And Hill had filed two other similar lawsuits even before the 2020 suit. (See Compl., Smith v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-408 (S.D. Ohio July 2, 2008), Doc. 11; Compl, Hill v. Goering, No. 1:18-cv-522 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2018), Doc. 3). In short, instead of being “reasonably unaware” of the alleged selective enforcement, Sparks and Hill were aware enough to sue over it.

The principal question before us is the interpretation of the agreement and the construction to be given to it and the lease when both are construed together. Since the lease and the agreement were executed on the same day and both related to the same general subject, namely, the production by Dailey of oil from Joslin's land described in the lease, they must be construed together. (See, Towel v. Fluharty, 110 Kan. 260, 203 P. 703; Skinner v. Skinner, 126 Kan. 601, 270 P. 594, and Spikes v. Weller, 159 Kan. 597, 156 P.2d 540.) Upon the points first presented for our determination counsel for appellant cite Towel v. Fluharty, supra; Hill v. Goering, 132 Kan. 189, 294 P. 679; Spikes v. Weller, supra, and Franklin v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 138 Okla. 186, 280 P. 839. While these cases contain matters persuasive in appellant's behalf none of them has the specific question presented here. On this point counsel for appellees cite Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372, 198 P. 954. The detailed facts giving rise to that decision are not set out in the opinion.