Opinion
Rodrick Hill, Petitioner, Pro se, Blythe, CA.
A.M. Gonzales, Warden, Respondent: Steven G Warner, LEAD ATTORNEY, CAAG - Office of the Attorney General, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ROBERT N. BLOCK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Cormac J. Carney, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 194 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner is a California state prisoner, currently incarcerated at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison in Blythe, California. On July 2, 2014, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus herein, ostensibly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Petition purported to challenge the outcome of a prison disciplinary hearing held while petitioner was incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison (" ISP"), which resulted inter alia in the loss of behavioral credits. The operative petition is the Second Amended Petition (" SAP") filed by petitioner on September 5, 2014, along with a supporting memorandum (" SAP Mem.") and several attached exhibits.
On October 21, 2014, respondent filed an Answer to the SAP (" Ans.") with attached exhibits. Petitioner filed a Reply thereto on November 10, 2014. Thus, this matter now is ready for decision. For the reasons discussed hereafter, the Court recommends that the SAP be denied.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner's custodial status stems from a 2000 conviction for possession of a controlled substance sustained in Los Angeles County Superior Court for which petitioner received a three strikes sentence of 26 years to life. (See Ans. Exh. 2 at 4.)
On October 6, 2012, while housed at ISP, petitioner was charged in a Rules Violation Report with participation in a riot in violation of title 15, section 3005(d)(3) of the California Code of Regulations. (See SAP Exh. A at 1.) On October 20, 2012, petitioner appeared before a Senior Hearing Officer (" SHO") for a disciplinary proceeding and pleaded not guilty to the alleged rules violation. Petitioner did not request that any witnesses be present at the hearing. (See id. at 2.) After considering the available evidence, the SHO found petitioner guilty of the disciplinary charge and assessed him inter alia with a loss of 90 days of behavior credits. (See id. at 4.)
After exhausting his administrative remedies, petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty finding in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Riverside County Superior Court on February 20, 2014. (See Ans. Exh. 2.) On March 6, 2014, the Superior Court denied that petition utilizing a check-off form for the stated reason that the proper party had not been served. (See Ans. Exh. 3.) Petitioner then raised the same insufficiency of the evidence claim in a habeas petition filed in the California Court of Appeal that was summarily denied without comment or citation of authority on April 2, 2014. (See Ans. Exhs. 4 and 5.) Petitioner then raised the same insufficiency of the evidence claim in a petition filed in the California Supreme Court that was construed as a Petition for Review of the Court of Appeal decision and summarily denied without comment or citation of authority on May 14, 2014. (See Ans. Exhs. 6 and 7.)
PETITIONER'S SOLE CLAIM HEREIN
The sole ground for relief now being alleged by petitioner is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the hearing officer in finding petitioner guilty of the rules violation. (See SAP at ¶ 8.a and SAP Mem. at 1-8; see also Reply at 10-14.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (" AEDPA"):
" An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
Under the AEDPA, the " clearly established Federal law" that controls federal habeas review of state court decisions consists of holdings (as opposed to dicta) of Supreme Court decisions " as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006).
Although a particular state court decision may be both " contrary to" and " an unreasonable application of" controlling Supreme Court law, the two phrases have distinct meanings. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 413. A state court decision is " contrary to" clearly established federal law if the decision either applies a rule that contradicts the governing Supreme Court law, or reaches a result that differs from the result the Supreme Court reached on " materially indistinguishable" facts. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam); Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. When a state court decision adjudicating a claim is contrary to controlling Supreme Court law, the reviewing federal habeas court is " unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1)." See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. However, the state court need not cite or even be aware of the controlling Supreme Court cases, " so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." See Early, 537 U.S. at 8.
State court decisions that are not " contrary to" Supreme Court law may be set aside on federal habeas review only " if they are not merely erroneous, but 'an unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law, or based on 'an unreasonable determination of the facts.'" See Early, 537 U.S. at 11 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (emphasis added). A state-court decision that correctly identified the governing legal rule may be rejected if it unreasonably applied the rule to the facts of a particular case. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406-10, 413 (e.g., the rejected decision may state the Strickland standard correctly but apply it unreasonably); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-27, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam). However, to obtain federal habeas relief for such an " unreasonable application, " a petitioner must show that the state court's application of Supreme Court law was " objectively unreasonable." Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24-27; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. An " unreasonable application" is different from an erroneous or incorrect one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011), review of state court decisions under § 2254(d)(1) " is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits."
