Opinion
NO. 14-17-00061-CV
01-04-2018
KEITH M. HILL, Appellant v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellees
On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 16-CV-0418
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this unemployment-benefits dispute, the trial court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds a lawsuit filed by appellant Keith M. Hill. A former Clear Creek Independent School District ("CCISD") employee, Hill challenged the Texas Workforce Commission's denial of unemployment benefits. Hill asserts on appeal the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Workforce Commission ("TWC") and CCISD. In two issues, Hill contends that (1) TWC's alleged delay in mailing its final decision denying him benefits extended the time for him to seek judicial review, rendering his petition timely filed or, alternatively, (2) the filing date of his petition "is subject to equitable tolling" because of the "inconsistent" positions taken by TWC.
Because we conclude that Hill's petition was not timely filed and equitable tolling did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court, we affirm the trial court's dismissal order.
Background
Hill filed a claim for unemployment benefits with TWC after he resigned from CCISD. After investigating his claim, TWC determined that Hill was disqualified from receiving benefits. TWC affirmed this decision through its administrative process. TWC mailed its final decision to Hill on March 7, 2016. TWC stamped the front of the decision with the mailing date and included a document detailing the relevant deadlines applicable to judicial review, should Hill desire to challenge the decision. Hill received the final decision on March 11, 2016.
See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 201.001-217.007.
Hill filed suit seeking judicial review of TWC's final decision on April 8, 2016. Hill served TWC via certified mail. Although the citation arrived at TWC, TWC personnel failed to route the petition to the proper TWC representatives for defense of the suit. Thus, neither TWC nor CCISD filed a responsive pleading to Hill's suit, and Hill moved for default judgment against them, which the trial court granted. When TWC discovered the default judgment, it filed a motion for new trial in October 2016. In October 2016, the trial court vacated the default judgment and granted a new trial.
CCISD filed its own motion for new trial and, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58, adopted TWC's motion.
Hill has not challenged on appeal the trial court's order setting aside the default judgment and granting a new trial.
TWC filed a plea to the jurisdiction. As grounds for its plea, TWC argued that Hill failed to timely file his petition by the statutory filing deadline of April 4, 2016, and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. Hill filed a response, asserting that TWC's "entire system of receiving and sending mail" had been called into question based on TWC's motion for new trial, in which TWC asserted that its staff failed to route Hill's petition to the proper agency personnel. Hill also urged that TWC was estopped from challenging his petition's timeliness because TWC had "consented to suit by not responding in a timely manner and allowing the suit to default."
CCISD adopted TWC's plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 58.
TWC replied to Hill's response, providing an affidavit from TWC program supervisor Mary Hernandez. Hernandez averred that she directly supervises and monitors the staff who prepare TWC decisions for mailing. She stated that "it is the normal procedure for the mailroom to mail the decision on the same day as the date stamped on the decision." Hernandez declared that, if a decision is not mailed on that date, the mailroom notifies her of any mailing delays, and that she had not been notified of any mail delays for decisions issued in March 2016.
The trial court heard the plea to the jurisdiction by submission in December 2016. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed Hill's case for want of jurisdiction. This appeal timely followed.
Standard of Review and Governing Law
When jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the legal question whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Workforce Comm'n v. Smith, No. 14-11-00003-CV, 2011 WL 4507077, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). A district court lacks jurisdiction to review a TWC decision when the plaintiff fails to file a petition during the legislatively mandated timeframe. See id. at *2 (citing Heart Hosp. IV, L.P. v. King, 116 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) and Kelley v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 01-05-001109-CV, 2006 WL 3804444, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034 ("Statutory prerequisites to suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity."); Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 511 (Tex. 2012) (same).
A party seeking judicial review of a TWC decision must file suit not later than fourteen days after the TWC decision becomes final. Tex. Lab. Code § 212.201(a). Absent exceptions not applicable in this case, a TWC decision becomes final fourteen days after the date the decision is mailed to the claimant. Tex. Lab. Code § 212.153 (stating that, unless TWC reopens the appeal or a party to the appeal files a written motion for rehearing, a TWC decision becomes final "14 days after the date the decision is mailed"); see also Smith, 2011 WL 4507077, at *1.
