Opinion
Civil Action No. 08 0091.
January 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner's application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner appears to challenge his conviction in and the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110, which in relevant part provides:
[An] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas corpus." Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992). It is settled that "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is `inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'" Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986). A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective. See Wilson v. Office of the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this date.