies on are irrelevant to this appeal, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment for Warden Vanihel and Investigator VanVleet.
[¶18] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.