Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-CV-1172
10-25-2023
LEON T. HILL, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH SINAVAGE, et al., Defendants.
Mannion Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DARYL F. BLOOM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Factual Background
The pro se prisoner-plaintiff, Leon Hill, filed a complaint on July 14, 2023, asserting claims against the defendants-two Wilkes-Barre City police officers and a school bus driver-pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Along with his complaint, Hill filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). This motion was granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending a preliminary screening review by the magistrate judge. (Doc. 7). The case was then reassigned to the undersigned.
Hill's complaint alleges that on October 16, 2019, he was riding in an Uber to the store when the Uber was pulled over by police who conducted a traffic stop. (Doc. 1 at 4). He claims that Defendants Sinavage and Homza, two police officers with the city of Wilkes-Barre, approached the car and asked for his identification. (Id.). He then asserts that he was taken out of the Uber, handcuffed and placed inside of the police car. (Id.). While he was sitting in the police car, the car was hit by a school bus driven by Defendant Walkowiak. (Id.). Hill asserts that he was not wearing a seatbelt at the time, and that he suffered injuries to his left knee, back, and his neck as a result of the collision. (Id. at 5). After he received medical care, he was arrested and charged with a crime, which he claims he did not commit, and asserts that the officers wrongfully charged him with a crime to cover up for placing him in the police car without a seatbelt. (Id.).
On the basis of these averments, Hill sued the two officers- Sinavage and Homza, as well as the bus driver, Walkowiak, and requests monetary damages. (Doc. 1). While Hill generally asserts claims under § 1983, we read this complaint as attempting to assert false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Officers Sinavage and Homza. Additionally, as best we can discern, it appears that Hill may be endeavoring to assert a negligence claim against the bus driver. After a screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
Hill's complaint is fundamentally flawed in at least two ways. First, Hill's § 1983 false arrest claim is plainly barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Second, to the extent Hill is asserting false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against the defendants, Hill's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, to the extent Hill is asserting a negligence claim against the bus driver defendant, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
1. Hill's § 1983 False Arrest Claim is Time-Barred.
The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims mirror the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009). In Pennsylvania, this limitations period is two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. With respect to false arrest claims under § 1983, the Supreme Court has held that the limitations period begins to run “at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to the legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007).
Hill's complaint asserts that the incident underlying his claims occurred on October 16, 2019, when he was arrested by Officers Sinavage and Homza. However, Hill did not file the instant complaint until July 14, 2023, more than three years later, approximately 21 months after the limitations period. Accordingly, Hill's false arrest claim is plainly time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Hill fails to State a Claim for Fourth Amendment Violations.
Construing Hill's complaint as asserting a Fourth Amendment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, Hill has not sufficiently pleaded facts that would establish claims for either false arrest or malicious prosecution. Regarding a claim for false arrest, Hill must allege that he was arrested without probable cause. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).
Here, while Hill claims he was arrested for a crime he did not commit, it appears that Hill was charged with several crimes in connection with this incident. A search of the public docket reflects that Officer Sinavage filed charges against Hill by way of a criminal complaint on October 16, 2019, in Luzerne County for receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and false identification to law enforcement. See Commonwealth v. Leon Hill Jr., CP-40-CR-0004337-2019. The docket further reflects that Hill was found guilty by a jury of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and that he entered a guilty plea to the remaining charges. Id. Accordingly, Hill's claim that he was arrested without probable cause is belied by his criminal conviction and guilty plea to these charges. See Rosembert v. Borough of East Lansdowne, 14 F.Supp.3d 631, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding that probable cause was established by the plaintiff's guilty plea); Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (same).
We note that we are permitted to consider matters of public record when we review a complaint through the lens of a motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Similarly, to the extent Hill is pursuing a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, Hill must show, inter alia, that the underlying criminal case terminated in his favor. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim). However, Hill's guilty plea and conviction establishes just the opposite. Accordingly, Hill cannot bring a claim for malicious prosecution on these facts and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
3. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over any State Law Claims.
Finally, to the extent Hill is asserting a negligence claim against Walkowiak, because we have concluded that the plaintiff's federal claims fail as a matter of law, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). We note for the plaintiff, however, that this would not hinder his ability to bring this claim in the proper state court if he chooses to do so.
While we recognize that Hill is a pro se litigant and generally would be entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint, see Fletcher Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), in our view this complaint is fundamentally flawed in several ways that cannot be cured by amendment. Accordingly, we recommend that Hill's complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.