As the Supreme Court explained in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011):
" Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here [i.e., where there was no reasoned statecourt decision], could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court."
Furthermore, " [a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87.
Here, petitioner's insufficiency of the evidence claim was disposed of on the merits when the California Court of Appeal, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to Article 6, § 10 of the California Constitution, summarily denied petitioner's habeas petition raising that claim and the California Supreme Court then summarily denied petitioner's Petition for Review of the Court of Appeal's denial of his habeas petition. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-85 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the California Supreme Court's summary denial of his habeas petition did not constitute a decision " on the merits" for purposes of the AEDPA standard of review).
DISCUSSION
A. Governing law
The Supreme Court has held that " [p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
">In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when behavior credits are revoked, due process requires that the decision of the factfinder be supported by some evidence in the record. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the " Hill standard is minimally stringent." Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that, although it characterized the evidence in Hill as " meager, " the Supreme Court went on to find that the record was " not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary"). Ascertaining whether the " some evidence" standard is satisfied " does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence." See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. " The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached." See id. at 455-56.
B. Analysis
Here, the record reflects that the SHO's disciplinary decision was based primarily on the Rules Violation Report of Sergeant M. Smith. (See SAP Exh. A at 3-4.) Sergeant Smith wrote (see id. at 1):
On October 6, 2012, at approximately 1352 hours a racial riot occurred on Ironwood State Prison Facility B. The riot involved approximately 461 inmates of all races White, Black, Hispanic, and Others who were actively fighting amongst each other, resulting in the use of force in order to gain control. Inmates in multiple areas of the facility simultaneously were fighting. While working as the Facility B Yard Sergeant I OBSERVED YOU, INMATE HILL, E-83841, walk in from the southwest corner of the basketball court, in a northeasterly direction where you met an unidentified White inmate and began talking to him. After approximately two (2) minutes, the unidentified White inmate attempted to strike you in the head with his fist. You dodged the attempt and struck the inmate near the face and upper torso with your fist several times. Your actions caused a racial riot to ensue involving a tremendously large amount of inmates on the yard. The White and Hispanic inmates on the yard began fighting with all of Black inmates on the yard. A code 3 was initiated and staff used force options, to include OC grenades, direct fire foam rounds, wooden baton rounds and warning shot from the mini 14 rifle to quell this incident. Your actions of not complying with verbal orders or audible alarms indicate that you were participating in a disturbance by three or more persons, acting in a disruptive and tumultuous manner in carrying out your agenda to attack and/or harm inmates of different ethnicities .
Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of participation in a riot because the only act by petitioner observed by Sergeant Smith was petitioner protecting himself before the riot broke out. (See SAP Mem. at 3; see also Reply at 10-14.)
The Court disagrees. According to Sergeant Smith's report, subsequent to petitioner striking the White inmate and the ensuing start of the riot, petitioner failed to comply with verbal orders or audible alarms. From this statement, the SHO reasonably inferred that Sergeant Smith had identified petitioner as having been a participant in the riot. (See SAP Exh. A at 4.)
The Court finds that it would not have been objectively unreasonable for the California courts to conclude that the SHO was entitled to find the statements in Sergeant Smith's report credible and base the determination of guilt solely on those statements. Sergeant Smith's statements provided at least " meager" evidence that petitioner had participated in a riot. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456-57 (statement of officer involved and his written report constituted " some evidence" in prison disciplinary proceeding); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1989) (" The reporting officer's testimony constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilty.").
Indeed, as respondent points out, the Supreme Court held in Hill that the some evidence standard was satisfied where the evidence supporting the disciplinary charge was no more meager than the evidence upon which the SHO relied here. In Hill, three inmates had received disciplinary reports charging them with assaulting another inmate. The evidence presented to the disciplinary board consisted of testimony from a prison guard and his written report. The guard had heard a commotion and, upon investigating, had discovered an inmate who evidently had just been assaulted. The guard had seen the other three inmates jogging away together down the walkway. Although no other inmates were in the area, the victim had given statements that the other inmates had not caused his injuries. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 447-48. In concluding that the some evidence standard was met, the Supreme Court reasoned: " Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary." See id. at 457.
Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to meet his AEDPA burden of showing that the state courts' rejection of his claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty finding " was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement."
RECOMMENDATION
IT THEREFORE IS RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue an order (1) approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the SAP and dismissing this action with prejudice.