Opinion
No. 05-07-01420-CV
Opinion Filed March 18, 2009.
On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-04638-M.
Before Justices BRIDGES, RICHTER and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves a boundary line dispute between two adjoining homeowners, Hill and Hancock. After a non-jury trial, the judge decided there was no mutual mistake of fact and ordered Hill take nothing on her claims against Hancock. Hill's sole issue is whether the trial court erred when it found as to a boundary line agreement, there was no mutual mistake of fact. We conclude there is no reversible error and affirm the trail court's judgment.
Background
Since 1992, Hill has owned the house located at 321 Houston Street. In 2000, Hancock purchased the house next door at 325 Houston Street. After Hancock moved in, she obtained a survey indicating Hill's fence was actually on land she owned. Hill disputed Hancock's position and Hill's attorney sent Hancock a letter on September 19, 2001 demanding Hancock stop any efforts to assert control of the disputed area. Hill took no further action.
Hill acquired the house from her grandfather in 1992. She uses it as an income-producing property and lives elsewhere.
In 2004, Hill applied for a loan using the house at 321 Houston Street as collateral. In conjunction with the loan, another survey was completed which showed the legal descriptions in the deeds by which each homeowner obtained her house set the boundary between 321 Houston Street and 325 Houston Street at different spots. To clarify the description of its collateral, Hill's lender demanded a boundary line agreement ("Agreement") be executed by Hancock and Hill. Hill disagreed with the 2004 survey and knew prior owners had settled the dispute by moving the fence between the properties. However, Hill signed the Agreement "under duress" claiming "I was about to go under. I was about to lose my house." At trial, Hill admitted when she signed the Agreement, she didn't think the Agreement's legal descriptions were correct.
Hill testified the prior owners "tore [the then existing fence] down and put it on the boundary line."
Without notice, in January 2005, Hill and a notary public went to Hancock's house where Hill demanded Hancock sign the Agreement so Hill could get her loan. Hancock signed the Agreement and Hill got her money. Within months, on May 10, 2005, Hill filed this case raising a claim of trespass to try title and seeking rescission of the Agreement and reformation of deeds relating to transfers of the parcels at 321 and 325 Houston Street. After a non-jury trial, the judge concluded (1) Hill's claims for trespass to try title and reformation of deeds were barred by limitations, and (2) Hill was estopped from bringing her claim for rescission of the Agreement. The judge specifically found as to the Agreement, there was no mutual mistake of fact. Hill brings one issue on appeal: did the trial court err in finding that as to the Agreement, there was no mutual mistake of fact between Hill and Hancock.
Standard of Review
Findings of fact entered in a case tried to a court are of the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict on jury questions. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Ashcraft v. Lookadoo, 952 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied). We apply the same standards in reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's fact findings as we do when reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's answer to a jury question. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297. We indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the findings and judgment of the trial court, and no presumption will be indulged against the validity of the judgment. Vickery v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 252 (Tex.App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light favorable to the fact finding, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable persons could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable persons could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). To evaluate the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, we consider all the evidence and will set aside the finding only if the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
Discussion
Hill contends that but for a mutual mistake of fact that their parcels overlapped, Hill and Hancock would not have entered into the Agreement. Because of this mutual mistake, Hill now claims the Agreement should be rescinded. A actionable mutual mistake of fact occurs when (1) there is a mistake of fact; (2) held mutually by the parties; (3) which materially affects the agreed-on exchange. Bolle, Inc. v. Am. Greetings Corp., 109 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). In order for the doctrine to be used to avoid a contract, the parties must have acted under the same misunderstanding of a material fact. Newsom v. Starkey, 541 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson v. Conner, 260 S.W.3d 575, (Tex.App.-Tyler 2008, no pet.). Hill never thought the Agreement had correct legal descriptions and knew prior owners had agreed to move the fence so that it was on the correct boundary line. Despite her knowledge, she signed the Agreement and then convinced Hancock to sign. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we conclude the trial court's finding that there was no mutual mistake of fact as to the Agreement is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. We overrule Hill's issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.