"Delay" in Mailing Final Decision
First, Hill claims that TWC's purported "delay" in mailing its final decision to him means that the time period for him to file a petition did not begin until March 11, making his petition timely. We disagree.
As the record reflects, the decision states on its face that TWC mailed the decision to Hill on March 7, 2016. Although Hill suggests that TWC mailed the decision after March 7, Hill offers no proof to support his contention. Hernandez's affidavit, discussed above, rebuts Hill's claim and Hill provided no controverting evidence, such as a post-marked envelope reflecting a mailing date other than the one appearing on the TWC decision. See, e.g., Smith, 2011 WL 4507077, at *1. Thus, the decision became final fourteen days later on March 21. Accordingly, Hill had an additional fourteen days—until April 4th—to file a petition in court seeking judicial review. See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 212.153. 212.201(a). Hill did not file suit until April 8th, which was outside the legislatively mandated timeframe. See Tex. Lab. Code § 212.201. A district court lacks jurisdiction to review a TWC decision when, as here, the plaintiff fails to file a petition during the legislatively mandated time period. See Smith, 2011 WL 4507077, at *2; Kelley, 2006 WL 3804444, at *2; Heart Hosp. IV, L.P., 116 S.W.3d at 835; see also Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034; Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 511.
Hill nonetheless maintains that, because he did not receive the decision until March 11, it became final fourteen days later, on March 25, and the deadline for filing his petition should be extended until fourteen days after that date, i.e., April 8. This assertion flies in the face of the statute's plain language providing that a TWC decision is final fourteen days after it is mailed, and a petition for judicial review must be filed not later than fourteen days after a TWC decision becomes final. See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 212.153, 212.201; see also Smith, 2011 WL 4507077, at *2; Kelley, 2006 WL 3804444, at *2; Heart Hosp. IV, L.P., 116 S.W.3d at 835.
Though parties should calculate the deadline for filing a district-court petition based on the date of mailing stated in the TWC decision, Hill's petition was untimely even if the decision were mailed after March 7, 2016. For Hill to have received the decision in Dickinson, Texas on March 11, as he alleges, the TWC must have mailed the decision in Austin, Texas, no later than March 10. If TWC mailed the decision on March 10, then it became final on March 24, and Hill's deadline to file suit was April 7. He did not file the lawsuit until April 8. Thus, even assuming TWC did not mail its decision to Hill until March 10, Hill filed his suit one day after the statutory deadline expired and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review TWC's decision. See Smith, 2011 WL 4507077, at *1-2 (holding that filing of suit one day past statutory deadline precluded judicial review of decision).
Because Hill's untimely petition failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court, the trial court properly granted TWC's plea to the jurisdiction. We overrule Hill's first issue.
Jurisdiction by Quasi-Estoppel
In his second issue, Hill relies on the equitable doctrine of quasi-estoppel to toll the filing date and confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. But a court cannot acquire subject matter jurisdiction through equitable doctrines such as estoppel or waiver when jurisdiction does not otherwise exist. Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293, 294 (Tex. 2001); see also In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that court-created equitable tolling may not apply when a statutory requirement is deemed jurisdictional); King v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 472 S.W.3d 848, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed, and cannot be waived or conferred by consent, waiver, estoppel, or agreement."); Heart Hosp. IV, L.P., 116 S.W.3d at 836 (explaining that neither statutory tolling under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.064 nor equitable tolling theory could cure a failure to comply with jurisdictional statutory prerequisites to filing suit under Tex. Lab. Code § 212.201).
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right that is inconsistent with a position previously taken by that party. Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Asgard Techs, LLC, 472 S.W.3d 50, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000)). This doctrine applies only when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to assert, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position to which the person earlier had acquiesced, or from which the person had accepted a benefit. Curry v. Pickett, No. 14-09-00188-CV, 2010 WL 3353952, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We overrule Hill's second issue.
Conclusion
Hill did not file his petition timely, so the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review TWC's decision. We overrule Hill's two issues and affirm the trial court's order dismissing Hill's suit.
/s/ Kevin Jewell
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jewell.